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South Africa, in common with many other developing countries, embarked on an
import substitution policy to promote development and industrialisation. Although
initially successful, it was recognised in the late 1960s that the scope for further
import substitution was limited and that alternative development strategies should be
embarked upon. Unfortunately, the years of import substitution resulted in high levels
of protection and consequently an anti-export bias.
In 1972, under the leadership of Dr Reynders, a commission found that South Africa
should embark upon a policy of export promotion. In 1980 a new form of export
incentive was introduced, viz. Category A and B. Category A incentives were aimed at.
neutralising the effects of import substitution and compensated exporters fifty per cent
of the duty payable on inputs, regardless of whether the inputs were imported or not.
Category B incentives compensated exporters for the consequences of cost increasing
on non-intermediate inputs because of the import substitution policy and was
calculated on the value added. Exporters also enjoyed various grants and tax breaks to
enable them to undertake export marketing.
The schemes were unsuccessful and were replace by a General Export Incentive
Scheme (GElS) in 1990. The main aim of the GElS was to encourage the export of
manufactured products. With the means of an econometric model, the success of GElS
is evaluated on a sectoral basis.
GElS brought with it rent seeking, corruption, lobbying, and threats of countervailing
duties. In addition to the enormous costs, exceeding R6 billion, there were other
bureaucratic costs. In general, the GElS was not successful. The sectors that did
benefit from receiving GElS benefits were the tobacco industry, footwear, furniture,
metal products, and electrical machinery. In most cases, exporters would have
exported with or without GElS. GElS was simply a windfall. Policy-makers failed to
recognise the dynamics of exporting. GElS contributed neither to additional exports,
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"But no amount ofsupport from government can bring success unless businesses are ready to
show their worth on the highly competitive international markets that are now open to them."
Nelson Mandela (1994t Government however, has made significant financial contributions
to South Africa 's export drive since the early 1980s and especially with the introduction of
GElS in 1990. With more pressure on the fiscus, it is necessary to evaluate the impact and
success that the allocation of these scarce resources has had on the South African economy.
GElS can be termed a success only if it resulted in export growth, which in turn contributed to
economic growth and therefore satisfied more wants with finite resources.
The trade policy and development strategy debate has raged on for the past few decades and
has been the subject of many comprehensive empirical and analytical investigations. Though
the jury may still be out, it would seem that an outward-oriented strategy favouring export
promotion could be associated with higher growth economies. Since the end of World War Il,
many nations have embarked on import substitution policies , while others have been outward
in their approach to development and embraced export promotion strategies.
South Africa always has been and still is heavily dependent on foreign trade for its economic
development and growth. There has been a long history of import substitution development
with the strategy beginning in the 1920s. South Africa 's growth rate in general and in the
manufacturing sector in particular has deteriorated markedly since the 1970s. Although it is
generally accepted that the effective tariffs are too high and detrimental to an export-led
growth, the social costs of abolishing protection instantaneously (or even over a phased
period) can be high. Many governments, including the South African government, therefore
preferred the option of providing exporters with assistance that will enable them to compete in
world markets . At the same time the assistance can be set at levels that will entice businesses
to overcome their lack of export orientation and to become accustomed to international
competition.
It is generally acknowledged that any improvement in the economy will have to be preceded
by an improvement in the manufacturing sector. South Africa's failure to join the international
growth trend was largely self-inflicted, the result of disastrous political circumstances
I Nelson Mandela, November 1994, at the President' s Award for Export Achievement.
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(apartheid, and the conflict, isolation and sanctions it engendered, poor economic
management, too much dirigism and low domestic confidence). There were massive capital
outflows. The policies aimed at developing industries and later self-sufficiency, contributed to
an anti-export bias. Protection made sales in the domestic market more profitable than
exports. It also contributed to increased cost of inputs. These affected domestic producers and
exporters alike placing them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign exporters who
have access to inputs at world prices.
The anti-export bias is not the only problem faced by South African producers in foreign
markets. Apart from the adverse influences, mainly of a cost-increasing nature, exerted by
import substitution on exporters, manufacturers are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis transport,
distance from the major markets, deficient knowledge and experience in export marketing,
and lack of economies of scale. In a sense, the arguments for export development assistance
by governments are akin to those raised for protection against imports and embodied in the
infant industry argument for tariff protection.
Since the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Export Trade of South Africa in 1972
(Reynders Commission), the accent in South Africa has increasingly shifted to foreign trade
promotion activities, in the hope of accelerated growth in the manufacturing sector. This laid
the foundation for the institution of a system of export incentives, in the latter part of the
1970s and 1980s. The system of export incentives that became known as Categories A (input
compensation), B (added value), C (general), and D (tax concession in respect of marketing
expenditure), enabled some manufacturing industries to penetrate the export market
successfully. With the sanctions campaign during the 1980s, South Africa went through a
difficult period. The country was shaken by the suspension of loans in 1985 and subsequent
the debt standstill and the other problems that followed. Despite the sanctions campaign and
largely because of the debt crisis South Africa continued to expand its exports and was
successful in diversifying to markets that had not been served for a number of years.
By the late-1980s, in spite of switching the country's policies and strategies from the
protection of local industry and subsequently to the promotion of the exports of manufactured
goods, South Africa's manufacturing industry remained more geared to import replacement
than international marketing. The Board of Trade and Industry (RSA, 1986) calculated that
the average competitive disadvantage of South African manufacturing industry on the value
added component of the sales price was approximately 17 per cent in that year. Against this,
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the Board calculated the average rate of nominal export assistance for all sectors for the period
1982 - 1985 was approximately 7 per cent (RSA, 1986). Taking inflation and foreign
exchange effects into account, the Board concluded that the current average effective rate of
assistance on all exports was inadequate. The Board further concluded that selectivity
concerning export assistance was called for to ensure those available resources are applied to
the best advantage. It was believed that this should comprise measures aimed at the movement
of resources from lower to higher productivity uses to improve the country's international
competitiveness and thus economic development and growth.
Therefore, in 1990, the Government introduced a new scheme, the General Export Incentive
Scheme or GElS. The aim of the scheme was to encourage the export of manufactured
products rather than raw or semi-processed products. In 1992, it was estimated that South
African manufacturing costs were 15 per cent higher than the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) average. This was mainly because South African
manufacturing firms had to pay 24 per cent more for their inputs than their OECD
counterparts (Hatty and Lockwood, 1992).
1.1 The aim and purpose of this study
To determine the impact that GElS has had on the South African economy, it was necessary
firstly to examine the theoretical foundations of the various trade policy options and how they
impacted on the industrial policy and economic growth; secondly to study the evolution of
trade policy in South Africa with special reference to the government's export promotional
activities and instruments , and thirdly to quantitatively analyse the impact of GElS on South
Africa's level of exports.
1.2 Methodology and outline
This study employed various research methods and techniques. Literature, applicable
speeches, and official government documents were extensively consulted. In addition, trade
policy experts, individual exporters and manufacturers were interviewed. The main bulk of
the study however comprises sectoral analyses around which a trade model is built and
econometrically tested.
Chapter 2 looks at the trade policy debate including the present international trading
conditions under which trade policy must be formulated. The causes and benefits of
globalisation and liberalisation are analysed. The policies of import substitution and export
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promotion are compared and evaluated. Various international studies are examined and the
issue of causality of economic growth and export growth is considered.
In Chapter 3 the historic position of South Africa's trade and export promotion policies are
considered, briefly looking at the South African economy from 1652 until 1972 when the
Reynders Commission proposed a policy of export promotion. The pre-1990 export incentives
are described and evaluated, as is the South African and international economic conditions
leading to the 1990 export promotional incentives. Finally GElS, EMA, the sectoral support
schemes, and the other export support measures are discussed.
Chapter 4 discusses the rationale, definition, and impact of subsidies. Subsidies have played
an important role in South African industrial policy. This is compared to other countries and
the impact it has had on those economies. Negotiations, mainly under the auspices of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which have taken place since the end of
World War II, have contributed to the liberalisation of international trade. Although much of
this liberalisation focused on reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, there have been
restrictions regulating the extent to which governments were allowed to subsidise
manufacturing in general and exports in particular. Nevertheless, subsidies remain popular
policy instruments and are provided by most countries. The Uruguay Round of GATT nearly
floundered because of disagreements in the negotiations on agricultural subsidies. The rules
governing the use of subsidies had been formalised by the Uruguay Round of GATT and the
economic consequences of both domestic and export subsidies are discussed fully. For various
reasons, including the fact that it was not permissible in terms of the WTO rules, it has been
decided to eliminate GElS in 1997.
The question now arises, if the Categories A and B schemes were ineffective in promoting
export, what was the impact of the GElS? "As early as 1776, Adam Smith condemned export
bounties as another wasteful expedient of the mercantile system." (Hufbauer and Erb,
1984:45). To determine the impact that GElS has had on exports, it was necessary to build a
simple model and test the results empirically. Besides the level of the incentive, the level of
exports is influenced by a number of other factors such as foreign demand, export prices,
exchange rates, relative inflation rates and spare capacity. An empirical analysis of GElS and
export growth relationship is carried out in Chapter 5. Using econometric techniques, export
functions are determined for each of 26 manufacturing sectors. Will South Africa's efforts to
market manufactured goods internationally flounder if financial support from government
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should cease? What impact has GElS had on exporters and how it has contributed to the
export drive? An econometric model aggregated at the three-digit SIC level is developed and
tested to determine which factors influence South African exports and how effective GElS
was.
Chapter 6 contains the summary of the findings of this study and the conclusions that are
drawn. It also contains recommendations pertaining to future trade policy and export
promotion. Should government therefore rather concentrate on removing the obstacles and the
anti-export bias that exporters face or should government leave exporters "to show their worth
on the highly competitive international markets that are now open to them." 2
1.3 Conclusion
The mercantilists believed in promoting trade to create a trade surplus for its sake, holding the
view that the trade surplus would maximise national wealth. All too many people still
maintain this view, it is commonly considered patriotic to export and disloyal to import.
Governments promote exports for a variety of reasons. Firstly, so that .hard currency is
available for imports of capital and other economic goods. Secondly, through feedback
effects, exports may stimulate growth. As President Mandela' put it: "We are all agreed on
the critical role of exports in generating sustained economic growth. We are one that a
vibrant export industry is vital for meeting our primary objective, a better life for all South
Africans. " Exports affect employment, productivity, and innovation. GElS was an expensive
scheme. The impact GElS has had on the manufacturing industry and the economy is
evaluated per manufacturing sector.
Figure 1-1 Problems f aced by exporters
Source: Engineering News
2 Nelson Mandela, November 1994 at the Presidents Award for Export Achievement.
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2. The trade policy debate
Although the trade policy debate is only part of the whole economic debate, it can be argued
that much of economic development policy revolves around trade policy. Received neo-
classical wisdom is that government's role should be limited to provide an infrastructure,
promote market efficiency and maintain a stable macro-economic policy. Economists , perhaps
except for the anarchists , would agree with this view, although they disagree on which trade
strategies will enable high growth and develop industrial potential.
The past two decades have seen turbulent international economic conditions as well as
international trade policy making. There have been large swings in the terms of trade and the
emergence of new industrial exporting countries. Further, there has been the formation and
strengthening of trade blocs. Global markets are seen as the epitome of the information age.
Instantaneous transmission of data results in immediate transfer of capital, material, and other
resources to wherever the yields seem most advantageous. The success of the Newly
Industrialised Countries (NICs), such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, has been attributed
by many politicians and economists to the success of exports of manufactured products . (This
fact has been disputed and is debated in section 2.4.1.)
Another factor has been the tremendous increase in the volumes of trade. Since the end of
World War Il, the growth of trade has exceeded the growth of output. "In virtually every year
of the post-war period, the growth of world merchandise trade has exceeded the growth of
world merchandise output. Overall, the volume of world merchandise trade is estimated to
have increased at an average annual rate of slightly more than six per cent during the period
1950-1994, compared with close to four per cent growth of world output. This means on
average that each 10 per cent increase in world output has been associated with a 16 per cent
increase in world trade. During those 45 years, world merchandise output has multiplied five
times and world trade has multiplied 14 times, both in real terms." (WTO, 1996). The WTO
estimated that world trade would grow eight per cent in 1995 while world output, measured in
terms of gross domestic product, would grow three per cent (Wall Street Journal, 15 Nov
1995).
Table 2-1 Growth a/ world trade and output, 1870-1990, (Average annual growth rate, percentage)
1870-1913 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990
World Trade 3,9 6,5
World GDP 2,5 4,2
Difference 1,4 2,3











Table 2-1 shows that world trade is clearly growing faster than world GDPs, and countries are
integrating. The past few years have seen a great liberalisation in trade. With the fall of the
Berlin wall, democratic governments replaced autocratic and autarkic governments. Many
Latin American countries have also followed more liberal economic policies for most of this
decade. Partly due to increased globalisation and partly due to pressure from organisations
such as the World Bank and the IMF, developing countries too, are following more liberal
policies (Holden, 1992). Developing countries have moved to reform partly as result of other
country's successes and partly as result of recognising their failures (Bhagwati, 1996).
Dombusch (1992) identifies four reasons why liberalisation has taken place: anti-statism, poor
economic performance, World Bank pressure, and the evidence of success of liberalisation.
This new climate has allowed for the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT
and the formation of the new WTO. These institutions should further contribute to liberal
trade reforms on a multilateral basis. The future trade policy debates will also be affected by
the development of trade blocs. Spurred by the success of the European Union (EU), more
trade blocs seem to form. 3
2.1 Background to the debate
Trade policy debates revolve around the appropriate degree of trade management: whether to
promote a country 's exports or protect local industries from foreign competition. In other
words, whether they should have an outward or inward oriented economy. Since Adam Smith,
there has been a protracted debate regarding which measures to improve growth are best.
South Africa has followed the route of many developing countries in trying to maximise
growth.
Most developing countries VIew industrialisation as an important part of their overall
development strategy (Du Plessis, 1994). Hirsch (1993: vi) echoes this VIew:
"Industrialisation is an indispensable key to economic development and rising living
standards." Industrialised countries seem to enjoy a higher standard of living than those
countries that are more agricultural or mining oriented. Many governments believe, therefore,
to improve the quality oflife of their citizens, it is necessary to industrialise. Davis (1994) and
3 North American Free Trade Association (NAFT A), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Mercado
Comon del Sur (Mercosur) .
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Bond (1991) have challenged this view. The National Economic Development and Labour
Council (Nedlac) has taken the following position: "Each constituency in Nedlac has the same
broad goals of creating jobs, economic growth, equity and participation by civil society in the
political and economic reconstruction process." (Nedlac, 1996). Rodrik (1992:310) states:
"The issue is not whether industrialization is good per se; but whether government
intervention is desirable to alter the speed and character of industrialization likely to result
naturally." This study will assume that industrialisation will contribute to growth of the
economy and probably also to employment and therefore is beneficial. Industrialisation is
consequently a goal oftrade policy. (See also section 2.2.)
"The trade policy of a country, in the narrow sense, comprises all the measures bearing
directly on trade" (RSA, 1972:96t Each instrument used affects more than one sector of the
economy. The Industrial Development Corporation (lDC, 1990) warned that their
recommendations would have to be implemented completely and warned against selective
implementation. "Virtually every government action can be regarded as a subsidy for
someone. And virtually all such actions can impact on exports." (Snape, 1988:3). Economic
policies therefore have to be carefully drafted to avoid undesirable consequences.
The trade debate centres on three questions: What is the link between outward-oriented
economies and economic growth and development ; how are trade regimes and growth defined
and measured; and what are the appropriate instruments for achieving an outward oriented
economy?
2.1.1.1 Globalisation
"Globalization and liberalization are powerful forces reshaping the world economy. They are
forces created by market realities that few countries now deny. The market, it is agreed,
determines how the world is to be for better or for worse" (Ricupero, 1996).
After the Industrial Revolution, products were developed for national consumption. As
specialisation advanced and technology improved, so firms outgrew their national boundaries
and began to sell their products internationally. "A New World economy slowly emerged as
the potential gains from innovation coincided with and reinforced the spread of the markets."
(World Investment Report, 1994). Technology is encouraging the international integration
4 Commission of inquiry into the Export Trade of the Republic of South Africa. 1972. Aka the Reynders Commision.
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process. Transport technology has contributed to reducing the travelling time and the costs of
moving both goods and people between countries. Together with this, communications and
information technologies have also developed at exponential speed. Transaction costs for
doing business across national boundaries have therefore been reduced.
Prior to World War I, the worlds developed nations exports as a share of their GDP was
substantial. Due to the Great Depression and increased protectionism of the inter-war period,
the proportion of exports declined. Table 2-2 clearly shows that since the end of World War
II, exports of both developed and developing countries have increased. Between the early
1950s and early 1970s global output of manufactures quadrupled, whilst world trade in
manufacturing expanded eightfold. Technology and liberalisation affected the financial
markets and contributed to their internationalisation.
Table 2-2 Exports as a share o/GDP a/selected countries, 1913, 1950, 1973 and 1992.
Country 1913 1950 1973 1992
France 13,9 10,6 14,4 17,5
Germany 17,5 8,5 19,7 24,0
Japan 12,3 4,7 8,9 9,2
United Kingdom 20,9 14,4 16,4 18,2
United States 6,1 3,6 3,6 7,1
Develo in Countries 16,5 17,8 19,8
Source: World Investment Report, 1994.
There has also been a growth in the number of transnational corporations (TNC), and direct
foreign investment (OFI) and world trade is becoming increasingly dominated by TNCs. It
has been estimated that intra-firm exports by transnational parent firms and by foreign
affiliates represent a third of world trade, while the exports of transnational corporations and
their affiliated firms to unaffiliated firms represent just less than a third of world trade. The
growth of TNC exports has doubled in the past decade. However, inter-industry trade between
developing and industrialised countries still dominate. (World Investment Directory,
1995:127).
2.1.1.2 Liberalisation
Impetus was given to trade liberalisation with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT
in late-1993 and its adoption in Marrakech on 15 April 1994. This agreement not only
consolidated liberalisation achieved by previous rounds of negotiation, but also liberalised
factors such as government procurement and trade in services. Besides the Uruguay Round,
many countries have embarked on unilateral liberalisation, while others have been persuaded
to adopt policies that are more liberal by institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.
Generally, liberal trade regimes have replaced government controls and direct intervention,
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while quantitative restrictions have been replaced by tariffs. These have opened the various
countries' economies to international trade. Many countries recognised as Dornbusch (1992)
pointed out, that during the 1960s and 1970s neither quotas nor tariffs prevented imports.
Liberalisation includes any action that would make a trade regime more neutral. It reduces the
bias towards primary production for the domestic market and against exports. This is achieved
primarily through the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Bell (1992:3) argues that
liberalisation "also includes direct export promotion measures, such as export subsidies,
which clearly also increase the incentive to export relative to production for the home market.
Furthermore such acts are generally accompanied by currency devaluation, which is seen as a
crucial instrument of trade liberalization. The principle attributes of trade liberalization thus
are relaxation of QRs, reduction of tariffs, devaluation, and export promotion measures."
The relationship between liberalisation and exports has not received the same academic
evaluation of that received by exports and growth. A priori analysis indicates that
liberalisation increases trade and consequently increases all exports. It is difficult to define
what a "liberalisation episode" would be and hence evaluate this relationship empirically.
However, liberalisation would tend to reduce the export-bias and consequently provide a
boost to exports. (Greenaway and Sapsford, 1994).
Protectionist regimes incur static costs, which, although low relative to the GDP, when added
to the costs of operating at inefficient scales of output and monopoly pricing, can be
significant. Rent seeking and corruption add to a high cost manufacturing structure. (Holden,
1992)
Jenkins (1995) identifies three theoretical arguments why trade liberalisation Improves
productivity. These arguments are graphically illustrated in Figure 2-1 below:





Firstly, the ' import discipline argument' hypothesis that trade liberalisation puts more
pressure on domestic manufacturers who respond by increasing their efficiency. Secondly,
trade liberalisation may lead to larger markets for domestic manufacturers through exports
and will expand production and take advantage of economies of scale. Thirdly, manufacturers
can source products internationally and therefore at competitive (lower) prices. Manufacturers
will also be able to adapt production processes to make use of inputs that are not readily
available in the domestic market.
If governments are to develop a sustainable approach to globalisation, it is important to
achieve macroeconomic stability and attach importance to institutions building. The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 1996) suggests that sweeping
liberalisation of import regimes should not proceed but go together with enhanced export
capacity and performance and secondly that exchange rates should be maintained at realistic
levels as an over-appreciated exchange rate will reduce the competitiveness of export
industries and therefore should be avoided by dampening portfolio investment inflows
through an appropriate pacing and sequencing of the liberalisation of the capital account.
2.2 Exports, growth, employment and industrialisation
Greenaway (1993) has described the foreign trade sector as having a crucial role to play in
economic development, and it has been called the 'engine' or 'handmaiden' of growth.
Numerous studies have been undertaken to establish what the links are between exports and
economic growth, employment, industrialisation and economic development. Contemporary
governments use similar arguments to promote exports as those used by the mercantilists and
dispelled by Adam Smith two hundred years ago. Sophisticated presentations using examples
of the successes of export-oriented countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, reinforce these ideas.
International trade allows countries to exploit their comparative advantages. Adam Smith is
credited with the idea of absolute advantage, where a nation exports an item if it is the world's
low cost producer. David Ricardo expanded this notion to that of comparative advantage. He
recognised that a nation will allocate its resources to industries where they are relatively more
productive. A nation's welfare will increase if it imports a good, even though it is the low cost
producer, but is relatively more productive producing other products. Trade cannot therefore
be a "zero-sum game" where one country benefits at the expense of another. Therefore
countries will become "better off' in terms of consuming at a higher output level, if they
specialise in those activities that they can manufacture relatively cheaper in an international
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sense. The ideal Pareto optimal scenario is only achieved when international market forces are
allowed to determine relative prices in the domestic economy. Under these conditions,
resources are most efficiently allocated. This in turn results in a better economic performance
as countries will specialise in their respective comparative advantages. Eli Heckscher and
Bertil Ohlin expanded on this to develop a theory to explain the patterns of trade and what
type of products (labour or capital intensive products) a country would export. Wolfgang
Stolper and Paul Samuelson proved that under certain assumptions various sectors will benefit
while others will lose. Nations gain factor-based comparative advantages in industries that
make use of the factors of which they have a relative abundance. "Government's have, rightly
or wrongly, implemented various policies designed to improve comparative advantage in
factor costs. Examples are the reduction of interest rates, efforts to hold down wage costs,
devaluation that seeks to affect comparative prices, subsidies, special depreciation allowances,
and export financing addressed to specific sectors. Each in its own way, and over differing
time horizons, aims to lower relative costs of the nation's firms compared to those of
international rivals." (Porter, 1990:627). Countries will therefore benefit and increase their
welfare if they export products in which they have a comparative advantage and import goods
from other countries in which they in turn have a comparative disadvantage.
In modem society, autarkic policies are sure to fail. It is doubtful whether any sophisticated
country can be self-sufficient nowadays. Therefore, unless the country receives donations
from others, it needs to export to import products it cannot produce. "Globalisation is
inevitable. Spurred by reduced transport costs and advances in communications and other
technologies, globalisation has fostered greater interdependence and cross-border linkages
between the countries of the world. Countries that seek to delink, and opt instead for
isolationism, risk paying a high price in future economic growth. In response to the trade and
foreign investment opportunities resulting from globalisation, a large and growing number of
developing countries have embarked on liberalising their trade and foreign investment
regimes, as well as adapting their economic structures and strengthening their export
capacity." (UNCTAD, 1996:3).
2.3 Import substitution v export promotion
For many years, politicians and economists have debated which policies should be used to
develop an economy. Traditionally, two main schools of economists have emerged advocating
alternative foreign trade strategies. The Neo-classical (neo-liberal) school (mainly in favour of
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neutral or export promotion policies) pursues a policy of free trade with muumum
government intervention, while industrial strategists (structualists) propose government
intervention (Pack and Westphal, 1986). The neo-classicists rely heavily on traditional
economic analysis, emphasising the importance of efficient resource allocation. The industrial
strategists, on the other hand, see growth as a series of structural changes in the economy that
results in the economy gradual moving away from predominately primary producing
agricultural economies to industrial economies (Liang, 1990).
The debate has oscillated: First with the import substitution favouring economists such as
Nurske, Prebisch, Singer and Chenery dominating (Krueger, 1984:137). After World War II
there was a general atmosphere of export pessimism. Two potentially conflicting diagnoses
were proposed as to why import substitution was a more suitable policy to follow for growth.
Firstly, Prebisch (1952) reasoned that since the terms of trade of primary products were
declining as the incomes of developed countries increased, the value/volume of primary
products would decrease relative to manufactured products. Industrialists in the developing
countries would respond to the exogenous price shift by industrialising. He therefore reasoned
that neither tariff protection nor industrial subsidies would be necessary. The Prebisch-Singer
thesis of secular decline in terms of trade for primary exporters implied that market forces can
work to the disadvantage of the poorer countries and favour more advanced industrial
countries. (Singer and Ansari, 1988). Nurske (1959) on the other hand argued that since
foreign markets would not be able to absorb manufactured imports from developing countries
on a sufficient scale as developing countries grew, governments would intervene to protect
their economies. Few exporters of primary commodities have sufficient levels of domestic
demand to influence the world market price of their products. In many instances, exporters of
primary raw materials are dependent on the revenues generated by commodity exports to
finance imports of other commodities including energy and food products used to satisfy
domestic consumption. As such, the value of commodity imports into consuming markets
represents a smaller proportion of total imports. Price fluctuations relating to the commodity
imports have a less significant impact on a diversified importing (developed countries)
economy than for the exporters (developing countries) which have greater reliance on fewer
products as revenue sources.
The neo-liberals (including Baldwin, Krueger and Balassa) argued that countries that opened
up their economies to foreign competition did better economically than those following
import substitution policies. In countries with neutral trade regimes, exports were
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concentrated in a few sectors in which there was a comparative advantage. Exporting
contributed to greater efficiency in the use of resources. As a strategy, it is considered far
better and more successful in promoting industrialisation. The structuralists argued against
this. They maintained that in a world of free trade, the existing divisions of labour would be
reproduced. Developing countries would face a decline in exports (in value terms) and would
rely on the developed countries for the manufactured goods that they would import at
increasing prices. (Hirsch, 1993:14). Neo-liberals criticised the views of the structuralists as
being protectionist. This encouraged inefficiency and caused the cost of production in the
domestic economy to increase. An anti-export bias was created as domestic manufacturers
preferred to earn rents in the domestic economy than to earn profits in the international
economy (Hirsch, 1993). Singer (1988) pointed out that critics of import substitution tended
to disregard or underestimate the importance of a previous phase of import substitution as
providing the necessary base for export-led growth.
With historic hind-sight the export pessimism following World War II was unjustified as
world trade grew faster than world income, and countries that followed an export promotion
policy (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) grew faster than those following
import substitution strategies. Bhagwati (1990) proposed the following reasons why an export
promotion policy is preferable to import substitution; firstly, there is a more efficient
allocation of resources, secondly, there is less directly unproductive profit seeking and rent
seeking activities. Thus while the static costs of import substitution generally remain low, the
real effective protection offered to local producers is much higher. Early literature equated
industrialisation and the policy of import substitution. (Singer, 1988). Policy makers used the
"infant industry" argument to justify their import substitution policies. These policies relied
on considerable state intervention especially high levels of tariff and other non-tariff barriers.
This intervention has contributed to bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption. Further it has
spurred the development of high-cost inefficient industries. A further problem of import
substitution policies is that they tend to over value the currency. This adversely affects what
normally would have been competitive industries from exporting. Further, an overvalued
currency also discourages direct foreign investment. "Just as Nurkse's (1959) pessimism
about the prospects for international trade were invalidated by the high growth of the 50s and
60s, it is to be hoped that events in the 90s will not invalidate the prospects for, and results of
present day liberalisation" (Holden, 1992:249).
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Winters (1991:213) argues that a country large in anyone market, will be worse off under an
export promotion trade regime, while import substitution will improve the terms of trade. This
factor might encourage import substitution rather than export promotion. Under these
conditions a country should impose an optimum tariff and choose import substitution or
export promotion. Where there is a lack of information import substitution is preferred, as
export promotion requires considerable knowledge of international markets. Importing
countries tend to get resentful of imports and impose additional restrictions. Using export
promotion policies, a country is more likely to feel international shocks than under import
substitution policies.
Export promotion is superior to import substitution where countries can use their comparative
advantage as only countries with export promotion policies can exploit their comparative
advantages. There are opportunities for specialisation. Economies with export promotion
regimes have to have more regard for market signals, they are more flexible and therefore
adapt better to exogenous shocks. Resource allocation is more efficient with neutral trade
incentives, where exports are not penalised. Export promotion policies tend to be more
transparent and their administration is easier. Import substitution policies tend to give more
scope to rent seeking than export promotional policies. However, highly targeted export
promotion policies may also attract rent seeking. This was certainly the case with GElS.
Although import substitution and export promotion policies are generally seen as two
alternatives and mutually exclusive policies, Liang (1990) has developed a typology that
acknowledges that both policies can be in operation at the same time in the same country. He
uses the following grid to illustrate his typology:









Milner (1995) used Liang's model to show that besides pure import substitution and export
promotion policies, mixed import substitution and export promotion policies might seek to
create a pro-tradables bias rather than neutrality. Attention needs to be given to the
endogenous effect of the prices of non-tradables and how these will affect the relative price of
tradables.
The neo-structualist school on the other hand accepted international integration and export
promotion, but rejected the notion of simply opening the economy up to international
competition. They maintain that export growth is conducive to long-term growth, but
allowing the laws of comparative advantage to operate will not result in the emergence of a
suitable growth pattern. There were other means to improve trade performance than opening
up the economy to international competition. Improvements in factors such as productivity
would be advantageous. Market failures that occur as a result of the opening up of the
economy are not conducive to the export growth of manufactured goods. Neo-structuralists
maintained that the neo-classical economists misread the economic history of the NICs.
Factors that the neo-structualists believed contributed to the success of the NICs were the
degree of industrialisation they enjoyed at the time prior to their outward development and the
degree to which the international trading environment has changed. They argue that
liberalisation, which may have positive consequences for one country, will not necessarily
have the same impact on another country (Hirsch, 1993).
2.3.1 A case for export promotion
Firms in the international market-place will be forced to become more competitive through
becoming more efficient, improve productivity and use innovation to improve products and
their marketability. International trade allows a nation to raise its productivity by doing away
with the need to produce all goods and services itself. This allows specialisation in those
industries and segments in which its firms are relatively more productive and import those
products and services where its firms are less productive than foreign rivals, thereby raising
average productivity. Aw and Hwang (1994) found that firms subject to foreign competition
are likely to be more efficient in their use of inputs. Further, exporting firms were also found
to act as conduits for the informal inflow of foreign technology and thus could generate higher
productivity. They conclude that government policies promoting exporters at the expense of
domestic market-firms may be more justified if the performance differences between the two
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groups of firms are explained by their productivity differences rather than resource
differences.
Trade also affects employment. As trade patterns change, so must the demand for both capital
and labour change by sector. Employment declines in sectors where the country imports and
increases in the sectors in which the country exports . Thus when the Corn Laws were repealed
in the United Kingdom, demand for farm labour fell but demand for labour for industry
increased. Problems do occur in the labour market when skills from one sector are not
transferable to the growing sector (Vanston, 1995). Clearly, a country must export. What
should be exported, should be determined by comparative advantage . The view that South
Africa should export has been contested by Gelb (1991); arguing that "neo-liberal export
orientated growth" is a continuation of the capital and raw material intensive path which
South Africa used in the past and which resulted in high unemployment. Although there may
be a trickle down effect that may benefit some workers, the benefits of reinvestment and
rising productivity will accrue to the large corporations. Governments do for various reasons
support their export industries. Therefore, all governments support their industry to keep the
playing field level and in order not to lose export market-share. In South Africa's case
industries were losing market share not so much because they faced unfair subsidised
competition, but rather due to structural problems caused in the economy by years of
protection.
In countries that have followed import substitution policies , firms and industries can easily
establish themselves and remain profitable under the protective import regime. However after
the easy phase is over, relative costs rise due to loss of economies of scale, especially in small
economies. Often import substitution industries are relatively capital intensive. Therefore the
domestic resource cost of saving foreign exchange under a protective trade regime will exceed
the domestic resource cost of earning foreign exchange through exports (Balassa, 1977). If
there are similar (neutral) incentives to selling in the local market and foreign markets, firms
will exploit both the local and export markets. This will result in a better allocation of
resources according to comparative advantage. Firms that enjoy a comparative advantage will
manufacture and export. The country will import goods that it does not manufacture because it
does not have a comparative advantage. This, will in turn, allow firms to achieve greater
capacity utilisation. Because the firm will be able to import or buy locally, its input prices will
be competitive (lower). The firms will also be able to exploit economies of scale since
factories will be the optimum size. The volume of production will be determined by the
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marginal cost. Firms involved in the international market place will also be exposed to the
latest technology. This will also reduce the marginal cost of production. Firms will therefore
be producing at a maximum profit level and will be able to reinvest and diversify into other
areas of comparative advantage. Although an export-oriented policy cannot ensure maximum
employment in the short term, it will ensure maximum growth and should result in a better
growth performance than policies favouring import-substitution.
2.4 International comparative trade policy experiences
Post World War II saw import substitution tried extensively In developing countries,
especially in Latin America. Studies of these economies are in general rather discouraging,
partly because of poor design of the import substitution policies: "the strength of protection
rarely seemed to reflect the externalities stemming from industries , barriers tended to
proliferate, bureaucracies grew, and new industries were discouraged as protection tending to
go to existing industries." (Winters, 1991:214). Import substitution regimes enjoyed early
successes in reducing imports and foreign exchange outflows. Once the easy stage was over,
opportunities for growth eventually ran out. The bureaucracy grew as more controls were
introduced to maintain the growth by stimulating intermediate and capital goods production
and rent seeking activities increased.
However, it is difficult to make international compansons without undertaking a
comprehensive study. Results of international studies of trade policies that have been
undertaken seem contradictory and results are sometimes achieved with simplistic reasoning.
Without comparative studies, it is all too easy to make a number of assumptions and present
elegant theoretical arguments (Hirsch, 1993).
Although many studies have been done to determine the effect of a county's trade policy on
the level of development and its growth, and many of these studies have shown a positive
correlation between growth and trade policy , there are many problems. Harrison and Revenga
(1995) suggest that most studies do not use tariffs as an indicator of trade policy and point to
econometric problems present in many of the studies. Frankel and Romer (1996) propose that
geographical characteristics influence trade. Baldwin and Seghezza (1996) criticise the various
studies for not identifying the economic mechanisms by which trade and growth is linked.
They find that domestic protection depresses investment and thereby depresses growth.
Conclusive evidence is difficult to obtain as many industrialising countries exhibit fluctuating
trade regimes over time (Harrison 1995).
19
Export promotion policies seem to have worked better. Growth in countries such as South
Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, affirm the success of export-oriented policies. Singer (1988)
claimed that the success of economies such as Korea could be ascribed to the fact that policies
were carefully and conscientiously inter-linked. Import substitution and export promotion
policies were adopted as alternative phases with shifting industrialisation between the sectors.
After the import substitution phase, capacity had been created. Export promotion policies
were introduced to exploit the international marketing potential that had been built up during
the import substitution phase.
There are numerous definitions and classifications of the vanous policies governments
employ to determine the environment under which firms trade, or do not trade, internationally.
The terms "inward" and "outward" imply a strict dichotomy of policy alternatives. In reality a
continuum of development policies exists from which governments can choose.
Empirically, it is difficult to summarise the effect of a trade strategy or trade orientation on the
economy or development. Consequently, different analysts approach the issue in different
ways. In addition, there is a problem identifying which trade policy reforms have taken place
and the extent to which they have taken place and how to measure the results. This is because:
• Export and import sectors are not clearly definable;
• There are multi-product sectors with different instruments of protection applied on
each product;
• Developing countries often have import replacement and export promotion
instruments co-existing simultaneously. Government reacts to short-term pressure
(fiscal constraints) with additional protection which often leads to higher protection -
the actual and intended effects of the policy may be quite different; and
• Trade strategy will alter over time. This makes it difficult firstly, to decide which
strategy is operating, and secondly in identifying causality between trade strategy and
economic performance.
Theoretical analysis has demonstrated that one can link:
• Trade strategy and export growth;
• Export growth and economic growth;
• Trade strategy and export growth; and
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• Trade strategy and economic development.
Various studies have been undertaken in an attempt to clear up the problems of identifying a
trade policy reform and measuring the effects.'
2.4.1 Cross-country trade strategy studies
Greenaway and Nam (1987) used multiple indicators to classify countries to analysis the
impact of trade policies. The following criteria were used: Strong outward orientation
(SOD) where there are a complete absence of trade controls; moderately outward
orientation (MOO) where there are limited uses of direct controls, relatively low import
barriers and some incentive to export, with overall incentives tending toward neutrality or a
slight bias toward production for the home market; moderately inward orientation (MID)
where the overall incentive structure distinctly favours production for the home market, with a
clear anti-export bias, with relatively high rates of protection, widespread use of direct
controls and an overvalued exchange rate; and strong inward orientation (SIO) implies very
high rates of effective protection, pervasive use of direct controls, strong disincentives to the
export sector and significant overvaluation ofthe exchange rate. (Greenaway and Nam, 1988)
This classification is judgmental especially between MOO and MID. However, from an
analysis of the table giving macroeconomic performance of countries grouped by trade
orientation below, it appears that there is evidence of correlation between the countries'
development strategy and growth of real GDP.






5,2 5,2 2,7 1,0 1,0 2,5 17,6 21,2 2,1
Note: Averages are weighted by each country's share in the group totalfor each indicator.
Source: Greenaway and Nam, 1987.
"These include Greenaway and Nam (1987), the World Bank's (1987) Development Report , Michaely (1991), Helleiner
(1990), Greenaway (1993) Table 2-4 lists a selection of studies undertaken and the effect that exports have on growth.
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Clearly, countries that can be classified as open tend to grow faster than those countries that
protect their industries. However, Rodrik (1994) demonstrates that South Korea and Taiwan's
growth were more a result of an investment boom that took place in both countries. With a
relatively well-educated work force, good returns on capital and by subsidising and co-
ordinating investment decisions, an even larger increase on the return on capital was achieved.
Rodrik explained that the outward orientation of the economy was as a result of the increase
in demand for imported goods.
Table 2-4 A selection ofempirical studies on the relationship between export growth and economic growth
Methodology
Study Data-set Economic Export Technique Othervariable Conclusion
Gro~h Gro~h
Michaely(1977a) Cross-section41 PercapitaGNP growth Growth inexportshare Rankcorrelation None Supportforexportgrowth
countriesAve. of1950-73 hypothesisThreshold
effect
Balassa(1978) Cross-section22 GNP growth Exportgrowth orreal Rank correlationOLS Labourforce growth Supportforexportgrowth
countriesAve. of1956-67 exportgrowth Productionfunction Domesticinvestmentand hypothesis
and 1967-73 foreign investmenUoutput
Williamson(1978) Time series 1954-740ne ChangeinGDP Laggedexports OLS linearmodels CountrydummiesDirect Supportfor exportgrowth
country investmentand foreign hypothesis
investmenUoutput
Fajana(1979) Cross-section31 GDPgrowth Exportsharesorexport OLS Trade balanceCurrent Supportfor exportgrowth
countriesAve.of1964-73 change/output account hypothesisThreshold
effect
Tyler(1981) Cross section 73 GDPgrowth Exportgrowth OLS Productionfunction Labourforce growth rate Supportforexportgrowth
countriesAve. of1960-78 Capitalgrowth rate hypothesis
Feder(1983) Cross-section10 GDPgrowth Exportgrowth OLS Labourforce growth Ratio Limitedsupportforexport
countriesAve. of1973-79 tooutputof domestic growthcausingeconomic
investment growth
Kavoussi(1984) Time series 1950-8137 GDPgrowth Lagged real exportgrowth Rank CorrelationOLS Lagged GNP (GD)) Supportfor exportgrowth
countries Productionfunction growth hypothesisthreshold
Real domesticinvestment effect
growth




Jung &Marshall Time series 1950-8137 Real GNP (orGDP) Real exportgrowth Maximumlikelihood LaggedGNP (GDP) Limited supportforexport
(1985) countries growth Simulteneousinear growth growthcausingeconomic
functions growth
Moschos(1989) Cross-section Real GDP growth Realexportgrowth GrangercausalityOLS Labourforce growth Supportforexportgrowlh
Productionfunction Real domesticinvestment hypothesisThreshold
growth effect
Salvatore(1989) Time series 1963-73,73- Real GDP growth Real exportgrowth OLS Production Labourinputgrowth Supportfor export
8526countriesin 4 Capital inputgrowth hypothesis
groupsbytrade policy Growthin industrial
orientation production
Source: Jung and Marshall (1985), Greenaway and Sapsford (1994)
2.4.2 Causality: economic growth and export growth
Since exports are a component of GDP, it follows that by definition an increase in exports will
result in an increase in the GDP. However, what is more important is the causal relationship
between export and economic growth. Does an economy grow and then its export growth will
follow or does growth follow an increase in exports?
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Holden (1990) found that for the period 1947 to 1987, there was bi-directional causality
between exports and growth in manufacturing in South Africa. Exports influenced
manufacturing growth and manufacturing growth in turn influenced export growth. This bi-
directionality occurred only later. From 1947 to 1970, growth of manufacturing output
promoted growth in export output.
Ghartey (1993) found that export growth causes economic growth in Taiwan. The same was
however not true in the United States or Japan. He used quarterly data with base years of
1982, 1985, and 1986 for the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan, that were drawn from national
publications. His analysis indicated that Taiwan's relatively open economy and severe
shortage of natural resources caused it to rely on exports for economic growth. In the USA,
the relatively closed economy and abundant resources meant that economic growth causes
export growth. In Japan, a relatively closed economy and scarce resources produce a feedback
causal relationship between exports and economic growth. The finding that Japan's terms of
trade cause export growth suggest those devaluation policies or the imposition of tariffs
improves that country's export performance.
Ukpolo (1994) found a positive relationship between economic growth and the growth of non-
fuel primary exports in some low-income African countries. His results show that a 1 per cent
change in the growth rate of non-fuel primary product exports yields an approximately 0,1 per
cent average gain in the expected growth rate among the eight countries. However, the export
promotion hypothesis is not strongly supported for exports of manufactured goods. While
there is a positive link between manufactured exports and growth in five of the countries,
most of the findings are not statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.
Amoateng and Amoaka-Adu (1996) examined the causality between export revenue and
economic growth in 35 African countries by introducing external debt servicing as a third
variable in the export-economic growth analysis. Granger's causality was used to analyse the
interrelationship between exports, GNP growth, and foreign debt servicing over the period
1971-90, World Bank data, World Debt Tables, and IMF International Financial Statistics
found that there was a feedback or bi-directional causality between external debt servicing,
economic growth, and exports, and therefore supported the export-driven GDP growth and
GDP growth-led export promotion hypotheses.
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These studies show that although it cannot be stated conclusively that exports cause growth, it
will be difficult for an economy to grow without exports. Trade and particularly exports form
an important component of growth.
2.4.3 Government intervention v the free market
As has been defined above, a strongly outward oriented policy is one where there are no direct
controls at all. Few countries , if any, can be classified as having no direct controls affecting
trade. As has already been discussed, all economic decisions by government have an impact
on some other sector. It is doubtful whether there are any economies today that are totally free
from government intervention. It is difficult to determine empirically whether government
intervention is a better policy to follow or not. Hong Kong has been successful following a
laissez-faire approach while Singapore has followed more interventionist policies. Other
countries such as Korea and Taiwan have followed a middle of the road approach. (Krueger,
1985).
Firstly, the government's interference with the market mechanism undermines the
achievement of a "pareto optimum". Secondly, governments' actions, no matter how sincere,
will always benefit certain sectors which will lead to rent seeking behaviour amongst firms.
Thirdly, the success of export-driven economies is overwhelming. Although there are
problems with various studies undertaken, the weight of the evidence strongly supports a
neutral or export oriented trade regime.
Successful exporting countries have tended to use incentives rather than direct controls. The
incentives were provided across the board to all industries rather than specifically. This would
tend to enhance the theory that the market knows best and is better at choosing "winners" than
bureaucrats.
2.5 International trade and growth in South Africa
South Africa has followed a typical pattern of development. A self-sufficient agricultural base
developed, with the help of gold and diamond mining, into a manufacturing-based economy.
The policy of import substitution, although it has contributed to the economic development of
many countries , including South Africa (RSA, 1972), is an inferior policy in the long run.
It has been argued that policies that are suitable for one country or region will not be suitable
for another. South Africa has flirted with the idea of an outward policy. Nevertheless for
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various reasons, South Africa has maintained a de facto import substitution policy. Although
there have been various subsidies in place to encourage exports the incentives given to import
substitution firms have been greater than those given for export production.
Bell (1995) points out that due to WTO commitments, South Africa was forced to embark on
import liberalisation which rather than strengthen the trade account, " ... will increase the
already heavy burden falling on export expansion." Since there are limits to faster export
growth, and import liberalisation tends to increase the import/GDP ratio, South Africa may
require further effective import substitution, which he argues are not incompatible with the
policy of export-oriented industrialisation.
The history of South African trade policy and the use of import substitution will be discussed
later in Chapter 3.
As we approach the end of the millennium, the pendulum has now clearly swung in favour of
promoting open international markets, there are those who are still partial to protecting their
countries' economies. Although the causal link between economic growth on the one hand,
and export growth on the other, is not conclusive or straightforward to interpret, the evidence
certainly points to a positive link between exports and development. This debate goes to the
very heart of the broad economic debate. As is often the case, there are fundamental problems
of measurement, statistical pitfalls and matters of interpretation. Although the relationship
between growth and trade may vary between countries, there are many alternative views in the
way in which a trade regime influences trade performance and there are conflicting attitudes
regarding the appropriate role of government policy and market forces.
Greenaway and Reed (1990) identify three possible responses to the empirical evidence.
Firstly, a nihilist view, which states that empirics can prove nothing. Secondly, an agnostic
view, where causality does not matter. In this case, the evidence of a relationship between
growth and exports is sufficient to recommend policies promoting an outward orientation.
Finally, although there may be no empirical proof to positively support outward orientation,
"the evidence linking inward orientation and growth is seriously wanting". Nevertheless, there




As will be shown in chapter 3, South Africa followed a policy of import substitution from the
1920s. This has distorted the South African economy. Export subsidies were used to
neutralise these distortions and set South Africa on an outward development path as a second-
best alternative. Chapter 4 analysis the use of subsidies while Chapter 5 looks at the impact of
GElS on the level of South African exports.
Clearly, the first-best trade policy option for any country would be a neutral trade regime,
where neither import substitution nor export promotion policies are favoured. This will result
in an ideal allocation of resources. Indeed if all countries followed this option, global welfare
would be maximised as countries would produce products in which they have a comparative
advantage and import all other products.
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3. Historical perspective on South African trade policy
Even before South Africa was first "discovered" by Bartholomew Dais in 1488 and more
particularly after it was "settled" by Jan van Riebeeck in 1652, its existence was based on
trading. South Africa's early colonisation was undertaken by one of the first TNCs, the Dutch
East India Company. Although the history of South Africa 's import replacement is well
documented, the same is not true for South Africa's export policy before 1972. Yet, despite
this long history of trade and the openness of the South African economy, very little active
trade policy developed over the years. Official export policy is sparse and the only evidence is
scattered in the speeches of Ministers and Government Officials, and in Hansard. It is
important to analyse and appraise what policy measures were taken and why those particular
policies were taken to evaluate present and future economic policy. "In economic affairs, as in
others, to know where society is going, it is necessary to know the road on which it is
travelling and why it has taken that road rather than another. The speed at which it will
continue to travel in future will depend on the extent to which it will continue to enjoy any of
. the special advantages of the past or will, by new effort and good fortune, be able to overcome
the obstacles to advance which lie ahead." (Frankel, 1944)
Although there is general agreement as to the phases into which we can divide South Africa's
economic history, there is disagreement when they began. The first period under colonist
control was marked by self-sufficiency. The agricultural sector was by far the most dominant,
although it only supplied the needs of the local inhabitants and the ships travelling between
Europe and the East. Very little mining activity took place before 1852, though there was
copper mining in Namaqualand. Manufacturing only provided for the basic needs of the local
inhabitants and was limited to activities such as bakeries, furniture manufacture, and very
basic agricultural implements. As can be expected the infrastructure was poor and
undeveloped.
The trade policy prior to 1806 favoured firstly the Dutch East India Company (DEIC), and
later British trade and shipping. There were prohibitive restrictions on trade with other
countries. Customs issues dominated the trade policy debate, indeed much of the political
debate, during the second half of the nineteenth century. Customs duties were a source of
revenue and as the two inland Republics wished to share in the customs revenue generated by
the two coastal Colonies. The distribution of this revenue was hotly debated.
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The economy began to make its first structural change with the discovery of diamonds in
1868 and gold in 1886. "Economically this country had slumbered peacefully for over two
centuries" (Botha, 1973). The mining sector developed rapidly from 1868 to approximately
1910 when the Union of South Africa was formed. After 1910, the development of
manufacturing began. This phenomenon was given further emphasis by World War I.
However the poor infrastructure still continued to hamper trade development. The
fundamentals of an import substitution policy were beginning to manifest. The main exports
were raw materials and precious metals. Imperial thinking frowned on any beneficiating in
South Africa.
With the establishment of Representative Government in the Cape in 1855, a more liberal
trade policy was adopted. The Cape Customs Tariff Act, which abolished discrimination of
the origin of the product, was pasted. The main purpose however of this Act was to raise
revenue. Similar instruments were established in Natal, the OFS and the ZAR. Eventually a
Customs Union was established from 1889 on, and a Political Union in 1910. South Africa
was one of the first countries explicitly to adopt an import substitution policy to promote
industrialisation. Although 1924 is generally considered the year in which the Union of South
Africa adopted a policy of encouraging the growth of industry by means of protection, there
were moves before this. In 1910, the Cullinan Commission" recommended protection "in the
best interest of the country as a whole that adequate protection should be given to agricultural
and industrial undertakings". The first Customs Act of 1914 embodied many of this
Commission's recommendations. The Board of Trade and Industry was created in 1921. After
the National Party and the Labour Party coalition won the 1924 General Election, Hertzog
immediately began to promote the manufacturing sector using an import substitution policy.
To achieve this he reconstituted the Board of Trade and Industry. In 1925, the Board of Trade
and Industry revised the Customs Tariff Act that included an important role for the Board of
Trade and Industry .
During the 1920s the arguments favouring protection were: Firstly , the maintenance of
protection of industries , such as fruit canning which was established during World War I;
Secondly, the poor-white problem could be solved by employment creation; and Finally, the
realisation that gold would eventually be mined out and that secondary industry had to be
6The Commission on the Conditions of Trade and Industry
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created. (Hobart Houghton and Dagut, 1973) There was opposition to the envisaged policy
and fears that protection would increase costs in South Africa. In addition, it was feared the
scarcity of skilled labour would be exacerbated and would be diverted into protected
industries. JH Hofmeyr stated that the country should develop either agriculture or secondary
industry. He felt South Africa ran a great risk of trying to develop both and eventually
achieving neither. He maintained agriculture was the appropriate sector. (Botha, 1973)
In 1928 Iscor was established as a state-owned company. Although the 1932 rise in the gold
price stimulated the South African economy, it did not contribute to further development of
the manufacturing sector that remained undiversified until the outbreak of World War n.
Agriculture and mining remained the most important sectors. The policy of protection did,
however, protect South Africa against the full impact of the Great Depression. Again, the
protection policy favoured British goods that received a rebate of 25 per cent ad valorem. As
gold, diamonds, and even wool were earning sufficient foreign revenue, there were no reasons
to promote exports during this period. Although by developing country standards, the tariff-
based protection has been moderate, it has been accompanied by a wide range of quantitative
restrictions. In 1934, the Government appointed the Customs Tariff Commission that
concluded that the protection enjoyed by industry at the time had reached the limit the country
could bear. Further, because of the potential of exports of primary products and the increased
economic nationalism of the time, it recommended that the Board of Trade and Industry
investigate all industries that had been granted protection and determine where protection
could be removed or reduced. However, in 1935 the Holloway Commission, which was
appointed to revise the protection policy, came out in favour of protection, provided cost and
price structures remained on a par with the major trading nations.
Table 3-1 GDP at/actor costs(current value}, the contribution a/the various economic sectors thereto and the population 0/
South Africa for various years .
Year GDP Percentage contribution of main economic sectors to Population
GDP
Primary Secondary
Nearest Growth sector sector Other Total (Nearest
Rmillion rate % % % % Million)
1911 300 5,4 45,9 100 6,0
1915 307 0,06
1920 558 12,07 40,5 9,9 49,6 100 6,9
1925 537 -0,8
1930 551 0,5 29,8 13,3 56,9 100
1935 688 4,5 9,6
1940 987 7,5 31,5 16,7 51,8 100
1945 1515 8,9 11,4
Source: Department ofStatistics as cited by Reynders Commission, (RSA,1972).
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During this period South Africa became more self-sufficient. Primary products made a smaller
contribution to the GDP while the secondary sector, which included manufacturing, increased
its contribution to the GDP. Manufacturing expanded and various manufactured goods were
produced.
World War II helped diversify the manufacturing base further. This occurred firstly, because
there was a need to supply the war machine, and secondly, because of the isolation it was not
possible to obtain imports from Europe for local consumption. This laid the foundation for the
future development of South African industry in the post war period. Toward the end of the
war, in 1943, the Minister of Trade and Industry requested the Board of Trade and Industry to
investigate what adjustments would be required after the war. In this report, (Board of Trade
and Industry Report number 282), it was recommended that as little protection be given as
possible and that the future of industry should not be secured by means of protection but
rather by increased productivity. The return of the National Party to government under Malan
in 1948 saw the reintroduction of a policy of import substitution. This contributed
considerably to the growth of the economy in general and the manufacturing sector in
particular. In 1957, the Viljoen Commission? found that the policy of providing protection by
means of moderate customs duties should be continued and that subsidies be granted in
certain cases. Quantitative import controls were not favoured because of the high degree of
protection given.
Table 3-2 Average rate ofgrowth of South Africa 's GDP and average contribution ofthe various sectors of the economy to
the GDP 1940-70
1940-50 1950-60 1960-69 1940-70
% % % %
Average growth rate ofGDP (current prices) 10,0 6,9
Contributions of the various sectors of the GDP
Primary sector 32,0 31,0
Secondary sector 17,0 21 ,0
Ofwhich manufacturing 12,0 16,5
Other 52,0 48,0











However, by the 1960s the most profitable import replacement opportunities were exhausted.
" ...the emphasis shifted toward intermediate goods industry (for example chemicals and
textiles) and greater local content of big ticket items such as motor vehicles, white goods and
audio visual equipment. Because of the relatively small size of the local market, South
African manufacturing had to forgo the advantages of economies of scale. This together with
7 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Protection of Industry. Report U.G.361I958.
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the social pressures to increase labour remuneration tended to build an inflationary bias into
the production cost structure. South Africa 's efforts to compete on the export markets with
manufactured goods has only been marginally successful." (RSA, 1990). In 1968 the Board of
Trade and Industry (RSA,1969) recommended that in certain cases, protection could still be
given on an interim basis. This recommendation was accepted by Government. Formula
duties were also introduced by the Board of Trade and Industry in 1968 to provide protection
against disruptive competition.
International empirical estimates of the significance of import substitution in the growth
process show large contributions up to the mid-1950s where imports were replaced firstly in
the consumer and the intermediate goods sectors. Du Plessis (1973) shows that for the period
1956/57 to 1966/67 import substitution was the most important contributor to growth for
intermediate as well as capital goods. In contrast, Scheepers (1969) showed that for the period
1956/57 to 1963/64 import substitution ended with little penetration into the capital goods
sector. As a result of the policy of import substitution from 1924 to the 1970s, first by way of
quotas and mild tariffs and later with high tariffs and complicated formula duties, imports
declined from 31 per cent of total supply in 1926/27 to 19 per cent in 1963/64 (RSA, 1972:35)
and South Africa industrialised. However behind the tariff curtain, manufacturers were
uncompetitive and shielded from international competition. "South Africa's infant industries
of 1920s are still infants and GElS seeks to add additional infants to the impoverished
family." (Davis, 1994:18) As in many other countries, that have pursued an import
replacement industrialisation strategy, the protection has resulted in inward-looking industries
only marginally interested in exports.
Because of the political isolation of South Africa during the late sixties and early seventies, a
new emphasis was placed on self-sufficiency. There were huge investments made in "strategic
industries" such as energy, chemicals, engineering, defence and transport equipment.
3.1 South African export policy and export promotion
Although, it was initially controlled by a multi-national trading corporation, South Africa
never developed a sound export policy until 1972. From 1855 to 1925, there was still no
export policy. The system was later extended so that South African goods enjoyed favourable
entry into Britain. Exports still consisted of gold, wool, diamonds, and certain agrarian
exports to the UK. South Africa still followed a policy of import substitution, and no effort
was made to adopt an outward trade policy.
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In 1961 South Africa become a Republic, and the UK, a major South African customer,
became a member of the European Economic Community in 1970, as a result of which South
Africa lost its preferential status. The South African Foreign Trade Organisation (SAFTO)
was founded in 1961 with the assistance of government. In 1964, the first Economic
Development Programme set export targets. The Reynders Commission (RSA, 1972) was
commissioned in July 1971 to examine South Africa 's export trade. From 1972 to 1983 export
growth was slow; from 1983 to 1990, export growth was moderately high. Exports of
agricultural products grew gradually while the exports of mining equipment grew rapidly.
Most of South Africa's exports, despite the period of sanctions from 1985 - 1990, are sold to
the EU, USA, and Japan. Since World War 11, international trade has been turbulent and since
South Africa has an open economy, it has had a direct impact on the South African economy.
Voluntary Restraint Agreements (VRAs) were imposed on South African steel exporters in
the mid-1980s .
With the loss of the UK and other Commonwealth country markets and the realisation that
South Africa's economy became more reliant on exports for growth. The Government had to
face the visible problem of the balance of payments. It became clear that a policy of export
promotion was required. In 1971, The Board of Trade and Industry recommended that
industries that could not compete without protection should not be established. This
recommendation was accepted by government. However, government did not liberalise
because of impending negotiations with GATT regarding various tariff bindings.
Unfortunately gold and foreign reserves reached a low level toward the end of 1971 and the
authorities again imposed a sharper degree of import control (RSA, 1972). Kleu (RSA, 1983)
stated "that some monetary, semi-monetary and fiscal measures introduced with a view to
short term considerations become protracted or permanent and often have unfavourable side
effects on the development of industry in the long run."
Political troubles in South Africa, especially since the 1974 coup d'etat in Portugal and the
effects it had in Southern Africa and South Africa 's own political problems , prevented
Government from "adopting policies strongly in favour of market-oriented interest rates and
measures" (RSA, 1983).8
8 Republic of South Africa, 1983: The Report 0/the Commission ofInquiry into the Export Trade 0/ the Republic 0/South
Afr ica, Government Printer, Pretoria.
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3.1.1 Reynders Commission and export incentives
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Export Trade of The Republic of South
Africa (RSA, 1972), popularly known as the Reynders Commission, was published in 1972. It
consists of two volumes , almost 700 pages, and covered the problems facing South African
exporters in detail. It made many recommendations and with it came the birth of export
promotion in this country. Unfortunately, the report found in favour of export promotion but
left distortions "such as infant-industry tariff protection, import control, policy toward
industrial locations, agricultural price supports , transport pricing , labour deployment, and the
development of labour resources" unchanged . Reynders did not look at the effects of taxes on
imports that reduced exports, nor the effect that subsidisation on exports has on the volume of
imports. (Radcliff, 1975:76)
In 1977, following the Reynders Commission, a Study Group under the leadership of Mr J
van Huyssteen was appointed to investigate the system of export incentives in South Africa.
This eventually resulted in the establishment of Categories A, B, C, and D that were effective
until 1990. Category A (input compensation) provided for exporters to claim 50 per cent of
the value of the import duty applicable to inputs used in the production of export goods. There
were other individual export promotion schemes in operation before 1980. The income tax
allowances for export market development, which came into operation in 1976, were the most
important. There were also transport concessions, financing incentives and iron and steel
export concessions . Although low by international standards of the time, altogether these
represented 3,5 per cent of eligible exports. (RSA, 1978). Exporters were also allowed to
apply for a rebate on the duty under Section 470,03 or a drawback of the duty under Section
521 of the Customs and Excise Act. This was however only available where actual imported
products were used.
Category A on the other hand made allowances for the price parity effect (which resulted from
duties) for locally manufactured goods. Under Category A it was immaterial whether the
inputs were actually imported or not. Assistance was therefore available to all producers of
export goods providing their inputs were subject to duty. It was immaterial whether this was
ad valorem, specific or formula duties. There was no provision made for compensation for the
increased costs of raw materials or inputs cause by quotas.
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Table 3-3 Total Category A export assistance (R millions)











































































































Source: ET!: Committee ofEnquiry into Export Incentives, 1987.
The Category B (value-added compensation) provided a subsidy of 10 per cent of the value-
added component oftariff-protected manufactured goods. The rationale for this assistance was
to compensate exporters for the cost-increasing effects of South Africa's policy of protecting
industry. The value added was the difference between the export price and the cost of the
inputs in producing the final product. The value-added included the overland transport cost to
the port or border, administrative and marketing overheads, wages and salaries, depreciation,
returns on land or intangible assets. It even included the compensation received under
Category A. From Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 it can be seen that the value added compensation
was approximately double the input compensation. The sectors to benefit the most were basic
metals and food.
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Table 3-4 Total Category B export assistance (R millions)




















Non-metal mineral products 1,63
Basic metals 14,12
Metal products 3,13





Total (excl agriculture) 69,74
Total incl. a riculture 70,12 .
































































Under Category C discretionary incentives were provided to exporters mainly to assist with
marketing costs. Much of this category (the main exception was the warehousing assistance)
is now encompassed in EMA (see section 3.3.5 below).
Both Categories A and B were complicated and difficult to administer. Exporters had to
complete numerous forms to prove their claims, adding to the cost of exporting.
3.1.2 Other subsidies
Although, due to the general nature of the Category A and B incentives, they received much
attention. There were however many other forms of assistance available to the exporters
which helped reduce costs and stimulate exports.
3.1.2.1 Infrastructural subsidies
The Railway Administration, under certain circumstances, were able to grant reduced rail
rates on commodities destined for foreign countries. Representations regarding special tariffs
could also be made to Escom as far as electricity intensive industries were concerned. The
relevant shipping or airlines offered special export rates. Furthermore, the primary steel
industry offered support in the form of special raw material import prices with regard to
manufacture for export. (RSA, 1972).
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3.1.2.2 Tax
Since the 1963/64 budget, provision was made under section 11bis and section 17 of the
Income Tax Act. Exporters were entitled to claim either 175 per cent or 200 per cent of certain
export marketing expenditure depending on whether there was an increase in export turnover.
Normally only 100 per cent of a marketing expenditure could be deducted. Exporters were
therefore not actually paying much for their export marketing. The definition of marketing
expenditure was very wide and included premiums on export credit insurance, paying
consultants to undertake market research, supplying free samples, bringing prospective
customer to South Africa, preparing and submitting tenders, commissions, SABS certification
fees, membership of export promotional organisation and warehousing. The scheme was open
to abuse and just about the only criterion for qualification was registration as an exporter with
the Department of Trade and Industry .
It was estimated that deductions in terms of Section 11 bis cost R250 000 in 1963/64 (when it
was introduced) and rose to R12 million in 1969/70. Although there was no mechanism in
place to calculate the total cost, nor to identify who the main beneficiaries were, it was
estimated that 80 to 90 per cent supported the manufacturing sector. (RSA, 1972). The
Receiver of Revenue never calculated the cost of this deduction although it was estimated at
R329 million in 1985, which is more than Categories A and B. Many of the costs allowed
were not necessarily related to export marketing . It was only in 1990 when a maximum of 20
per cent of exporter turnover could be claimed that expenses were brought into line with
actual export marketing activities. Most exporters interviewed were happy with this limitation
of 20 per cent of exports introduced in 1989 and felt that this would minimise abuse of the
system and contribute to South Africa 's export drive. New exporters or exporters targeting
new markets, it was felt, could use either Category C incentives before 1990 or the Export
Marketing Assistance (EMA) after this date.
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Table 3-5 Estimated total Category D export assistance (categories indicated by the claimants) ROOO




Clothing and footwear 8,8
Wood products 1,3
Furniture 1,0






Non-metal mineral products 6,7
Basic metals 34,1
Metal products 11,6





Total (excl agriculture) 136,0
Total incl. a riculture 195,3
































































In terms of section 17 of the Income Tax Act, expenditure incurred with the appointment of an
agent outside the borders of the Republic could be deducted from taxable income. This
expenditure could include expenditure of a capital nature.
From interviews with exporters, the withdrawal of the tax deductions under section 11 bis of
the Income Tax Act contributed considerably to reducing the cost of overseas marketing.
Warehouses and selling organisations contributed to maintaining market-share in a
competitive international environment.
3.2 Critique of the system of pre-1990 incentives
In 1978 the Technical Committee on the Practicability of the Van Huysteen Study Group
Proposals (RSA, 1978), found that before the schemes were introduced, frequent changes in
the incentive programme would reduce its effectiveness and any changes should be according
to a "predetermined timetable". It indicated that Government should be fully committed to the
export effort and be seen to support the export effort. Although the scheme ran for nearly 10
years there was constant criticism of the scheme and Government was not seen to be "fully
committed." Kleu (RSA, 1985) acknowledged that these export incentives were "an important
step in the right direction." He also highlighted the following shortcomings: There was no
clear distinction drawn between what constituted a protective duty and what was merely a
fiscal duty. Therefore, certain industries were receiving too much assistance that over-
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compensated for protection, while other sectors still suffered from an anti-export bias .
Because the removal of the fiscal duties would result in a lose of revenue, the Board of Trade
and Industry were loath to grant rebates unless the pressure exerted by them was significant.
In 1985 the Minister of Trade and Industry appointed the Board of Trade and Industry to
" investigate a system of export assistance measures that could replace the current system, and
to make recommendations in this regard" (RSA , 1988).
The following short-comings were recognised by the Board of Trade and Industry (RSA ,
1988):
• The level of assistance was too low. The Board of Trade and Industry estimated that
South African manufacturing suffered a 17 per cent competitive disadvantage, while
the assistance provided to exporters was roughly calculated at 7 per cent for the period
1982 - 1987; and
• The payment method was inappropriate. Payments were made as a tax deduction that
was not very helpful to exporters in an assessed tax loss position. This was later
rectified and payment was by means of promissory notes. Further, claims could only
be lodged once the export had taken place. The time delay meant that the incentive did
not contribute to additional exports.
The Committee of Enquiry into Export Incentives (RSA, 1987) found the effective rate of
assistance" was lower than many other countries. The effective rate of assistance expresses
export aid in terms of the value added and therefore does not include all imported raw
materials and components.
9 The effective rate of assistance is the defined as Assistance/Value added. Value added was defined as the sum of the
compensation paid or allocation to factors of product ion (inputs) involved in the operation or process concerned i.e. for
labour, capital, entrepreneurs and government (taxes) (Board of Trade and Industry, 1987).
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Table 3-6 Table of the effective rate of assistance







Clothing and footwear 15,3
Wood products 39,3
~m~re ~6






Non-metal mineral products 6,2
Basic metals 6,8
Metal products 32,0





Total (excl agriculture) 15,2
Total incl. a riculture 13,2
































































In 1985 the effective rate of assistance varied from a low of 6,2 per cent for other
manufacturing to 74 per cent provided to transport equipment. Regrettably, the Board of
Trade and Industry did not calculate the export assistance elasticities of exports. They
concluded that the direct effect of the assistance "was at best very modest." However, they
speculated that the indirect effects (generating income, employment, and productivity) could
be substantial. It was even argued that net tax receipt, after paying for subsidises, could be
positive.
The problem of whether to provide a uniform export or a differentiated incentive was raised.
Uniform subsidies cause fewer additional distortions in the economy. Whereas it is argued
that those sectors that are least likely to succeed internationally will receive the largest share
of the pie and therefore encourage inefficiencies. Not all exporters face the same level of
protection on their inputs and therefore some manufacturers are able to obtain their inputs at
world prices. Factors other than protection also influence competitiveness such as transport
costs and power tariffs. Kleu (RSA, 1985) argues that because of varying elasticities, even a
uniform overvalued currency affected the different sectors differently.
The incentives rewarded actual exports. There were no incentives aimed at creating additional
capacity to export. South African manufacturers tended, and still do, to manufacture for the
local market. Manufacturing facilities were therefore never constructed with international
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trade in mind. Part of the competitive advantage of the Eastern Tigers was that they achieved
economies of scale that lowered the unit cost of the goods manufactured. South African
exporters simply diverted production away from the local market to the international market
or only exported when they had spare capacity. A subsidy to create production capacity would
have resulted in long term international commitment from manufacturers giving South Africa
a more balanced development profile.
There were no incentives provided for technological innovation directed specifically at
exporters.
This together with the period of political uncertainty and the threat of, and eventual
imposition of, sanctions on a number of industries did not provide ideal conditions for
companies to invest increasing the manufacture of exportables. Manufacturers found it far
easier to lobby for additional protection due to the "total onslaught".
3.3 The 1990 export support measures
From the 1970s, South Africa embarked on a more outward-oriented trade and industrial
policy. Therefore, in order to counteract the anti-export bias and provide an incentive for
manufacturers to export certain measures were introduced. In the mid-1980s, there was a re-
evaluation of the incentives and policies. They were found ineffective and new incentives had
to be provided. (Jones, 1994).
3.3.1 Background to the 1990 export support measures
In the 1960s and 1970s there was rapid growth in both production and exports compared to
the period from the early 1980s. (See Table 3-7 below.) There were numerous factors that
affected trade adversely including: decline in the growth of world demand for basic
commodities; the international debt problem; capital shortages in major industrial countries;
import substitution policies; volatile exchange rates; increasing protectionism; and an increase
in the oil prices in the 1970s.
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Table 3-7 Average annual percentage change in volume terms
1960-69 1970-79 1980·83 1984 1985 1986
Production:
All merchandise 6,0 4,0 0,0 5,5 3,0 3,0
Agriculture 2,5 2,5 2,0 5,0 2,0 1,0
Mining 5,0 3,5 -3,5 0,0 1,0 6,0
Manufacturing 7,5 4,5 1,0 7,0 3,5 3,5
Exports
All merchandise 8,5 5,2 0,5 9,5 3,5 3,5
Agriculture 4,0 3,0 1,5 4,0 0,0 -1,0
Mining 6,5 7,5 2,0 12,0 -2,0 7,5
Manufacturin 10,5 7,0 4,5 4,7 5,0 3,0
Source: GAIT: Internat ional Trade 1985/86 and Focus Newsletter October 1987 as published in HTI Report number 26/4
The changing patterns of trade had a significant impact on South Africa's foreign trade in that
markets for her traditional exports had not grown as fast as markets for manufactured goods
especially certain new products. Neither did South Africa at the end of the 1980s show that it
had adapted to the new changing patterns. Non-tariff protectionist policies have had an
adverse effect on world trade. This was exacerbated in South Africa's case in that she still had
to deal with sanctions. Although the motives for imposing the sanctions are not questioned, it
would seem as though "sensitive" (agricultural products, steel, coal and textiles) industries
were targeted.
3.3.2 Anti-export bias
Belli (1993) found that the average statutory tariff, weighted by the value of imports, did not
make South Africa an over-protected economy. The average statutory duty in 1993 was 27,5
per cent that was just above the median for developing countries . It was however twice as
high as New Zealand 's average tariff.
In 1990, the IDC undertook a study into South Africa 's effective protection. They assumed
that firms set their prices up to the limit allowed by the tariff. On average, the effective
protection was 13 per cent on inputs and 18 per cent on outputs and the effective rate of
protection was about 30 per cent.
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Table 3-8 Estimation ofthe effe ctive protection
Sector Protection on Protection on Effective protection
inputs outputs
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles, apparel and leather
Wood and wood products




Metal products and equipment
Other manufacturing
Total manufacturin































SACOB (1991) found that South African manufacturing costs were 15 per cent higher than
OECD averages, partly because capital and producti vity-adjusted labour costs are higher, and
because input costs are higher. According to Belli (1993) the net effect of the effective
protection and GElS was that exporters were still operating in an anti-export biased
environment.
3.3.3 GElS
During the sanctions period, it was deemed necessary to promote exports more aggressively.
To boost exports in general and manufactured goods in particular, it became essential for
financial export incentives to be cost-effective. The Categories A and B schemes of the 1980s
were not achieving the results necessary. Government consequently developed an incentive
scheme that rewarded export performance while encouraging the beneficiation of local raw
material s. The new General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS) replaced the Categories A and B
incentive schemes with effect from 1 April 1990.
3.3.3.1 The formula
In formulating the GElS , the Government decided that certain basic requirements should be
met. The most important of which were selectivity, simplicity, flexibility, and easy
administration. The degree of assistance granted is determined according to a formula , which
is based on the value of exports (D), the extent of processing of the export product (M),
inflation and exchange rate fluctuations (E), as well as the local content of the export product
(P).
The formula for the calculation of the GElS benefit is:
Z = D x (M ± E) x P
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The individual components of the formula are discussed below.
Z-value
Z represented the tax-free incentive paid to exporters. Since the GElS was an open-ended
scheme and the claims on the exchequer theoretically had no limit, although there were budget
constraints, the Department of Trade and Industry issued promissory notes for claims more
than R25 OOOpa (or R12 500 each six month). The promissory notes were however interest
bearing after April 1991. Before 1 April 1991, the interest earned on the promissory notes was
taxable. The GElS subsidy payment was tax-free since its inception until the Minister of
Finance, Derek Keys announced the tax-exempt status would be withdrawn from March 1995.
He stated that "the tax-exempt status of GElS payments was unsound in principle and of small
effect in increasing the incentive value of the payments" (SAPA, 22 June 1994). One of the
reasons for the withdrawal of the A and B Schemes was that: " ... the method of payment was
inappropriate ..... claims for assistance could only be lodged after export had taken place.
Even now, with export assistance being provided by means of promissory notes, claims can
only be lodged annually." As a result many exporters did not use A and B in their costing nor
did it contribute to increased expenditure. Although GElS claims are allowed every six
months , payment still may take place by means of a promissory note and after the export has
taken place. In the worst case scenario, an exporter can wait up to two years after the export
has taken place to receive payment that may be cash or a promissory note.
Ll-value
The U-value represented the free on board (f.o.b.) value of the products qualifying for the
subsidy. This included all transport and insurance costs incurred within South Africa getting
the product to the harbour or border post. Commissions and other overheads cost which were
incurred outside South Africa were not included in the fo.b.-value. The date stamped on the
customs documentation (DA550 and F178) was used to determine the exchange rate (spot-
rate) which was to be used to convert foreign currency into South African Rand.
Using an f.o.b.-value as opposed to an ex-works value was that in reality, transport was also
being subsidised. This subsidy would therefore tend to assist inland exporters (mainly in the
PWV/Gauteng region) who have spare capacity. This was not conducive to new investments.
If an export promotion strategy is to be followed, a firm would more likely set-up near a port
as it would be closer to sources of imported raw material and export markets. GElS therefore
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hindered the development of industry in that potential investments would not be optimally
located.
M-value
This factor was designed to promote the export of products with a high degree of value added.
Customs and Excise have categorised all products into codes based on the Harmonised Tariff
System (HS). This system is used internationally by most of our trading partners and is
harmonised to the six-digit level. The South African system consists of eight digits and is
published in Schedule 1 to the Customs and Excise Act, 1964. Using this code, all export
products are divided into four categories, namely:
Category 1: Primary Products that are products have not been beneficiated significantly and
include basic raw materials and resources.
Category 2: Beneficiated Primary Products that are products that have undergone at least the
first stage of beneficiation but the added value relative to raw material input is still low.
Category 3: Material Intensive Products are products have been beneficiated to such an extent
that further addition of value can occur only if they are either incorporated in or transformed
into category 4 products.
Category 4: Manufactured Products are products are considered those which have been fully
manufactured and to which adding any further value is uneconomic or physically impossible
to add before their use.
To illustrate the categories : raw cotton or wool would be considered a Category 1 product;
yam spun from wool or cotton would qualify as a Category 2 product; once the yam has been
woven into fabric it would be categorised as a Category 3 product ; and finally when it was
made into a garment it was rated as a Category 4 product. Although the scheme was designed
to assist in the beneficiation of products, clearly more work goes into producing a worsted
fabric or other specialist fabric such as that used for parachutes than for a simple T-shirt. Yet
the highly beneficiated specialist fabric only attracted a Category 3 rating while the T-shirt,
which is traded almost as a commodity item in world markets, was rated Category 4.
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Table 3-9 Examples ofthe classifications ofthe industry types
Stage1 Stage2 Stage3 Stage4
Rawmaterials Materials beneficiation Materialtype products Manufacturestype


























Since the level of the export incentive increases according to the category classification of the
product it was hoped that the traditional imbalance between the export of primary products
and final manufactured goods would be redressed.
Reclassification of products
The categories were defined using the HSIO• It soon became obvious, that although the M-
factor was designed to stimulate the export of goods with added value, there were anomalies.
A box of matches, for example, was originally classified as a category 2 product, the wooden
splints used in manufacturing matches qualified for category 3 assistance. Clearly, the degree
of value added in a box of matches was greater than the degree of value added in the wood.
The Department of Trade and Industry therefore set up a committee to evaluate all requests
for reclassification. Numerous changes were made to the system. Special new tariff numbers
were created by the Department of Trade and Industry to differentiate between products sold
in bulk and those packaged for retail sale. The system that was meant to be simple when it
was introduced therefore became more complicated. Companies had to ensure that their
products were correctly categorised before quoting for export orders as the difference in the
subsidy between a category 3 and a category 4 product was 12,5 per cent. Care also had to be
taken when using the new HS numbers created by Department of Trade and Industry, since
Customs and Excise only recognised their HS numbers, the DTI's (GElS) HS code on the
claim form could be different to the code on the Customs and Excise (DA550) form.
P-value
GElS also made it more profitable to export products that were manufactured with South
African content.
llYj'he system was developed for custom s purposes and was introduced in 1988 in South Africa. Most of the trading nations
of the world have now adopted this system. It does not conform to the needs of the manufacturing sector.
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Where U is the value of exports based on the f.o.b. price, and I is the invoice
value of inputs known to be imported.
Products containing more than 75 per cent local content received 100 per cent of the GElS,
while if the local content was less than 35 per cent the export received no assistance. Within
these parameters, the exporter would receive GElS pro-rata to the actual percentage local
content. In 1995, the local content threshold was reduced to 60 per cent to receive full
incentive. This gave exporters more flexibility to use imported inputs that improved their
competitiveness.
The P-factor encouraged exporters to buy South African inputs and discouraged making use
of rebates and drawbacks for importing raw material (under either section 470,03 or section
520,00). GElS therefore inherently maintained the anti-export bias and did not attempt to
remove or reduce it. Only the symptom and not the cause of South Africa's low export
propensity was addressed. As in the case of the If-value including transport costs, the P-value
did not encourage the development of export industries at coastal areas where manufacturers
would have been able to import at world prices and then again export without incurring the
additional transport costs between the port and Gauteng.
E-value
To compensate for the exchange-rate fluctuations and inflation, another factor was built into
the formula whereby a greater subsidy was given if the South African Rand strengthened
against a basket of currencies of South Africa's major trading partners. Since the inception of
GElS however this factor has been negative, which indicates that the authorities felt that the
Rand was undervalued. Figure 3-1 A graph showing the movement of the E-factor and the R
shows the movement of the E-factor and the REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate).
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Source : South African Reserve Bank and Department ofTrade and Industry
The E-factor lagged behind the REER by a few months. This is because the South African
Reserve Bank calculated the E-factor for the Department of Trade and Industry, and based the
calculations on the same basket of countries with similar weights as was used for the
determination of the REER.
The E-factor, because it was based on a basket of currencies, could not compensate for
fluctuations in individual currencies. Although the basket was weighted to represent South
Africa's trading patterns, exporters, especially those exporting to only one or two markets,
could be negatively effected.
Another complaint about the E-factor was that it was only announced six weeks before the
start of the new period. This was to give the South African Reserve Bank and the Department
of Trade and Industry time to establish a reliable future trend. However, many exporters had
to prepare quotations for delivery in six months and therefore had to anticipate or guess the
future E-factor before quoting or determining export price lists.
These complaints were summarised by SACOB (1991) as follows: "The export community is
disappointed and confused by the announcement that the E-factor for the calculation of export
assistance under the General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS) has been fixed at minus 7,5 per
cent for the period 1 April to 30 September this year. The factor is adjusted on the basis of a
basket of currencies. This basket was composed on the actual exports in 1988 and has not
revised since. The US$ has weakened quite significantly since 1988 and more specifically in
recent months. Exporters selling in dollars now find themselves in a position where they lose
Rand earnings on exports because of the weakened dollar."
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Non-qualifying products
As motor vehicles and motor vehicle components benefited from Phase VI of the Local
Content Programme, they were excluded from any GElS benefits. Second-hand, refurbished
and re-exported products did not contribute to the development of the manufacturing sector.
These products too did not qualify for GElS either.
Jewellery, it was argued, consumes gold and other precious metals that would have been
exported in any event. The export incentive was therefore only calculated on the value added
to the precious metal employed in the manufacturing process. GElS payments on precious and
semi-precious stones incorporated into jewellery or other articles were calculated separately
on the export sales value of the stone according to its specific M-factor.
Category 1 products, those raw materials to which no value was added or insufficient
beneficiation took place, had a M-factor of zero. Therefore, unless the REER of the rand
increased significantly, no products in this category would receive any benefit from the
scheme.
3.3.3.2 The claim procedure
An exporter could choose to submit a claim once every six months or once a year, coinciding
with the company's financial year-end. Most exporters however choose a six monthly claim
period because this improved their cash flow. Even exporters claiming every six months only
received the incentive some time after the export had taken place. This, together with other
uncertainties, never encouraged exporters to factor the subsidy into their pricing and therefore
did not encourage the gaining of market-share.
Initially, the claims procedure was relatively simple and therefore open to abuse. After an
investigation by the auditing firm Deloitte and Touche, certain new procedures were
introduced which added to the cost of submitting claims. An auditor's certificate for example
had to accompany each claim. Although Closed Corporations do not have to submit
statements verified by a Chartered Accountant when submitting tax returns, they were
required to obtain these for GElS claims. Therefore, especially small exporters had to
specially appoint a Chartered Accountant to verify the claim that added to the cost.
Late claims
Only claims received by the Department of Trade and Industry within three months after the
relevant claim period had expired were considered by the Department. Although certain
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concessions were made, such as claims sent by mail were accepted if the post mark or other
proof indicated that they were dispatched on or before the expiry date, the procedure did
require exporters to concentrate on claim procedures rather than on export marketing. For
example, The Citrus Board missed the deadline for submitting a R36m GElS claim to the
Department of Trade & Industry for their 1994 export crop. About 1 200 farmers claimed that
government had reneged on its obligation to pay GElS allowances . "Morally and legally, that
money is ours." (John Stanbury, CE of the board's marketing arm Outspan International.) He
acknowledged that the initial claim was 26 days late but says there had never been a problem
before because there was a long-standing agreement on late claims (Financial Mail, 08/07/94).
There are numerous other examples where claims were submitted late, but due to the
regulations controlling the payments of GElS, the Department of Trade and Industry has no
discretion and may not pay late claims..
3.3.4 Critique of GElS
3.3.4.1 Regular changes to the system
The Government's intention to scrap Categories A and B and the deadline was announced
before a replacement had been designed. There was not sufficient time to undertake careful
analysis of the implications of GElS. The system was designed on the run. "Incentives should
be certain and not discretionary. When GElS was mooted, officials could not tell
manufacturers how it would be implemented as they wanted to see how it ran - and then make
the rules. This is hardly a way to promote investment. Schemes should be simple, they should
be bold and they should capture a businessman's imagination" (Hasson, Haywood and van
Zyl, 1993).
In common with export incentives in Turkey and Costa Rica, the entire system of export
incentives was too complicated and subject to frequent changes. Initially , the system of GElS
was designed to be easy to understand and easy for exporters to claim. It soon became clear to
the Department of Trade and Industry that the system was open to abuse and it initiated an
enquiry directed to the administrative procedures . Consequently the guidelines were amended
from 1 October 1992.
Revision 2
The most important changes included:
49
• Certified copies of Bills of Entry (DA 550, DA25, DA 28) and the Exchange Control
Declarations (F178)1I now had to accompany claims were required;
• More accurate information regarding the imported inputs, used to calculate the P factor
was needed;
• A declaration by the chief executive officer of the claimant certifying the accuracy and
validity of the claim had to accompany the claim;
• A declaration by the consultant preparing the claim accepting eo-responsibility for any
fraud also had to be included;
• The cession procedure was amended; and
• The audit report of the independent auditor was extended to ensure that audit
procedures led to a greater degree of compliance.
These amendments put greater burden on the exporters to ensure that they complied with the
rules. Although it does seem to be reasonable,. bearing in mind that public funds were being
used, it did add to the cost of submitting claims. The CEO of the exporting firm now not only
had to ensure that products were sold and marketed efficiently in foreign markets, but that the
GElS claims submitted were correct.
The Department of Trade and Industry did give its assurance that the scheme would continue
until 31 March 1995. This was met with scepticism. Coopers and Lybrand (1993) wrote:
"However, uncertainty exists as to the position after that date. Notwithstanding the assurance
that the scheme will apply until 1995, it may happen that the financial burden of the scheme
may become too onerous for the state. The Department of Trade and Industry may,
accordingly, extend the list of non-qualifying products to such a degree that the total value of
the subsidies is effectively limited in the process. In addition, claimants must take cognisance
of the fact that the current favourable dispensation, namely that the subsidy as well as the
interest on the promissory note is currently income tax free, may not necessarily continue for
the full remaining period of the scheme." This view was the common perception.
Manufacturers were therefore hesitant at making the necessary investment into export
I1 The "DA" forms are the forms Customs and Excise requires exporters complete when goods are exported, while the Fl78
is required by the South African Reserve Bank to ensure that the foreign exchange is received for goods exported.
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marketing and even more reluctant to expand facilities to create capacity for exports as is
required for a successful export promotion strategy.
Revision 3
This revision further clarified definitions and concepts to avoid misunderstandings.
Revision 4
The Department adjusted the GElS benefit levels downward on 1 April 1995 and, according
to its commitments under the WTO, announced that the GElS would be scaled down until the
scheme terminated on 31 December 1997. The reason given was that the expenditure on the
GElS, represented one of the largest single items on the central budget, and payments on
GElS competed with other important development projects on the budget. The Department
had to prove, on a continuous basis, to the Department of State Expenditure and to taxpayers
that the GElS was justifiable and in the interest of industrial development. The Auditor-
General conducted a performance audit on the GElS and questioned the control over GElS
payments.
In terms of GElS Guidelines it was recommended to make it compulsory for claimants to
submit a report on developments that had taken place in the particular firm regarding R&D,
work organisation, human resource development, and in fact on any other positive
developments. To enforce this ruling on GElS beneficiaries, the Department of Trade and
Industry planned to withhold a small portion of GElS payments until these requirements were
met. The Department of Trade and Industry never did implement these changes, although
similar requirements were introduced for the Clothing and Textile industries Duty Credit
Scheme. This was yet another change to the scheme that introduced confusion and created the
impression in the minds of the exporters that goal posts, once set, would be moved again.
Not only were the regular changes to the system a problem to the exporters, but also the
constant consideration by the Department of Trade and Industry and later by bodies such as
Nedlac about future changes to the system or even a complete abandonment of the system
raised concern among exporters. As a result there was continuous speculation by exporters as
to which way government was planning on going. This environment was not conducive to
additional investment.
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3.3.4.2 GElS failed to neutralise the anti-export bias
Holden (1992) determined that there was an implicit tax of 71 per cent (including gold - this
figure is only 34 per cent if gold is excluded) which was shifted to exportables. An increase of
10 per cent in the duty structure resulted in an increase in the average export tax of 3,4 - 7,1
per cent. With GElS benefits of less than 20 per cent for category 4 products, and
considerably lower for other categories, clearly the anti-export bias is still present in the South
African economy. The de facto policy of Government could therefore be considered import
substitution.
This view was confirmed by Belli et al (1993). (See Table 3-8.) Belli found that effective
protection ranged from -26,1 per cent to 239,3 per cent while the GElS payments ranged from
1,19 per cent to 19,1 per cent in 1993. It was found that GElS was neither related to the
protection on inputs nor the degree of effective protection in the domestic market. Of the nine
sectors, two were pro-export, five exhibited an anti-export bias and two an extreme anti-
export bias. Chapter 5 analysis the impact of import substitution on each of the 26
manufacturing sectors, and the impact of export incentives.
In addition, GElS was structured in such a manner to maintain the anti-export bias. The U-
value (see section 3.4.3.1) subsidised transport costs and therefore encouraged exporters to
remain inland and away from the ports. The P-value (see section 3.4.3.1) discouraged
exporters buying foreign inputs and therefore provided no incentive to reduce the anti-export
bias even marginally.
3.3.4.3 GElS failed to recognise competitive or comparative advantages of various
industries
No prior analysis was done to determine which industries had either comparative or
competitive advantages . (See footnote 19 on page 130 and footnote 19 on page130 for a
definition of comparative and competitive advantage.) The various categories were
determined simply on the degree of raw materials beneficiation. Further, no analysis was done
to determine price elasticity of supply in South Africa or the price elasticity of demand in
foreign markets to give a subsidy to those industries that would have contributed the most to
the growth of the South African economy. The subsidy was too general, no potential winners
were identified. It was expected that equal results would be achieved by all sectors.
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3.3.4.4 Impact on imports
One of the reasons GElS was introduced was to generate foreign exchange to meet
commitments under the Debt Standstill Agreements. It is true that the "P-factor" discouraged
the use of imported raw materials. There was, however, no corresponding analysis of such as
machinery requirements , which would be required for increased exports.
3.3.4.5 Small and medium exporters
Figures released by the Department of Trade and Industry show overwhelmingly that GElS
benefited the larger exporters in absolute terms. However, the administrative rules such as the
requirement that claims be accompanied by an auditor's certificate (prepared by a registered
CA) also harmed small exporters . Even the Receiver of Revenue does not require an auditor's
certificate. The cost of preparing a claim and the auditor's certificate often represented such a
great percentage of the claim that exporters would not bother to submit such claims.
Further, it was difficult for small exporters to import raw materials directly. They were
therefore not able to negotiate with large suppliers to obtain the raw materials at international
prices. Large exporters could import the raw materials and use the rebate and drawback
facilities. They used this lever to obtain better raw material prices from domestic supplies for
products exported. However, a few producers of raw materials such as Iscor (Committee for
the export of secondary products) , the South African Sugar Association (see 3.8.3) and Alusaf
(see 3.8.2) do provide rebates to manufacturers who export. Again, the procedures are
complex and detrimental to small and medium sized exporters.
3.3.4.6 Budget
From a budgetary point of view, the scheme is open-ended. It could have cost far more than
was budgeted for. However, the scheme could be manipulated, as many exporters have
indicated, by setting an E-value that is far lower. The Department of Trade and Industry also
issued promissory notes that could be paid from future budgets.
3.3.4.7 Corruption
As with most such financial schemes, it was rife with corruption . Obviously Customs is more
interested in ensuring that their revenue from import duties and excise tax is properly
collected. They therefore seldom checked export consignments. All their resources are
dedicated to checking imports. There was little co-ordination between the Department of
Trade and Industry and the Commissioner for Customs and Excise to ensure that the proper
controls were set in place. The DA 550 was the most important document that the Department
53
of Trade and Industry used in assessing a GElS claim. It was possible for an exporter to load a
container with rocks and complete documentation for clothing and export them without
Customs ever being aware. However, had adequate controls been put in place, it would have
been counter-productive. Customs could and would have had to stop and check many
containers. These goods would have been unduly delayed. This would have caused delays that
are unacceptable to foreign importers. Costly and uneconomical controls and verifications had
to be set in place. Uncertainty was created among exporters who, rightly or wrongly were
under investigation. This certainly impacted negatively on the export drive.
As the scheme progressed it became obvious that abuses were taking place and the
Department of Trade and Industry placed more administrative requirements in place.
Declarations are required from a Chartered Accountant and the Freight Forwarder. In many
cases, exporters have obtained the services of "consultants" who complete and submit the
claims. The scheme, which was originally meant to be simple and easy to administer has
become clumsier and uses considerable resources that could be put to more effective use in
the South African economy.
3.3.5 EMA
Partly as a result of the withdrawal of Category C & D (section 11bis), EMA was introduced.
However, EMA comprises mainly old Category C incentives. The following schemes are
available under EMA: primary export market research; outward selling trade missions; inward
buying trade missions; and participation in foreign exhibitions. These schemes are especially
geared towards assisting small- to medium-sized concerns (SME) in their efforts to find
suitable markets abroad.
3.3.5.1 Primary export market research
This scheme partially provides compensation to exporters for costs incurred in developing
new export markets through personal contact with potential clients in international markets.
The assistance covers the following: the cost of an economy class return air ticket; the cost of
transporting the samples up to a maximum of R600; and a subsistence allowance of R400 per
day for a maximum of fifteen days per applicant.
3.3.5.2 Assistance for outward-selling and inward-buying trade missions
The Outward-Selling Trade Mission Scheme provides financial assistance to trade missions to
make contact with foreign buyers with a view to concluding export orders. The primary
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objective of such missions is to facilitate personal contact in trade and government circles, to
obtain information regarding the trading conditions in the markets being explored and to
exploit new opportunities. The ultimate aim should be to conclude new export contracts. Only
a recognised employers' organisation or a trade association qualifies for this scheme.
The Inward-Buying Trade Mission Scheme provides financial assistance to inward buying
trade missions so that prospective buyers can make contact with South African exporters to
conclude export orders. The primary objective is the same as the outward selling trade
missions. The only difference is that potential importers are assisted in coming to South
Africa and establishing links with South African exporters.
Outward missions are regularly arranged by SAFTO, Chambers of Commerce, and other
business organisations . Despite the subsidisation of these missions by the Department of
Trade and Industry, the organisers often find it difficult to recruit participants. Different
exporters have different needs, which cannot be accommodated by trade missions. Trade
Missions tend to be more public relations exercises than trade promotion efforts.
Inward buying missions are usually initiated by firms, who approach organised business to
make applications on their behalf. For this reason, inward missions have tended to be more
successful. It is mainly large exporters who benefit.
3.3.5.3 Participation in foreign exhibitions
Exhibitions are considered the most cost-effective means for an exporter to introduce and
promote his product to a number of potential clients. The Department administers two
promotional schemes to encourage and assist exporters to introduce their products into foreign
markets by participating in exhibitions.
Official group participation by way of national pavilions
These projects are undertaken for both commercial and political "waving the flag" purposes.
The Department of Trade and Industry officially participates in exhibitions around the world.
This participation takes the form of national pavilions in which South African exporters may
exhibit their products to identify foreign outlets. Participation in international exhibitions
using national pavilions offers firms an ideal opportunity, particularly new exporters, to
experience international foreign marketing conditions while their direct expenses are
relatively small and all the administrative arrangements are taken care of.
55
Financial assistance for individual participation.
Besides the assistance granted in respect of participation in national pavilions, exporters
participating in any other specialised exhibition qualify for financial assistance. The cash
reimbursement will only be made after termination of the exhibition. The amount paid by the
Government will be limited to 80 per cent of the acceptable items, up to a maximum of
R15 000 on the basis of actual expenditure, as substantiated by invoices, receipts and proof of
payment ofthe foreign exchange involved.
3.3.5.4 The impact of EMA
The aim of assistance is to partially compensate exporters for costs incurred in developing
new export markets, establishing personal contacts, introducing their products into foreign
markets, and more importantly, to conclude new export contracts. Most governments assist
exporters with exhibitions. Many governments also assist with trade missions. The Primary
market research scheme is not as common. The South African Government stated at the
Review of it's Policies in June 1993 that it did not consider that the EMA schemes were
contrary to GATT and that the intention was to keep them.
3.3.6 Sectoral support schemes
During the late-1980's the Board of Trade and Industry, under Dr L. McCrystal, investigated
the replacement of the Categories A and B incentives with industry specific incentives. The
underlying rationale for these programmes was the weak performance of the manufacturing
sector, its inability to adapt to changing market conditions and its uncompetitiveness in the
international markets. These were known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP).
However, after the investigations the Director-General of Trade and Industry, Dr S. Naude,
complained that the proposed SAPs were too complicated to administer and that a simpler
system would be needed. As a result GElS was introduced. However the SAPs for two
industries, the clothing and the automotive industries, remained. The SAPs made it attractive
to export by reducing import duties on certain products based on export performance. Both
these industries enjoyed a high protection rate making them ideal candidates for this type of
incentive. However, it is not in the scope of this dissertation to analysis the success of the
SAPs.
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3.3.6.1 Motor vehicle manufacturing
With this programme, the local content, on a value basis, of South African produced motor
vehicles, was required to increase from an industry average of 55 per cent at the inception of
the programme with the aim to raise this to 75 per cent by 1997. Essentially, the Phase VI
Local Content Programme tried to reduce the foreign exchange used by South African vehicle
manufacturing and associated industries by about 50 per cent over eight years. To this end, the
provisions of the programme contained a 50 per cent penalty on foreign exchange usage by
the industry or a 50 per cent avoidance incentive.
Vehicle manufacturers, in terms of Phase VI of the programme, achieved the prescribed local
content targets in essentially two ways. One is by reducing foreign exchange usage or imports,
or by increasing the local content in locally assembled vehicles (i.e. import substitution). The
second method of increasing Phase VI local content was by foreign exchange earnings,
through incremental export business. To encourage exports further, component manufacturers
who exported their products could cede such export credits to the motor vehicle manufacturers
to raise the local content level of the motor vehicle manufacturers.
The criticism of the programme was summed up by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Derek
Keys during the 1993 budget debate on the Department of Trade and Industry . He stated: "it is
abundantly clear that whereas (Phase VI of the local content programme for the motor vehicle
industry) has achieved one of its objectives in making the industry export conscious, it has
certain flaws which have the overall effect of reducing local jobs and increasing motor vehicle
prices. In addition, very material frauds have been perpetrated." This critique can probably be
said about any export enhancement programme in the world. This industry is discussed in
more detail in section 6.3.30.
The Motor Industry Development Programme
Registered motor vehicle manufacturers that export motor vehicles and automotive
components and tooling manufacturers or exporters may qualify for importer rebate credits
under the Motor Industry Development Programme. Import rebate credits can be earned
through the export of eligible products. The value of import rebate credits that can be earned
will be the difference .between the foreign currency earnings and the foreign currency usage.
Royalties received been in respect of exports will only form part of export sales value if
included in the export sales value of eligible exports. Commissions, salaries, etc paid in South
Africa and transferred abroad later will not form part of the export sales value. The local
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content value of the products exported may be used to rebate the import duty payable on
completely built-up light and heavy motor vehicles and auto automotive components. Each
one ran value of local content of exported lighters motor vehicles qualifiers for use to rebate
the duty payable on one rand of the value of imported lighters motor vehicles. Each one rand
value of local content of export light and heavy motor vehicles, approved automotive
components and tooling qualifiers for use to rebate the duty payable on one rand of the value
of imported automotive components and heavy motor vehicles. The local content value
exporters of heavy motor vehicles , auto automotive components and tooling is reduced by
25% if assembled light motor vehicles are imported against such credits. From table below it
can be seen that the benefits growing to the manufacturers and exporters under his scheme
decrease as the rest of duty imposed on the imports of these products decrease. However, a
period of seven years has been given to the industry to adjust to the international market.
(DTI,1996)
Table 10 Phasing down of the rates ofduties
1 January 1996 61,0 46,0
1 January 1997 57,5 43,0
1 January 1998 54,0 40,0
1 January 1999 50,5 37,5
1 January 2000 47,0 35,0
1 January 2001 43,5 32,5
1 January 2002 40,0 30,0
Source: DTI (/ 996:4)
3.3.6.2 Textiles and clothing
The textiles and clothing industries programme allows clothing and textile fabric
manufacturers who export at least 2,5 per cent of their turnover the duty-free importation of:
products (yams, fabric or clothing), based on exports of products (fabric and/or clothing)
manufactured from locally produced raw materials, or from imported raw materials on which
full duty was paid; and fabrics based on local purchases of raw materials (yams or fabrics).
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As with the motor vehicle industry, the programme is under review. A new export support
programme came into effect on 1 April 1993. This incentive is in the form of duty credit
certificates where the value of such certificates is calculated as a percentage of the f.o.b.-value
of clothing (30 per cent), fabric (15 per cent) and yarn (10 per cent) exports. The duty credit
certificates may then be applied against import duty liabilities for imports.
3.3.7 Drawbacks and refunds of custom duties
3.3.7.1 Approved list of products
Provision is made for the drawback of customs duties previously paid on products listed under
specific industries that are for use in the manufacture, processing, finishing, equipping or
packing of goods for export. The products appearing in this part have been approved by the
Director-General as a permanent form of drawback assistance used in finished goods that are
exported regularly and where local raw materials suitable for the specific use are not locally
available.
3.3.7.2 Temporary drawback
Provision is also made for a drawback of customs duties already paid on goods used in the
manufacture, processing, finishing, equipping or packing of any goods exported in the initial
stages in the development of a new industry when the exporter is testing the export market or
is involved in a once-only transaction and requires relief as a temporary measure.
3.3.7.3 Refunds of duties on goods exported in the same condition
Refunds of custom duties are provided for in respect of goods which are not legally saleable
in South Africa or which, at the time of importation, were not in accordance with the terms of
the contract or which have been landed damaged and are either returned to the supplier or
abandoned unconditionally to the Commissioner.
A refund of customs duties on goods (not having been returned to the supplier) which are
exported for trade purposes in the same condition as imported or in a condition in which the
essential character of the imported goods has been retained, is also available.
3.3.8 Rebates and refunds of excise duties
3.3.8.1 Approved list of products qualifying for specific excise duty rebates
A full specific duty rebate is given on excisable goods imported (including the supply as
stores for foreign-going ships or aircraft) to the manufacturer of such goods. The list of goods
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includes mineral water, beer, wine, spirits, tobacco , petroleum oils, certain chemicals and new
motor vehicles.
3.3.8.2 Other products qualifying for specific excise duty rebates
A drawback of a specific excise duty may be claimed by manufacturers on excisable goods
used in the manufacture of other goods than those listed, on export of such manufactured
goods. The drawback however, is confined to beverages and related products.
3.3.8.3 Ad valorem excise duty rebates
Manufacturers may claim a full ad valorem excise duty rebate on excisable goods exported ex
a customs and excise warehouse (including the supply as stores to foreign-going ships or
aircraft).
A refund of ad valorem excise duty could also be claimed by an exporter, registered with the
Director-General as an approved exporter, who is not the manufacturer of the goods and who
paid the duty.
3.4 IDC finance schemes
The IDC has a number of finance schemes that are used to develop industry. Schemes have
been developed for exporting manufacturers to further stimulate exports and manufacturing in
general.
3.4.1 Low interest rate scheme for the promotion of exports
RIOO million per year is made available by the IDC to promote new investment directed at
exports. Finance is available at nine per cent per annum for the first three years for the
acquisition of fixed assets (machinery and equipment). Thereafter, the normal IDC rates for
the remaining term of the loan will apply. To qualify for the IDC export promotion scheme at
least 30 per cent of the additional capacity generated by the investment should be directed
towards exports.
3.4.2 Finance for the export of capital goods
Credit facilities are provided by the IDC and commercial banks for capital goods and services
exported from South Africa. These are provided at attractive interest rates, subject to an
acceptable local content. The scheme comprises the following:
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• Post-shipment finance, which commences when the contract has been completed and
the goods have been accepted by the buyer, or upon progress payments falling due.
• Medium to long-term finance to foreign customers, where the repayment periods are
two years or more, up to a maximum of 10 years.
3.5 Export credit re-insurance
The Export Credit and Foreign Investment Re-Insurance Act was introduced in 1957 and is
considered the first direct involvement of Government in the promotion of exports. Its aim
was to limit the exposure of an exporter to credit risk when pursuing export opportunities.
Export credit re-insurance is regulated by the Export Credit and Foreign Investment Re-
Insurance Act, 1957 (Act 78 of 1957) as amended. Exporters who ship goods to buyers
outside South Africa on credit terms are subject to certain risks before they receive a return on
their outlay. The possibility of non-payment, owing to political or commercial circumstances
beyond their control, constitutes a major part of the risk factor in the export business. Political
risks include laws, wars, strikes, and political upheavals that obstruct the importation of goods
in the buyer's country, or prevent transfer of payment from such a country to South Africa.
Boycotts and sanctions that have the same effects also fall into the risk category.
Commercial risks consist of three main types, namely:
• The insolvency of the buyer;
• protracted default (failure to pay within six months of due date); and
• repudiation (unwarranted failure or refusal of the buyer to take delivery of goods).
The Export Credit Reinsurance Scheme, which is administered by the Credit Guarantee
Insurance Corporation of Africa Ltd (CGIC) in conjunction with the Government, provides
insurance cover against political and transfer risks, as well as commercial and insolvency
risks. Reinsurance of the political/transfer risks is undertaken by the State through the
Department of Trade and Industry, while the commercial/insolvency risks are underwritten by
the CGIC. Commercial/insolvency risks are underwritten by the Department of Trade and
Industry, when the capacity of CGIC is over extended.
It appears as though the scheme has been managed on a commercial basis with very little state
involvement. Even the Political and Transfer risks are covered by the Credit Reinsurance
Fund that is generally made up of premiums. Under Section 11bis of the Income Tax Act,
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exporters could deduct an additional 75 per cent of the premium off their taxable income. This
however seems to be the extent of the State's involvement. Most other developed countries
have such schemes that are heavily subsidised.
Policies covering exports where credit is extended typically from periods up to 180 days cover
five basic risk groups. Pre-shipment cover protects exporters who would not be able to resell
goods if the contract is frustrated between the date of the contract and shipment. Goods
manufactured to certain exact specifications should be covered. Post-shipment cover provides
exporters with protection from the moment the goods are shipped until payment is received.
An exporter will still take out marine insurance to cover loss or damage of goods while in
transit. Exporters who are required to ship consignment stocks, such as South African fruit
exporters, can be covered against confiscation or loss. To promote exports by enabling
approved exporters to require additional finance to secure and execute certain export orders,
and who would not normally be able to obtain finance under normal banking practices,
guarantees are given to commercial banks who provide such finance. (For a further discussion
on the potential use of credit insurance see section 5.5.)
3.6 Tax
Before 1992, section 11 bis was the most important incentive available to exporters under the
Income Tax Act. It was withdrawn because of cost and abuse. Nevertheless, a few other tax
benefits remain which exporters can use.
3.6.1 Value-added process allowances 37E of the Income Tax Act
Section 37E of the Income Tax Act provides for an accelerated write-off of existing
allowances for the cost price of machinery, plant and buildings used in a value-added process
of local and imported raw materials and intermediate goods, and for an accelerated deduction
of pre-production interest or finance charges.
Section 37 E of the Income Tax Act was introduced in September 1991 and expanded in
March 1992. It provided for tax allowances in the form of accelerated write-offs for capital
goods and property used in the beneficiation of raw materials and intermediate products. The
main aim of this allowance was however geared to promoting investment in value-added
projects aimed toward export.
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The applications for qualifying under this scheme expired on 11 September 1993. A new
company tax structure was introduced whereby the company tax rate was reduced from 48 per
cent to 40 per cent. However, a fifteen per cent tax on distributed profits was introduced with
the aim to encourage firms to retain profits and reinvest them in new projects.
The accelerated write-off was mainly aimed at allowing projects such as Columbus Steel and
the Alusaf extensions to be internationally competitive.
3.6.2 Appointments of export agents
The Income Tax Act allows the deduction of the costs incurred in appointing agents: III
countries outside South Africa for the sale of goods to persons outside South Africa. The
deduction is claimable by taxpayers who carry on a trade, other than mining or farming, e.g.
by a manufacturer or any authorised agent in South Africa; and in any export country (as
defined in section 11 bis) for obtaining orders for the supply of goods or services to persons in
export countries.
3.6.3 Doubtful debt allowance
The uninsured portion of foreign debt arising from exports of capital goods may be treated as
doubtful debts for purposes of a deduction in terms of section 11 CD of the Income Tax Act.
3.6.4 Exemptions
The Income Tax Act provides for the exemption from income tax of any amount paid on or
after 1 April 1990 by the State under any scheme for the promotion or financing of exports.
Interest calculated in respect of a period after 1 April 1991 in terms of the GElS is also tax-
free. This interest free allowance was revoked in the budget speech on 22 June 1994.
3.6.5 Value added tax
Value Added Tax was introduced III September 1991. In common with most, if not all
countries that use VAT as a form of revenue, the Act provides for the zero rating of exports of
either goods or services. An exporter would therefore be entitled to obtain credit or refunds of
the value added tax (input tax) paid by him on taxable supplies used to manufacture the
exports.
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Importantly , the Act provides for the zero-rating of services comprising the filling, granting or
maintaining of intellectual property rights such as patents, designs trade marks or copyrights ,
insofar as they are to be used in the export country.
Exporters have not complained that the claims procedure is too complicated. There is
however, a delay from the time the inputs are purchased until the time the VAT is reclaimed.
This has caused certain cash flow problems initially. Exporters have however adapted to this
and it seems as though procedures at the Receiver's Office are running smoothly.
3.6.6 Indirect tax incentives and concessions
A manufacturer who exports at least 15 per cent of the total value of all goods manufactured
by him, calculated according to the ex-factory price, may qualify for a relief from surcharge
on capital goods imported for use by him.
3.7 Concessions
There were many concessions in the 1970s and 1980s available to exporters. Reduced railway
rates were introduced because the then South African Railways realised that the
manufacturing was in the PWV area and that where exporters could prove that the cost of
railage "is the most important reason why the product cannot be marketed at a competitive
price abroad, the South African Railways will consider the introduction of reduced or 'export'
rates in an endeavour to offset this disadvantage." (Department of Trade and Industry,
1973:13) This benefit is no longer available although the cost of shipping from Durban to
Singapore or Rotterdam is cheaper than from Johannesburg to Durban.
Shipping lines are often willing to negotiate reduced rates with exporters. These negotiations
are offered as good business practices rather than providing further incentives to exporters.
There is more southbound cargo to South Africa and therefore rather than sending empty
ships north, it is better to offer concessionairy rates. The Conference Lines offer a 'COP-rate'
of up to $150 off each container depending on the volumes and frequency. Non Conference
lines are always willing to negotiate lower freight rates, again depending on volumes,
frequency of shipping, and the balance of north and southbound trade. The rates normally
differ considerably, from a low of $550 for a 20 foot container shipped to Singapore to $2 400
for a container to Chile. Distance is not the deciding factor. A Container to Mombassa costs
$1500. (Turners Shipping, 1996).
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3.7.1 Electricity
In many industries, the cost of power is an important element of the total cost of processing.
Escom is the major generator of power in South Africa. In some cases it supplies directly to
the consumer, in other instances power is purchased by municipalities and other suppliers.
However, Escom has made arrangements with Alusaf to supply electricity at a reduced rate
and the price is determined by a formula linked to the Aluminium price at the London Metal
Exchange. Since South Africa has a spare capacity of electricity that is among the cheapest in
the world, this symbiotic relationship should benefit both industries and a precedent has now
been established and will probably extended to other manufacturers.
3.8 Private sector subsidies
The Reynders Commission recommended that: "private firms which supply raw materials for
incorporation in export products, give special attention to the possibilities of reducing their
prices on those quantities used in the manufacture of goods, especially in view of benefits
which could accrue from high production volumes and marginal costing; and agricultural
marketing boards of whatever type consider, in consultation with the Department of
Commerce, further possibilities for more favourable prices concerning the quantities of
primary raw materials incorporated in export products." (RSA, 1972)
There have been many complaints that manufacturers use import parity pricing policies. They
maintain separate prices for the local market and the export market, the later being lower.
Many primary producers do in fact provide rebates for manufacturers who use their raw
materials as inputs for the manufacture of export products. Regrettably, prices are simply
brought into line with those available internationally. There is no evidence that manufacturing
exporters are given the benefit which "accrue from high production volumes and marginal
costing". As with all bounties, because of the potential for fraud, claims procedures are
complex and add to the cost.
3.8.1 Iron and Steel
The Committee for Secondary Manufacture allows exporters who use South African steel in
their exports to claim a rebate. The South African Iron and Steel Institute claimed that in the
five-year period to March 1995, through this export assistance scheme of price incentives and
rebated prices, the steel industry paid out RI298-million. Although it received over
R800million in GElS. (SAPA, 10 April 1996)
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Although the primary producers passed on more than received from GElS and assisted
downstream manufacturers to remain internationally competitive, effective protection
remained a problem for these manufacturers.
Claims submitted are only paid if there are funds available. Exporters are therefore not sure
how long they will have to wait to receive these rebates. This hampers exporters' cash flow
and makes it difficult to determine export costs. The claim procedure, although similar to
GElS 's claim procedure, is more complicated in that exporters have to determine the value
and quantity of steel exported. This also contributes to increased costs that hamper exporter
competitiveness.
3.8.2 Aluminium
Huletts Aluminium and Alusaf provide an export rebate based upon the actual mass of the
aluminium exported. The amount of the rebate is negotiated with the exporter before the
actual export-taking place. It can therefore vary and it depends on the negotiating skills of the
exporter. Huletts Aluminium were not prepared to disclose even the average rebates paid to
exporter. It would seem therefore that small exporters and exporters entering the export
market for the first time are at a disadvantage and therefore still experience an anti-export
bias.
Claims can be submitted monthly. Exporters can therefore calculate this benefit into their
export costing. However, the claims procedure and the negotiations that have to take place
before exporting, simply add to the cost of exporting. Although a good second-best option, it
would be preferable to reduce the protection, which would give exporters access to inputs at
world prices. Claims need to be supported by audited proof certifying the aluminium mass of
the product actually exported together with official export documents (DA550 or F178) to
prove exports actually took place.
3.8.3 Sugar
The South African Sugar Association provides rebates to exporters of food products who use
sugar as input. The rebate is calculated to give the exporter the price of sugar at world prices.
The exporter therefore, could benefit by buying sugar normally at the South African price,
when the South African price is lower than the world price.
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The exporters have to complete certain documentation that contributes to increased costs.
These have however been kept to a minimum. Regrettably, the South African Sugar
Association has found fraudulent claims that may result in additional controls.
3.9 Conclusion
Although there are many schemes and export enhancement measures, clearly South African
exporters face an anti-export bias along with numerous other factors that hamper their export
efforts. Since 1972, the South African Government and various private sector organisations
have endeavoured to compensate for the barriers. The effectiveness of GElS in neutralising
the anti-export bias and creating an export culture will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.
Table 3-11 Examples ofthe classification ofindustry types
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Raw materials production Materials beneficiation Material type products Manufactures type
industries industries (first stage) industries second stage) products industries




























































Table 3-12 Export incentives per annum
@i6:f Gl:fWM0:FU:!-lii:!U:f@:@U·mq
Administration 0 0 0 0 0 15674284 16614311 20736291 23837401 28772629 42311487
Advertising 447929 549057 493965 701419 901787 1248979 1413372 1472216 1761710 1753476 1514493
Fairs 575872 721525 830060 1357231 171 0681 1805491 2189132 2616386 2129910 2535140 1004524
Exhibitors 58222 164793 175409 21 5921 0 1364589 2859571 2568401 2063771 1879738
SP's Export Award 0 0 0 0 415248 30440 23290 32561 31444 44625 0
Trade Missions 70136 147705 183620 295389 444607 1246303 1303349 1365189 1277030 630695
Sitprosa 0 0 0 0 0 196000 259000 356000 409000 450000 0 240000
SAFTO 0 0 0 0 0 4099998 4200000 4900000 5390000 5603000 0 5250000
Interest financing CGIC 4573213 13137545 18588425 2070041 30349809 16895195 24537350 42833702 79304645 33469683
Interest financing foreign stock 150 1562721 2581866 2858819 3379134 6480734 4336595 3256340 658166 184106 0 0
Warehousing 7016 118013 17877 74186 33025 761267 1043905 1177139 1251455 542880
Primary Market research 10588 15657 21780 66104 969473 2744130 2082622 1880569 1680768 1979675 175304
Beneficitation of minerals 42006005 56989238 68672662 78487853 83801346 105000000 131765620 157608917 159702081 46000000 134280105 134280000
AANDB 0 0 0 0 8132896 6076046 440203910 451 635450 650084686 563822277 210961089 872514000
GElS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1031854993 1156450000 1567500000
Airsubsidy on perishable 868189 2009426 1375070 2010618 5569476 5344406 2714170 2947439 3396502 1359009 0 0
Counter Trade Ass 0 0 0 0 0 111707 381684 388934 90000 213440 0 90000
Assistance to Auto Industry 0 0 0 0 0 4125320 0 39348589 170305765 162173724 12173472 21 7522000
Joint market research 0 0 2800 2245 0 3500000 3786666 3500000 6219 0 0 67000
Perishable products 1347132 1297829 3302637 0 4497795 4124959 3823092 3706077 4267307 1241276 0 0
Contributions to C.of 0 0 0 0 0 251094 16657 0 805885 1315386 0 0
Commerce
SAR&H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62000000 0
Wool &Mohair 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11550000
CGIC fund 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1000
Source: Department of Trade and Industry Annual Reports
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4. Subsidies
The problem of export subsidies is no longer a privy issue intermittently deliberated
by international trade negotiators. Subsidies have in fact moved to the centre stage of
international trade fora and were prominent during the Uruguay Round of GATT.
Most governments provide subsidies that benefit their exporters in one form or
another. The South African Government has paid over R6 000 000 000,00 since April
1990 in GElS payments in an effort to achieve greater growth in exports and thereby
stimulating the South African economy.
Table 4-1 Amount spent on GElS in an attempt to promote South Af rican exports
Year Amount spenton GElS
1990/91 1000000000,00
1991/92 1300000000,00
1992/93 1600 000 000,00
1993/94 1300000000,00
1994/95 1500000000,00
Source: Clothfed (1996) and DTI Annual Reports.
Assuming that an export promotion policy is suitable for South Africa and will
contribute to welfare improvement , the next question is whether the government 's
1990 package to stimulate exports was indeed the correct policy option. This chapter
will examine the rationale behind government's use of subsidies to attain economic
goals and particularly to promote exports. A definition of an export subsidy, the effect
of both domestic and export subsidies, the reasons why governments use subsidises,
and the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) governing the use of subsidies
will also be examined.
4.1 Introduction
Sovereign governments, as can be expected, use "macroeconomic, industrial or social
policies" to achieve various economic or even non-economic objectives to improve
the national prosperity. Subsidies are one of these measures (Hufbauer and Erb,
1994:5). Standard welfare analysis implies that subsidies reduce overall economic
welfare by driving a wedge between what consumers pay and what the producers
receive for a product. The optimal therefore is no subsidy. However, because markets
are imperfect, this analysis has to be revised and subsidies can be shown to improve
welfare if subsidies are limited. (Ford and Suyker, 1992). In the case of export
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subsidies it is foreign consumers who may pay less for the goods as a result of the
subsidy. Therefore, unless there are other factors such as externalities, increasing
returns to scale or information asymmetries, export subsidies will not improve
welfare. (These factors will be discussed in more detail in section 5.)
It is a well-established proposition that subsidies are better than other forms of
government intervention. (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963) and (Corden 1974)
Therefore if it is deemed necessary to produce a particular product or promote a
particular industry, then government should either subsidise production or the export
of that product rather than imposing barriers to imports. Subsidies encourage
production rather than discourage consumption.
Governments use many techniques to boost or protect their manufacturers. Tariffs are
probably the oldest and most widely used methods. However there are many other
non-tariff barriers that are designed to achieve the same end albeit by indirect means.
The most common form of non-tariff barriers used by Governments are: quotas which
include a wide range of instruments ranging from import control to voluntary restraint
agreements (VRAs), local content requirements, subsidies, anti-dumping regulations,
and various technical requirements such as labelling requirements or certain quality
standards. New forms of protection are introduced regularly. It can even be argued
that the sanctions imposed on South Africa in the mid-1980's were a form of
protectionism in that the products targeted were so called sensitive products -
agricultural and iron products and textiles and clothing. All the above restrictions
obviously have an impact on trade.
Arguably, the easiest policy options available to government to stimulate domestic
production are tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Since the end of World War H, tariffs
have generally been reduced. There has been a general trend toward freer trade.
However, non-tariff barriers have begun to play a more prominent role in international
trade. This substitution of explicit tariffs for non-tariff trade barriers is sometimes
called new mercantilism or new protectionism. (Carbaugh, 1985) The international
negotiating community has limited itself mainly to those actions that assist firms
directly to compete internationally. Less visible non-tariff barriers that also have the
effect of limiting trade, are replacing tariffs. Subsidies are granted to help domestic
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firms compete against foreign firms (in either the domestic or international market)
and can also be considered an indirect form of protection. The effect of the subsidies
is to allow less efficient domestic producers to compete against efficient foreign firms
in the domestic market and thereby keeping the foreign competitors out. Subsidies
allow firms to sell products at prices lower than actual costs or profit considerations
would normally allow.
In reality, as with all government favours, subsidies are granted for a multitude of
reasons. Herderschee (1995) identifies three economic reasons why export incentives
are necessary in countries with high levels of protection.
• Firstly, subsidies offset protection for intermediate inputs used in the production of
exports. Import substitution policies cause price increases in intermediate inputs
used in manufacturing for export. Balassa (1982) has indicated the effect of the
import substitution policy by calculating the effective rates of protection. The high
input prices result from tariffs, quantitative restrictions or discriminatory
regulations.
• The second reason for incentives is to offset factor-market distortions. As a result
of protection, import-substitution firms draw scarce resources to their activities and
away from exporting industries. This effect is also felt by non-traded goods and
services, and their costs rise as a result of protection. As import substitution
policies begin to influence the economy, skilled labour (which is scarce in
developing counties) and other scarce resources are diverted to those industries.
Theoretically, subsidies can be given to offset these factor-market distortions. It is
usually beyond the fiscal and administrative capacity of most developing countries
to implement such schemes. Liberalisation, however, remains the first best
alternative.
• The third category of incentive, intra-industry subsidies, which governments can
use to increase the volume of exports, is to encourage (or force) firms to use the
profits generated in the home market to become competitive in the international
markets. Many of the reasons given for subsidies are of a political rather than
economic nature.
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Subsidies can take many forms. Subsidies can vary m form from direct grants
dependant upon exports, such as GElS, to indirect assistance such as subsidised
insurance cover. The instruments which governments use include grants, tax
concessions, loans (below market rates), and equity participation that will be
discussed in greater detail below.
There is an unrelenting debate between politicians, producers, organised labour, and
taxpayers regarding the merits of supporting one sector or industry over another. Any
subsidy granted to one sector would have an impact on other sectors directly or
indirectly. The effect can be positive or negative.
Many justifications have been put forward for the introduction of various subsidies.
These include: the infant industry (or sunset industry) argument, national security,
others do it and the playing fields must be levelled, industries must achieve economies
of scale, to offset the anti-export bias, exporting is more risky and more difficult than
domestic marketing and therefore needs assistance,· and to earn foreign currencies
because of foreign debt or other financial crises to achieve social goals such as
regional development. These will be discussed later in section 5.
4.2 Definition of an export subsidy
4.2.1 Domestic subsidies
It is important to distinguish between those subsidies that benefit exports directly and
those which do so only incidentally. A domestic subsidy relates to all production in a
particular sector regardless of its destination. All government actions are meant to
benefit someone and can be regarded as a subsidy. Many of these subsidies will
benefit exports albeit indirectly. Snape (1988) quotes the example of requiring flags
flown on government building to be locally manufactured. This action will secure a
home market and may promote economies of scale allowing the firms to export. It
therefore becomes very difficult to know where to draw the line. Defence is a
recognised government function. By assisting defence contractors to cover the cost of
weapons, commercial applications such as computers, the Global Position Systems
(GPS - to assist location plotting) and many other commercially marketable
applications have been developed.
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The US government is by far the world's largest consumer of military hardware. US
manufacturers dominate the production of military goods involving large economies
of scale. US government purchases of defence equipment often help US corporations
gain economies of scale that help them in both the US and international civilian
markets. Adams and Stoffaes (1994) cite the example of Boeing: The B-52 bomber
resulted in the development of the Boeing 707. Now even though the Boeing 707 has
reached the end of its civilian life it continues to be manufactured as the AWACS
reconnaissance plane. Military R&D sometimes give US companies knowledge that
they can apply elsewhere.
Although education is certainly a function of government, educating and training
citizens in a particular industry will surely give that industry an advantage they can
use to export. Ismail (1995) maintains that South Africa's low levels of education
have been crucial to the failure of the manufacturing export sector to expand.
In the South African context, the Electronics Support Programme is a good example
of a local subsidy that benefits both local sales and export sales. Manufacturers are
assisted to develop new electronic applications. Although many of the items
developed are exported, the aim of the programme is to develop the electronics
industry.
Nam (1987) found that domestic subsidies, as opposed to export subsidies, provided
by the Korea and Mexico authorities, provoked countervailing duties in the US. These
countervailing duties exceeded the amounts of subsidies given to Korean or Mexican
exporters. Because domestic subsidies can also be provided by many more diverse
channels, than export subsidies, they are more difficult to detect. They obviously can
also assist exporting and therefore the US government's countervailing duties.
4.2.1.1 The effects of domestic subsidies
Governments give subsidies to agents in the market to influence the market to achieve
certain given political, social or economic goals. The subsidies are usually designed to
either lower the price or increase the supply of the good being subsidised. Subsidies
will invariably have side effects that will influence other sectors of the economy. In
some cases, the subsidies can affect the economy considerably in other cases less so.
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However, in the majority of cases, subsidies make use of government funds which are
raised by taxes. Thus the total welfare of a country can be affected negatively by the
impact of the additional taxation or positively by the beneficial impact of the
redistribution or other effect of the subsidy.
The trade and welfare effects of a subsidy are shown above. The initial supply for
South African widgets is shown at Ssal and the demand at Dsao. Since South Africa is a




small purchaser of widgets, increases or decreases in amounts purchased do not affect
the world price. Given a world price of Pworld South Africans would buy Q3 and
manufacture QI. South Africa would therefore import Q 3 - QI widgets . Assuming the
government then offers to subsidise the manufacture of widgets for some economic,
political or strategic reason; the supply curve would shift from SsaO to Ssal' Domestic
production would expand from QI to Q2 and the amount imported would reduce
accordingly. The subsidy revenue will partly be redistributed to efficient widget
producers as a producer surplus denoted by area a. There is also a protective effect
that allows more costly less efficient production to take place. This is shown by area b
and is a dead-weight loss to the South African economy. The Government could
achieve a similar effect by using tariffs or quotas. This would generally involve a
larger sacrifice in national welfare. Unlike subsidies, tariffs and quotas distort the
choices for domestic consumers. Subsidies on the other hand have to be paid for
directly by tax revenues, which may not be popular with taxpayers.
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4.2.1.2 Effects of an export subsidy
In essence export subsidies are measures provided by government that allow an
enterprise to sell in an export market at a price below the total net private costs of
production for that market; or allow customers in an export market to buy at a price
below the costs of supplying that market. This assistance is provided to exporters in
three ways: Directly, by subsidising the cost of an industry or activity by providing
concessionary taxes, exemption from government charges, reimbursement of charges
at more than 100 percent, government equity participation or free provision of market
information; indirectly, by subsidising the costs of inputs to an upstream industry - for
example, by subsidising domestic industries which provide material inputs to an
export, or by subsidising the infrastructure used by industry (for example by under-
recovering the cost of port services); or by subsidising consumption - such as by
providing export credit at less than commercial rates or underwriting risk so that more
favourable rates can be obtained than would otherwise be the case.
The beneficiaries of the subsidies include the owners and employees of the industry
producing the subsidised output and consumers of the subsidised product.
In the case where a government has given an export subsidy, producers are
encouraged to export by providing an incentive either to reduce the price paid by
foreigners to South African firms or to increase the margin. Foreign consumers are
favoured over domestic consumers to the extent that the foreign price of the
subsidised product can be less than the products domestic price.
It is assumed that the exporting country (South Africa) is not a price taker, but rather
Figure 4-2 The effects ofan export subsidy
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selling into niche markets. At the equilibrium point Eo, the exporter will sell Qoat
price Po. When government introduces a subsidy, the equilibrium point moves from Eo
to El. The demand curve Do represents the foreign importer's demand curve and
remains unaffected by the subsidy given to the exporters. Therefore, the price paid by
the importer drops to Pw while the price received by the exporter increases to Psa• From
the above analysis , clearly two effects take place when an export subsidy is given to
an industry. Firstly, the subsidy will have an impact on the terms-of-trade. The
equilibrium point shown by Eo will move to El. The export price will fall. This will
result in a decline in the country 's terms-of-trade. Secondly, there will be a revenue
effect. The drop in the price paid by foreigners will result in an increase in the
quantity bought from Qo to QI . If the percentage of goods sold increases more than the
percentage drop in the price of the goods, the country will benefit.
After GElS was introduced the timber furniture manufacturers complained that
foreign importers were negotiating with different manufacturers in South Africa with
the effect that after the introduction of GElS , export prices fell by almost 19 per cent,
which represented the value of the subsidy to the manufacturer. Although production
did expand, and exports of pine furniture increased, this did take time and therefore
the net welfare effect of the subsidy was negative .
4.2.2 WTO definition
The WTO was founded to promote fair trade among nations. It has drafted regulations
to discourage or prevent the use of subsidies that distort competition and adversely
affect other countries. The WTO does not wish to restrain the right of governments to
provide subsidies unduly. Three categories of subsidies have been identified:
prohibited, permissible and actionable subsidies.
The Marrakech Agreement defines a subsidy as existing if the government makes a
financial contribution either directly or through an agent to a firm or industry, or
provides income or price supports. One of the following must occur: direct transfer
from the government's funds or the government guarantees of payment of loans; the
government foregoing the revenue that should otherwise have been collected ; or the
government providing goods or services, or purchasing goods benefiting the industry.
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4.2.3 Definition
Before any meaningful discussion can take place, the term "subsidy" must be defined.
There are many proposals for the definition of the term "subsidy". Subsidies can take
the form of cash grants, tax exemptions, preferential exchange rates, government
contracts with special privileges, inputs (including electricity) at reduced prices or
prices below the cost of producing that input; or any other favourable treatment given
to firms. In fact, since export subsidies have been outlawed by GATT, they are
mutating and adopting forms more difficult to detect.
The provision of subsidies has resulted in the over-production of certain commodities
and the demise of certain industries in particular countries. Subsidies are a sensitive
matter and are regularly discussed in international trade fora. Subsidies were one of
the most heavily discussed issues during the Uruguay Round of GATT. As there are
legal and diplomatic implications it is important, subsidies are defined. Hufbauer and
Erb (1984) hold that "virtually all definitions failed to meet the practical needs of the
policymakers". Broadly, these "policyrnakers" are international fora where
governments meet to discuss the ramifications of each of their policies on their
countries and to negotiate changes. The United Nations (1982) use the following
definition of subsidies for national accounting purposes:
Subsidies include all grants on current account which private industries receive fr om
government. These transfers which, in view of the basis on which they are made, represent
additions to the income of the producers from current production. The grants may, f or
example, be based on the amount or value of the commodities produced, exported or
consumed, the labour or land employed in production, or the manner in which production is
organized and carried on. Transfers by public authorities to private industries for investment
purposes or to cover destruction, damage and other losses in capital and working assets are
classed as capital transfers rather than as subsidies.....Subsidies also include all grants on
current account which government make to public corporations, for example, in compensation
f or operating losses (negative operating surplus). In the case of government enterprises,
transfers on current account should be treated as subsidies when it is clear that the transfers
are the consequences ofthe policy ofthe government to maintain prices at a level at which the
proceeds ofthe enterprise will not cover the cost ofproduction.
For a number of years, the question of what a subsidy is, has been the focus of
economists, politicians, and lawyers. In 1979, the Tokyo Round of the GATT
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negotiations was concluded. A "Code" was negotiated which interpreted and extended
GATT provisions relating to subsidies and countervailing duties.
It is thus difficult to find a workable definition of a subsidy. Policymakers have
therefore turned to the degree to which governments provide subsidies . Hufbauer and
Erb identify four broad concepts that provide the framework of the pre-Marrakech
international rules governing subsidies and countervailing measures: firstly, all
producers must have access to inputs at "world" prices and should be able to sell their
output on world markets at world prices; secondly, governments should not subsidise
exports - selling goods internationally cheaper than in the home market; thirdly,
incentives to industries or agriculture should not be sector specific; and fourthly, any
nation should be entitled to the offsetting remedial action where the second and third
principles and the resulting trade harm the nation 's economic interests.
Subsidies given by the government of the exporter may harm either the domestic
industry of the importing county and other exporters .
4.2.4 The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)
Although there were attempts in the 1920s to return to the gold standard and to
organise trade on a more liberal basis (du Plessis, 1994), the period between the two
world wars was characterised by bilateralism in trade relations and a disintegration of
free trade. Many countries reverted to protection and autarky after the Great
Depression. Towards the end of World War II, the Allied Powers planned to form





The IMF to take care of short-term problems of international liquidity ;
The International Trade Organisation (ITO) to take care of the real side of
internal trading and create liberal system of regulations governing international
trading conditions; and
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/World
Bank to help channel international investment along desired lines.
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Unfortunately , the ITO, the instrument that was to carry the world into a system of
free trade, was the least successful. In fact, the organisat ion was never ratified by
many governments. A less ambitious organisation, GATT, came in its place. It served
as a "clearing house" for trade negotiations between countries. The GATT was
originally signed by 23 countries including South Africa but now represents more than
100 countries and about 24 other nations on a provisional basis.
Seven "rounds", apart from the founding conference, of tariff-bargaining negotiations
have taken place. These were in 1949 (Annecy, France), 1951 (Torquay , UK), 1956
(Geneva), 1960-61 (The Dillon Round), 1964-67 (The Kennedy Round), and 1973-79
(The Tokyo Round). The latest, the Uruguay Round, was initiated in Punta del Este,
Uruguay in September 1986 and was concluded with the acceptance of the Final Act
in December 1993 and signed in Marrakech early in 1994.
GATT has successfully seen the steady reduction of tariffs and a dramatic increase in
world trade. However many tariff barriers have been replaced with non-tariff barriers
and subsidies that distort free trade. Trade among participants has seen a seven-fold
increase since 1950. GATT's success in reducing tariffs saw an increase in the use of
non-tariff barriers. GATT lamentably only regulated trade in manufactured goods. The
Uruguay Round established rules for reducing non-tariff barriers, brought services,
agriculture , and foreign investment into the negotiations , and protected intellectual
property rights.
4.2.4.1 The Uruguay Round
On 15 April 1994 South Africa became a signatory to the Uruguay Round of the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Marrakech Agreement after the Final Act was
signed. The key elements of the Agreement , a 400 - plus page legal document, can be
summarised under three headings:
• Liberalisation of international trade by way of a lowering of import tariffs and
the elimination of non-tariff measures ;
• Strengthening of international trade rules e.g. new agreements on subsidies
and anti-dumping and safeguard measures ; and
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• New agreements on subjects not previously covered by the GATT, namely
Trade in Services, Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), and Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs).
These agreements have and will continue to affect virtually all aspects of South
Africa's foreign trade and they will have a direct bearing on the competitiveness of
industries . As a result of the agreement , South Africa has now been fully integrated
into the international trading community and will in future have to adhere to all the
rules and regulations in this regard. South Africa's offer to the aforementioned
Uruguay Round was negotiated and debated within the National Economic Forum -
labour, business, and government are therefore equally bound by this agreement. It
can be added that South Africa also consulted the other Southern Africa Customs
Union members 12, albeit at a late stage, on the offer to GATT.
GATT has been responsible for much of the liberalisation of international trade since
the end of World War 11. The Uruguay Round too, contributed to the improvements
made in multilateral rules pertaining to international trade in goods. Problems relating
to the trade of services and the protection of intellectual property were also addressed.
The Uruguay Round also saw the creation of the WTO of which GATT is now only
one part.
Agreement On Subsidies And Countervailing Measures (SCM)
Before the Uruguay Round, countries had the option of signing various codes. Before
the Final Act, countries could sign a separate Subsidies Code. Regardless of whether a
country signed the code, providing they were signatories to the GATT, they enjoyed
most favoured nation status. South Africa chose not to sign the Subsidies Code. (Du
Plessis, 1994). This alternative was not offered in the Final Act and countries either
had to sign the entire agreement or not be part of the multilateral negotiating system,
which would have had serious implications regarding trade and the most favoured
nation status members enjoy with each other.
12 The so-called BLSN-countrics viz. Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia.
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The GATT rules do however recognise that governments grant subsidies for various
measures such as encouraging the development of new industry. The GATT rules
governing the use of subsidies are complex and differ for industrial and agricultural
products. The main GATT provisions are elaborated in the SCM (for industrial
products) and in the Agreement On Agriculture (for agricultural products). The SCM
defines a subsidy and introduces the idea of a "specific subsidy". For the most part,
the SCM set out to control subsidies available only to an enterprise, industry, or group
of enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the authority granting the
subsidy.
Only specific subsidies would be subject to the disciplines set out in the Agreement
where:
There has been a financial contribution by a government (or any public body)
where: the government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants,
loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g.
loan guarantees); government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not
collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits)!" a government provides goods
or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods; or a government
makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to
carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated above which would
normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs
from practices normally followed by governments.
Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, are
prohibited: subsidies contingent, in law or in fact", whether solely or as one of several
BIn accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the provisions of Annexes
I through III of this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product
when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those
which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.
14This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without having been made legally
contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere
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other conditions, upon export performance; subsidies' contingent, whether solely or
as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.
The aim of the Agreement is to prohibit or discourage governments from using those
subsidies that distort conditions of competition and cause adverse effects on the trade
of other economies and not to prevent governments from their right to grant subsidies.
nrc, 1995)
Prohibited, actionable and non actionable subsidies
The Agreement establishes three classes of subsidies; prohibited (red), actionable
(amber) and non-actionable (green). (The traffic lights are used as an analogy; red -
must stop; amber - proceed with caution; and green - may proceed.) First, it deems the
following subsidies to be "prohibited": those contingent in some way upon export
performance; and those contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. The
agreements illustrative list includes:
• subsidies based on export performance (such as GElS);
• currency retention schemes involving a bonus on exports;
• provisions of subsidised domestic inputs;
• exemptions from direct taxes (e.g. tax on profits related to exports);
• exemption from indirect taxes (such as VAT) on exported products in excess
of those borne by the product (South Africa's system in this regard therefore
falls within the prescriptions);
• remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied on inputs
consumed in the production of exported goods (again South Africa's drawback
and rebate schemes - sec 470,03 and 521 - do not make provision for payments
in excess of those levied and are therefore "GATT-friendly");
fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be considered to be an export
subsidy within the meaning of this provision.
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• export guarantee programmes offering levels of coverage in excess of the
long-term costs of the programme (South Africa's credit reinsurance schemes
has run at a profit and therefore does not offer excessive levels of coverage);
and
• overtly preferential export credit programmes, where they are used to secure a
material advantage in export credit.
In addition, subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods
are also prohibited.
Under the previous GATT rules, the codes pertaining to the use of export subsidies
did not apply to developing countries. The new rules have now been extended to
include developing countries except for the least developed countries and countries
with GDPs less than $1000 per capita. The rules however do allow a more generous
period in which to phase out the subsidies in the case of developing countries.
The second category is "actionable" subsidies. The agreement stipulates that no
member should, using subsidies, adversely effect the interests of other WTO
members. The subsidies should not cause injury to the domestic industry of another
signatory, nullify or impair the benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other
members under the General Agreement (in particular the benefits of bound tariff
concessions), or serious prejudice to the interests of another member. "Serious
prejudice" is presumed to exist for certain subsidies, including when the total ad
valorem subsidisation of a product exceeds 5 per cent. In such a situation, the burden
of proof is on the subsidising member to show that the subsidies in question have not
caused serious prejudice to the injured member.
The third category involves "non-actionable" subsidies, which are either non-specific
subsidies, or specific subsidies involving assistance to industrial research and pre-
competitive development activity, assistance to disadvantaged regions, or certain
types of assistance for adapting existing facilities to new environmental requirements
imposed by law and/or regulations. Where another member believes that an otherwise
non-actionable subsidy is resulting in serious adverse effects to a domestic industry, it
may seek a determination and recommendation on the matter. These would include
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subsidies for research activities, subsidies to adapt existing facilities to new
environmental requirements and to assist the development of industries in
disadvantaged regions.
Even the developing countries have to cease export subsidies on products that are
"export competitive", having at least 3,25 per cent share of the world market of any
section in the Harmonised System Nomenclature (HS) for a period of two years.
Further any subsidies given to encourage privatisation will be treated as a non-
actionable subsidy.
Remedial actions and countervailing measures
Where countries feel that they have been adversely affected by a permissible subsidy,
the agreement allows for the matter to be raised in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
Another part of the agreement concerns the use of countervailing measures on
subsidised imported goods. It sets out disciplines on the initiation of countervailing
cases, investigations by national authorities and rules of evidence to ensure that all
interested parties can present information and argument. An application for an
investigation shall include sufficient evidence of the existence of a subsidy, material
injury to the domestic industry; and a causal link between the subsidised imports and
the alleged injury. A countervailing duty can only be imposed after an investigation
by the injured country. However, rules and procedures are set out. The rule does not
per se regard that the exporter may sell his product at a lower price in the foreign
market than in the home market as censurable. It is realised that the importing
country's industries and consumers may benefit from the lower prices. The domestic
industry must therefore complain about suffering from material injury because of the
subsidy. This will be determined by factors such as a decline in output, sales, market
share, profits, productivity, return on investment, and the utilisation of capacity.
Potential decline as well as actual decline suffered is taken into consideration. Also
included are the effects on domestic prices, actual or potential effects on cash flow,
inventories, employment, wages, and growth. The producers who petition the
investigation must represent at least 50 per cent of production of the producers who
expressed either an opinion for or against the application and must also represent at
least 25 per cent of the industry's total production. Once a decision to undertake an
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investigation is initiated, the investigating authorities have an obligation to notify the
government of the exporting country.
Calculation of the amount of a subsidy
Certain disciplines on the calculation of the amount of a subsidy are outlined, as is the
basis for the determination of injury to the domestic industry. Any method used by the
investigating authority to calculate the benefit to the recipient conferred, shall be
consistent with specific guidelines . The Agreement would require that all relevant
economic factors be taken into account in assessing the state of the industry and that a
causal link be established between the subsidised imports and the alleged injury. A
determination of injury shall involve an objective examination of both the volume of
the subsidised imports and the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic
producers of such products .
Investigations
Countervailing investigations shall be concluded immediately in cases where the
amount of a subsidy is de minimis (the subsidy is less than one per cent ad valorem)
or where the volume of subsidised imports , actual or potential , or the injury is
negligible. Except under exceptional circumstances, investigations shall be concluded
within one year after their initiation and in no case more than 18 months. All
countervailing duties have to be concluded within five years of their imposition unless
the authorities determine the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation
or recurrence of subsidisation and injury. Public notice of products that are subject to
such investigations shall be given, and other interested parties notified. Under this
agreement a Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures has been
established. There is also an obligation to enter into negotiations with the government
of the exporting country before the investigation is undertaken. Exporters can avoid
countervailing duties imposed on their products by undertaking to increase their
export prices.
There is an obligation that there is constant review of the countervailing duties. A
sunset clause is also included under which countervailing measures automatically
expire five years after their imposition.
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4.2.4.2 GElS and the SCM
Clearly GElS qualifies as a "prohibited" subsidy and could possibly in some cases be
viewed as an "actionable" subsidy in terms of the SCM. In terms of Article 28.1 (ii) of
the SCM, GElS , which is generally recognised as being susceptible to the definition
of a prohibited subsidy, will have to be brought into conformity with the provisions of
that Agreement within three years of the date of entry into force of the WTO for South
Africa, 1 January 1995.
Of special importance is Article 28.2 of the Agreement which is interpreted to mean
that after the entry into force of the WTO, a notified prohibited subsidy scheme may
not be renewed in the event of it expiring before the end of the three-year period as
provided for in Article 28.1 (ii). Article 29 of the Agreement refers to "members in the
process of transformation from centrally planned into market, free enterprise economy
..." Such members are allowed a period of grace of seven years to bring their subsidy
programmes into conformity with the Agreement and, furthermore , the Counsel has
the discretion of inter alia extending the time-frame. The provisions applicable to
developing countries are complex, but Article 27.2 (b) allows for eight years for the
phasing out of their prohibited subsidies (GATT, 1995). The Agreement recognises
that subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of
developing countries . Therefore , provision has been made for exemptions from the
disciplines of the Agreement in respect of least-developed countries. There is no
provision in the Agreement in terms of which South Africa could apply for derogation
from the three-year period of grace for GElS.
The GElS Guidelines were changed on 1 April 1995 with the aim of eventually
reducing benefits and phasing out the scheme by the end of 1997. The following
changes were introduced:
• GElS became taxable;
• The E-factor remained, but no benefits are paid if the net M+E drops below 2
percent;
• The minimum category 2 level of 2,5 percent was abolished ;
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• The cut-off point for full incentives was reduced from 75 percent to 60 percent
local content to increase competitiveness;
• Certain category 3 products were reclassified as category 2;
• There were maximum benefits associated with each product that will be
reduced as shown in Table 4-2 below:"
Table 4-2 Revised net payout levels





While the SCM allows for the phasing out of GElS as shown above during the
transitional period, the threat remains that South African exports receiving GElS can
be countervailed if the importing countries domestic industries are injured.
4.2.4.3 Agreement on Agriculture
Over the years, GATT was able to develop rules for subsidies on industrial products.
Unfortunately, it has not been able to bring about the same discipline to subsidies
granted by governments to the agricultural sector. The Agreement on Agriculture is
the first systematic effort to lay down rules for subsidies on agricultural products. This
agreement nearly caused the whole Marrakech Agreement to falter. The rules however
do differ from the SCM. There are no prohibited subsidies. Governments are required
to reduce subsidies. The agreement does however establish a ceiling on the value and
volume of subsidised exports of agricultural products. Developed countries are
required to reduce their export subsidy expenditure by 36 per cent over six years while
the volume of subsidised exports must be cut by 21 per cent. GATT estimates that
international export subsidies on agricultural products will be reduced from $22 500
000 million to $14 500 000 million. The EU pays half of these subsidies.
15 These benefits have subsequently been revised. A full discussion concerning the history of GElS and the
changes made are discussed in Chapter 5.
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The WTO secretariat estimates that annual gains in world income will range from
$100 000 million to $315 000 million, using various static models and between $185
000 million and $510 000 million using various dynamic models.
4.3 The role of subsidies in South Africa's industrial policy
South Africa has followed a typical pattern of development. A self-sufficient
agricultural-based economy developed, with the help of gold and diamond mining,
into a manufacturing based economy. The aim of industrial policy is to change the
structure of the economy moving away from an agricultural or mining-based economy
to an economy based on manufacture. Unfortunately, agricultural-based economies
are almost universally perceived as being less desirable than manufacturing based
economies. This perception is exacerbated by the fact that generally industrialised
countries have a greater per capita income than undeveloped countries. (Davis, 1990).
It is this rationale which governments use to promote industrialisation. Regrettably
.governments, especially democratic governments, look to the short term and ignore
the medium and longer-term implications. Although even Keynes was also suspicious
of the long term and declared: "In the long term we will all be dead", policies do have
implications over time. Therefore, governments eventually have to face the long term
realities of their policies. It is for this reason, that looking at the implications of
subsidies both in the long and short term is necessary.
Various reasons for government interference in the South African economy using
subsidies have been mooted. Economic reasons such as the infant industry argument
were augmented with political objectives such as national security or decentralisation .
Real or perceived threats caused government to stress self-sufficiency and allowed
enterprises to operate behind a wall of protection and subsidies. Partly due to
apartheid logic it was felt that urbanisation was bad. To encourage citizens to stay in
the rural areas, a decentralisation policy was introduced giving subsidies to companies
willing to invest in those areas. In addition, in common with most other governments,
there was a need to assist local industry. These affect on other industries that lobby
their governments for incentive to counter-act the incentives or in fact to give their
industry an advantage.
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In 1958 the Viljoen Commission (RSA, 1958)16 recommended that the balance of
payments be kept in equilibrium and endorsed the encouragement of exports on an
economic basis. The Commission came to the conclusion that: "Even though
subsidies, may, in certain cases, be shown to be preferable to tariffs as a means of
protection, their application is beset by many practical difficulties that their scope
must always be strictly limited." (RSA, 1958). Until approximately 1970, successive
South African governments relied on import substitution policies. As a result of
various rounds of GATT negotiations, import control was replaced by tariff
protection. The Report of the Technical Committee on the Practicability of the Van
Huyssteen Study Group Proposals (RSA, 1978) found that "import substitution,
export promotion and expanding the size of the domestic markets are not, however,
alternatives but are more often than not in practice complementary."
Kleu (RSA, 1983)also set out "three sets of policy measures which deserve
consideration: a reduction of the existing level of protection; a system of domestic
taxes and subsidies coupled with exchange rate adjustments; and a system of taxes and
subsidies on external trade with or without exchange rate adjustments." Kleu further
recommended that the 1980 system of export incentives be continued, but that certain
shortcomings must be eliminated. In 1988 the Board of Trade and Industry (RSA,
1988) found that the 1980 system of export incentives was ineffective and failed to
achieve the objective of increased and diversified exports. The reasons given were that
the level of the incentives was too low and the method of payment was inappropriate.
The Board recommended the following in order to increase and diversify exports: that
the A, B, C and D export incentives be phased out, that the system of rebates be
improved, that a system of "input cost assistance" for particular industries be
introduced, that export market development and export marketing project assistance
be given, that productivity improvement schemes be introduced; and that
comprehensive structural adjustment programmes be devised for selected industries.
The Department of Trade and Industry dismissed these recommendations as being
administratively too difficult. Nevertheless Categories A, Band C were abolished and
16 The Commission of Inquiry into the Protection of Industry
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were replaced by GElS, EMA, Phase VI and the Duty Credit Scheme, all of which
have been found wanting and have been restructured or are in the process of been
abolished or restructured.
Belli et al.(1993) confirmed that South Africa suffered from an anti-export bias as a
result of the protection policy. The system made domestic sales in South Africa more
lucrative than sales into foreign markets. This was achieved by allowing firms to raise
prices in the domestic market more than would have been the case without protection.
Secondly, the costs of inputs increased and therefore made South African firms less
competitive internationally. In other countries, the anti-export bias is counteracted
with effective duty drawback schemes, export-processing zones, and subsidies.
Although South Africa has some of these schemes in place, Belli concluded that "they
are not commonly used and their effectiveness is doubtful".
4.4 The international use of export subsidies
Politicians, trade negotiators, business executives and trade unionists call for the
proverbial "level playing field", while manufacturers call for increased protection of
their industries and subsidies and governments around negotiating tables are calling
for subsidies to be reduced. Although GATT has played a major role in the
liberalisation of trade and has had a code regulating subsidies, governments continue
to give subsidies to their exporters. These vary in form and extent.
Although the US condemns the practise of export subsidies, US exporters also receive
subsidies. Roberts and Whish-Wilson (1993) have shown that the expansion of the US
Export Enhancement Programme (EEP) damaged the Australian wheat industry,
(although Australia has certain export-support measures that it pays to its exporters.)
The EEP is an export subsidy scheme applied selectively to US exports to certain
markets that account for most US wheat exports. It was found that these subsidies
increase average prices to US producers that led to increases in US production and
exports. Higher US exports depress world prices thereby adversely affecting returns
for Australian wheat. These subsidies also result in lower prices on targeted EEP
markets than elsewhere (Roberts and Whish-Wilson, 1993).
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The whole of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was nearly derailed because
of export subsidies given to farmers in the European Community . The EU grants
export subsidies on a wide range of agricultural products including wheat, wheat
flour, beef, dairy products , poultry, and certain fruits, as well as some manufactured
products such as pasta. The Uruguay Round agreement requires that the EU reduce
export subsidies over six years by 21 per cent in volume and 36 per cent in value from
a 1986-90 base period. On the other hand, Nothdurft (1992:80) found that: "The
Europeans have concluded that direct business subsidies simply do not work.
Subsidies do not improve competitiveness because they do not change capabilities.
They do not engender commitment to a course of action because recipients have made
no meaningful investment and stand to lose little. And they do not provide public
programme managers with useful information on the needs of clients, because there is
no market feedback, no market test for the Assistance." The Marrakech Agreement
distinguished between agricultural and other subsidies. Two agreements were
concluded; one for agricultural and another general agreement for all other products.
The use of subsidies and other forms of incentives world-wide is considerable. Many
subsidies are difficult to detect because they are in contravention of WTO rules.
Although the extent to which individual South African exporters have benefited from
the Categories A and B and GElS has not been made public (except for very general
details of the largest GElS claimants) , the schemes were very transparent.
4.4.1 Research on the impact of export subsidies
Various studies have been undertaken internationally to determine the impact of
export subsidies on the domestic economy of the country offering the subsidy. It is not
clear whether subsidies in fact do give an exporting country an advantage.
4.4.1.1 Latin America
According to Nogues (1989), after the experiences of the depression of the 1930s and
particularly after World War II, most of the Latin American countries embarked on
import substitution strategies to promote industrialisation. These policies contributed
to balance of payment problems which in turn delayed development. Export subsidies
were introduced to reduce the anti-export bias. Nogues found that export subsidies
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appear to have improved exports in Brazil (although the econometric evidence is
weak). He ascribes this success to the fact that Brazil liberalised import control and
stabilised the real exchange rate at the same time that subsidies and other policies
conducive to growth were introduced. In other Latin American countries, particularly
Argentina, export subsidies failed to have any significant impact. In Argentina, export
subsidies contributed negatively to the economic development. This, Nogues argues,
was because the export subsidies contributed negatively to the fiscal effects, there was
exchange rate misalignment, the subsidies had an anti-employment bias and an anti-
efficient export bias.
Nogues stresses that governments should distinguish what is possible from what is
likely. The likelihood of an export subsidy contributing positively to exports is low
when they are applied in an environment of high import protection and unstable real
exchange rates.
Export subsidies compete with other government programmes, and if they are
unsuccessful, government funds would be better spent on infrastructure, health and
education.
4.4.1.2 Costa Rica
Hoffmaister (1992) developed a model to estimate the effects of export subsidies on
the supply of exports in Costa Rica. Although the export subsidy scheme led to an
increase in exports, the direct fiscal costs were substantial. The subsidy scheme also
led to a significant increase in imports. Hoffmaister contends that the elimination of
export subsidies would not have a particularly harmful effect on the trade balance and
would improve the fiscal position and thereby generate economic efficiency.
In its review of Costa Rica's Policies the GATT (1996) found: "The most distinctive
feature of Costa Rica's economic policy from 1990-1995 has been the liberalisation of
trade and the deregulation of the economy. These objectives have been achieved
through the adoption of a number of measures under four different approaches:
unilateral opening, participation in the Central American integration system,
negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and, of course, the adoption of
the commitments negotiated within the framework of the Uruguay Round.
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"The policies and measures taken in these areas have yielded very positive results for
the strengthening of Costa Rica's export capacity and its greater integration in the
global economy. Since 1990, exports have increased at an annual average rate of 14
per cent, rising to a figure of 29 per cent for the first three months of 1995. The
composition of exports has changed, with a noticeable decrease in the dependence on
traditional crops and an increase in non-traditional exports, which now amount to
more than 50 per cent of total exports. In addition, the markets for Costa Rica's
exports have diversified, moving away from the focus on the Central American
market during the 1970s, which then received around 70 per cent of exports, towards
other markets, mainly around 45 per cent to the United States and 30 per cent to
European countries. Imports have also increased over the past four years at an annual
average of 13 per cent.
"The increase in exports, as well as their importance as the driving force for growth in
the Costa Rican economy, means that Costa Rica has had to play an increasingly
active and aggressive role in defending its trade interests, above all endeavouring to
maintain and increase access to the markets of other trade partners and to defend its
exports against the protectionism prevalent in other markets. To do so, Costa Rica has
sought to avail itself of the instruments offered by the multilateral system." (WTO,
1995)
4.4.1.3 Turkey
Turkey has had similar developmental expenences as Latin America and South
Africa. After World War 11, Turkey embarked on a policy of import substitution. This
contributed to pressure on the balance of payments (Krueger, 1985). The failure of the
import substitution growth strategy led to the adoption of an outward-oriented export
promotion strategy introduced in 1980. The two significant export promotional
instruments used were: firstly, the adoption of the Japanese sogo shosha export
trading companies. They received certain rebates, tax incentives, and subsidies.
Although the aim was to establish trading houses that could assist small manufacturers
export their products, in reality most of the trading houses was part of large industrial
groups and exported the parent's products. Secondly, attractive incentives were used
as instrument. These took the form of tax rebates, rebates from the Support and Price
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Stabilisation Fund, export credits, foreign exchange allocation, retained foreign
exchange earnings, duty free imports, tax exemptions, and technical and
administrative support. Changes to the system were frequent. Because the systems
were complicated, exporters and manufacturers were never quite sure where they
stood. (Dicle and Dicle, 1992)
Dicle and Dicle (1992:74) conclude that it was not clear that an export promotion
strategy based on direct monetary incentives can ensure enduring success. Further,
"the ephemeral success resulting "from subsidised competition can be deceptive." A
sound export promotion strategy requires a well-developed infrastructure, qualified
work force, domestic investment for export production (an export culture) and
appropriate technology. They do concede that temporary measures may be required
initially.
4.4.1.4 Taiwan
Herderschee (1995) found that in 1969 the majority of exporting sectors in Taiwan
had a large domestic sales base which was limited in growth potential because of the
size of the market and market barriers. Taiwan used various export incentives
including drawbacks of import duties, pre-export finance, provided export
information, and subsidised export credit and insurance. The tax and export credit
subsidies only amounted to 3,8 per cent and therefore protection offsets were the
single most important export incentive. Because of these export incentives,
Herderschee found that export production allowed firms, of all sizes, to achieve
economies of scale and firms shifted from production for the Taiwanese market to
production for the export markets.
4.4.2 Conclusion
Although export subsidies may have led to increased exports, the desired macro-
economic effects were not always achieved. The subsidies had a direct negative
impact on the fiscus. The increased exports often led to an increase in imports with no
net foreign exchange savings. Therefore, even though exports can be shown to
improve growth, the instruments used to promote exports may neutralise these effects.
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4.5 Evaluation of the benefits of subsidies and other export promotional
activities
The International Trade Centre (ITC, 1987) recommend that governments undertake
evaluations of their export promotion programmes in order to ascertain the magnitude
of the results and the effectiveness of the programme, to uncover problems and
solutions, identify any improvements and help define activities which will contribute
to the effectiveness of any new programme. Countries use different methods to
evaluate their respective programmes: Canada uses a cost-benefit analysis as well as
making an assessment of what exports would have achieved without the programme,
France uses experienced specialists to evaluate each programme and to make
recommendations regarding future programmes, Ireland uses both internal and
external evaluators, Japan do not have any systematic review mechanism but do
undertake evaluations on an ad hoc basis, while the UK setup certain returns that it
hope to achieve for each project and then measure the result against this norm. The
ratio of total export promotion costs to the total value of additional exports generated
is in the order of 1:50, while individual programmes vary from 1:3 and 1:146.
Various statistical techniques can be devised for each programme to ensure that the
evaluation is scientific. Targets set beforehand ensure that all parties are aware of
what is required and they will be aware that should the goals not be reached the
programme will be terminated . No goals or targets were set when GElS was
implemented. The system was open-ended and aimed simply to export .as much as
possible. Exporters were promised that GElS would last at least five years. It could
therefore be justifiably said that: If you do not know where you are going any road
will take you there!
4.6 Conclusion
The strategic trade policy argument holds little relevance to the South African
manufacturing sector, since most markets in which they operate are not oligopolies.
Most South African exporters are price-takers. If the rationale of the strategic trade
policies in fact do take hold and if governments believe that they will increase the
welfare of their countries, and subsidies are also extensively used, South Africa's
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trade will be detrimentally affected as a small country, because she will not be able to
match the resources used in providing subsidies.
Valid reasons have been given for each of the tariffs and subsidies imposed on the
economy. However, the stage has long been reached that the subsidies and other forms
of protection are given because of the distortions created by past policies. Although
GElS can therefore be accepted as a policy implemented to reduce the anti-export
bias, steps should have been taken to reduce the cause (the anti-export bias) and not
the symptom. Exporters who are competitive internationally would continue to export
and would in all likelihood increase exports and fully exploit their comparative
advantage in an increasingly liberal global economy. "Government does not have the
power to encourage one branch of production except by curtailing other branches. It
withdraws the factors of production from those branches in which the unhampered
market would employ them and directs them to other branches... It may subsidise
openly or disguise the subsidy in enacting tariffs and thus forcing its subjects to defray
the costs..."(von Mises, 1949:737).
The Australian Tariff Committee was of the opinion that subsidies were inferior
"Since bounties require payments, while duties create receipts, the interests of the
treasury are all against bounties. Bounties are less popular with protected interests,
partly because their costs are more obvious, but also because they are less secure. And
the more effective the protection becomes, and the larger the volume of production,
the larger is the amount required for the bounties. It may be equally so with duties, but
the larger amount is not realised." (Union of South Africa, 1958).
Firstly, from a growth point of view, export promotion is a more promising strategy
than import replacement, since the costs of export promotion are borne by the fiscus
and are therefore less likely to become as excessive as import replacement where costs
are hidden. Secondly, exporters compete with strong international industries and tend
to be more efficient by nature than import replacing enterprises who operate behind
barriers of protection. Thirdly, exporting firms are more likely to achieve economies
of scale since they are not limited to the size of a market, as are import replacement
industries. (Holden and Holden, 1981).
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Unsuitable macroeconomic and monetary policies can swamp the effects of export
incentives. A stable REER is important to both the exporter and the importer who
need to calculate their margins before making any long term commitments or
investments. High tax rates or interest rates discourage further investment and
exporters and cannot compete in a world with rapidly changing technology.
"Subsidies are rarely associated with true competitive advantage. On going subsidies
dull incentives and create an attitude of dependence. Government support makes it
difficult to get industry to invest and take risk without it. Businesses focus on
renewing subsidies rather looking at means of creating a ' true competitive advantage'.
Subsidies in one ailing industry encourage others to seek them." (Porter, 1990:639)
Arguments in favour of providing subsidies to infant industries for national security or
for the reasons given by the strategic trade economists will sound justifiable to most
voters. Government will be faced with lobbyists trying to extract a "free lunch".
Before any plans are devised, governments should set predetermined goals by which
the cost and the benefit of the subsidy, including externalities and economies of scale
that have been generated can be accurately measured. Subsidies are bound to attract
countervailing duties.
Subsidies do change the countries' terms of trade. The subsidies cause a country to
export products at a lower price. If imports coming into the country also receive
subsidies, then the terms of trade may remain steady. However, if there are no
subsidies on the goods being imported the terms of trade will deteriorate.
If export subsidies given to select industries are successful, they will export more than
they otherwise would have. This would, ceteris paribus, help to maintain a stronger
local currency. With a stronger local currency, receipts are lower if the price in the
foreign currency remains constant. There will be a tendency on the part of exporter to
push up the price in the foreign market that may effect turnover and market share. It
will therefore hamper the efforts of exporters of products that may enJoy a
comparative advantage but not enjoying the same level of subsidy support.
Subsidies also have to be financed from the treasury. To finance the subsidies the tax
rate has to be higher than it would have been without the subsidies.
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Under the new international trade rules negotiated during the Uruguay Round,
transparent subsidies are an endangered species. However, as lobbying groups'
pressure government for protection or assistance to give it a "competitive edge",
subsidies will be more difficult to detect but will remain. In addition, Governments
will make more use of anti-dumping rules to protect their industries.
Economists and policy makers should ask themselves the questions Nogues (1989)
poses: What is the possible outcome of the granting export subsidies and what is the
likely outcome? Are the conditions conducive to exports in general and if not how
will subsidies contribute to improving this? If the export subsidy is recognised as a
failure, it should be dismantled.
It is not clear whether subsidies have a net positive welfare effect on the economy as
they may interfere with the comparative advantages of a country. The theory of
comparative advantage states that if one country is more efficient in the production of
a good, all countries will benefit if they produce the products that they manufacture
relatively efficiently and trade those products for products that they are relatively
inefficient at producing. Therefore a country may not trade in the goods it is most
efficient in producing nor will it import the goods in which it is least efficient in
producing if subsidies are given.
Herderschee (1995) identifies three preconditions before a country can increase
exports rapidly. Firstly, the country must have a literate work force. It makes sense
that if a work force is not aware of the requirements that exports have to attain, it is
unlikely that the products will attain the necessary standard. This is especially true in
more manufactured products. Secondly, successful exporting requires developed
commercial skills. Exporting takes place across internationally boundaries. Exporters
therefore have to negotiate with people of different cultures and values. If the
exporters' skills have not been developed to relatively sophisticated levels in the home
market, it is unlikely that they will be successful in the international market. Finally, a
well-developed infrastructure helps reduce the cost of manufacturing and doing
business in addition it contributes to lower transaction costs.
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Governments should look at areas such as education, research universities and
providing advanced infrastructure as a means of developing new technologies and
methods of production that will foster the development of internationally competitive
industries. The first best solution to an anti-export bias is to remove the factors
causing the bias. Increasing liberalisation and exposing the industries to world
competition will increase efficiency and productivity . Lower input prices will also
contribute to international competitiveness.
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5. Reasons for and consequences of export subsidies
Many reasons are given for introducing various export subsidy schemes. The
arguments presented are similar to those used by the mercantilists two centuries ago.
Strengths of countries are often judged on the relative strength of their currency and
what their foreign exchange and gold holdings are and how many months ' imports can
be paid with this. Governments are therefore not only lobbied by industrialists , who
stand to benefit from the incentive, but also by labour organisations and others who
may not benefit directly. Exporting has become to be considered patriotic by many
average citizens and therefore export subsidies generally meet with little resistance
from taxpayers. Adam Smith wrote in his Wealth of Nations: "Consumption is the
sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be
attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.
The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it.
But in the mercantile system, the interest of the consumer is almost constantly
sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider production, and not
consumption, as the ultimate end and objective of all industry and commerce."
Reynders (RSA, 1972:95) gives the following view: "It (the export objective of a
society) is associated with the aim of maximising the economic well-being of all the
peoples of South Africa with due regard to the costs involved and due cognisance of
the social and political goals. It does not imply exports at all costs but rather the
utilisation and allocation of physical resources and labour complement of a country in
the most advantageous combination as between production for the local and the
foreign markets."
Governments may accept that export subsidies are a second best solution but
nevertheless justify their actions with the following arguments:
5.1 Anti-export bias
Countries, such as South Africa, that use import substitution policies and therefore
have high levels of effective protection, have an anti-export bias. These policies make
it more attractive to produce for the domestic market rather than the export market.
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This is because of over-valued currencies and the cost of inputs that tend to be higher
without foreign competition.
Protection impedes exports and creates an anti-export bias in two different ways.
Firstly, domestic sales are more lucrative than export sales as protection allows firms
to sell their products at higher prices than would prevail in a free trade regime.
Without protection the competition from foreign producers would keep prices lower.
Therefore input costs are higher than the world market prices. Secondly, factor market
prices increase in a protected economy. Import substitution industries draw skilled
labour and other resources away from other industries by paying more by drawing on
rents accruing because of protection. Drawbacks, rebates and export processing zones
are typically used to counter the effects of protection. In South Africa there are no
export processing zones. The effectiveness of the drawback and rebates (Schedule
470,03 and 521 of the Customs and Excise Act) is also doubtful in general although
some exporters do use these facilities. Protection has had differing effects on each of
the various sectors in South Africa. The IDC (1990 and 1992) has calculated the
nominal and effective rates of protection and Belli (1993) has calculated an anti-
export bias for each of the manufacturing sectors. The cause and impact of the
protection policies and resulting anti-export bias are discussed for each sector in
Chapter 5.
Doubtless the first-best alternative would be to remove the barriers to imports and
reduce the anti-export bias. Nevertheless, subsidies can be effective while reducing
the anti-export bias. In an effort to create a neutral trade regime, subsidies are given to
offset part or even the whole of the anti-export bias. The incentives in effect in South
Africa before 1990, know as Categories A and B, made specific allowances for
exporters to claim back part of the duty and so offset at least part of the anti-export
bias that was created.
5.2 Infant industry
Justification for export subsidies often draws on similar infant industry arguments for
the imposition of various protection measures including tariffs. It has been popular
with developing countries since Alexander Hamilton used it in his Report on
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Manufactures in 1791. The rationale behind the argument is that a new national
industry has to be protected from foreign competition during its "infant" stage. In the
long run, it is maintained that the industry will become competitive , be able to stand
on its own and make a positive contribution to the national economy. Protagonists
maintain that a country which in fact has a comparative advantage in a certain good
may not be able to exploit this advantage in the short term because another country
has established a lead and has an early advantage in the production of that product. It
is therefore argued that in the long run the protection or subsidy given to the industry
will result in the exploitation of the comparative advantage that would be in
everyone 's favour. In the short term a new industry may suffer losses as a result of not
achieving the necessary "economies of scale" or not having had enough time to "learn
by doing". In such cases, if government believes its information to be better than that
of the private sector, it should provide a subsidy. Capital markets may not be willing
to lend "infant" industries capital because of perceptions that the industries will not be
able to repay.
Unfortunately , many infants remain infants and never develop the wherewithal to
compete. Regrettably, in each industry marginal firms are barely able to stay in
business and rely on protection for their survival. These marginal firms are presented
as the norm and what will describe the social consequences of the firm ceasing
production. Average and competitive firms obviously benefit from the additional and
unnecessary protection given to the entire industry. The main policy used in South
Africa to stimulate the infant industry was tariff protection. However, past
governments have used other methods such as establishing State Enterprises such as
Iscor, which received both subsidies and protection.
It is difficult to conceive that an industry, which is going to enter world markets, can
ever be considered an infant. Indeed, exporting in particular and international trading
in general require a high degree of maturity. Governments providing protection either
in the form of tariff barriers or subsidies create a culture of dependence from which it
is difficult for corporations to escape. It is clear from interviews with exporters that
even though it is accepted that GElS is not a permanent institution, they maintain that
government should provide some other form of support measures. Many of the
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exporters even maintained that the GElS should be retained while the "new" measures
are introduced and phased in. In a survey by Deloitte and Touche in 1992, exporters
indicated that they would prefer improved incentives above lower tax rates, lower
import tariffs, other investment assistance, devaluation of the rand and lower interest
rates. However, exporters also indicated that they would prefer a lower inflation rate
rather than improved export incentives.
5.3 National security
It is argued that due to national security measures, certain domestic industries must be
able to survive foreign competition and continue to operate within the domestic
market. Many nations subsidise their agricultural sectors, because, it is argued, in the
case of war they need to be self-sufficient. Consumers end up paying more for food
since foreign producers, who enjoy a comparative advantage, are unable to sell their
goods in the subsidised market. Often national pride, rather than true national security
concerns, determines which industries are protected. Using this contention, most
products could be included. South Africa developed a petro-chemical industry, an
arms industry, as well as capacity in the engineering and transport sectors as a result
of the "total onslaught". These investments took place with direct and indirect
subsidies, outright transfers and a significant level of tariff and non-tariff barriers. In
most cases these enterprises will never be able to compete freely internationally and
will require some form of on going assistance if they are going to survive.
5.4 Exporting is more risky than domestic marketing
With local markets having received protection and industries being established in
relatively uncompetitive markets, exporters face many uncertainties and new
challenges. Exporting also involves many new complexities and risks not present in
the local market. Credit risks are greater and complicated by various complex legal
structures. Many countries, including many of our natural trading partners in Southern
and Eastern Africa, do not have sufficient foreign exchange to pay for their imports.
Viviers et at (1996) found that non-exporters perceived exporting to be more risky
than actual exporters. This perception certainly contributes to a lack of an export
culture in South Africa and therefore hinders the development of an export sector.
103
There is perhaps a case that inexperienced exporters be given certain assistance to
help overcome this perception . Such an argument sounds suspiciously similar to the
infant industry argument and begs the question: "When will an infant exporter be
mature enough to survive in the international market place without these benefits?"
Secondly, the experienced exporters would consider it discriminatory and would
object especially if the infant exporter competed with them in their established foreign
market.
Most governments have some form of credit protection or insurance plan. Many of
these are government owned, operated and therefore subsidised. The South African
Government helped establish the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of South
Africa (CGIC). CGIC issue all the credit insurance policies and then re-insure only the
"political" and "transfer" risks with the Government. A separate fund has been set up
into which all premiums are paid and into which all claims are paid. Since its
inception the fund has operated at a profit, indicating that the premiums are too high
or that the government is risk averse - which does not help to overcome the perception
or problem exporters have that exporting is more risky than local sales. From Figure
5-3 below it is clear that there is premium income exceeds claims paid. In addition the
a large percentage of the claims paid are eventually salvaged.


































Source: Department a/Trade and Industry Annual Reports
Using strategic trade policy logic, the South African Government should provide very
cheap credit insurance into Africa, the logical market for South African
manufacturers. Viviers et al. (1996) also showed that in most other parts of the world
exporters would first start selling into their neighbouring countries. African markets
do indeed suffer from a shortage of "hard" currency. The exporter will therefore
eventually be paid, as can be seen from the "claims salvaged" above, but especially
for a small exporter, that this may be too long. With government providing cheap
subsidised credit insurance, exporters will be able to recapture these markets, which
were served by mainly European exporters before 1990.
Credit insurance is one area which government should consider expanding. Since
most claims are . eventually paid by the foreign importer, a small subsidy from
government can neutralise a major stumbling block and the risk of international
trading can be minimised. Further, it probably will not attract retaliation since most of
the DECD countries have some form of subsidised credit insurance.
5.5 Exporting is more difficult than domestic marketing
Exporting is complicated by the distance from most of our foreign markets, cost of
transport, cost of raw materials (due to tariffs on imported components), tariff and
non-tariff barriers, different marketing channels, different pricing structures and new
involved distribution channels. In addition, products often have to be adapted to meet
legislative and marketing requirements ofthe importer. It is often argued that to "level
the playing field" and assist exporters overcome these obstacles, government must
provide assistance.
105
Most countries provide some form of extension service to their exporters. The South
African Government maintains offices in approximately 50 countries that provide
exporters with market intelligence at no cost. Although many governments do charge
a fee for this service, it seldom represents the true cost of obtaining information.
This service should be expanded and enhanced since most other countries provide it
and therefore would not attract retaliation. Secondly, the cost of obtaining information
through trade representatives is considerably less than exporters trying to obtain the
information themselves.
5.6 Foreign debt or other financial crisis
The Mercantilist view is that exports are good and imports are bad and that a country
should generate a positive or "favourable" trade balance. If we are to buy, we must
sell and similarly, if a country is going to import, it must export. There are few if any
completely self-sufficient countries. South Africa is no exception, and needs to import
a variety of products such as machinery and raw materials, especially with a policy of
import substitution. After the financial crisis of the mid-1980s where Chase
Manhattan Bank and other foreign banks refused to renew credit facilities, South
Africa was almost forced to pay "cash" for all its imports. In order to maintain exports
at a sufficiently high level and maintain the currency at a relatively stable rate, it was
necessary to promote exports that would generate foreign exchange to pay for imports
and a surplus to repay the debt as was negotiated at the various "Debt Standstill
Agreements".
5.7 Copycat syndrome
Governments are often lobbied by industrialists to grant similar, if not better,
subsidies than competing nations. The argument is offered that unless their industries
are treated the same, they will lose business and eventually the industry will
disappear. The targeted industries benefit and may even increase their international
market share. This is at the taxpayer's expense. The benefits need to be analysed and
weighed against the costs. The problem is that eventually governments compete
against each other rather than industrialists using comparative and competitive
advantages to gain market share.
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5.8 Strategic trade policy
In recent years, much has been written about strategic trade policy. The argument
has been developed to justify intervention in free trade. Brander and Spencer (1983)
who developed the theory of strategic trade policy contend that optimum scale of
production in oligopolistic industries can be achieved if government assistance as
subsidies are given. This Government assistance enables a firm to achieve a national
objective in international trade it would not have achieved without assistance.
Implicitly, the rest of the economy benefits from spill-over effects that will exceed the
cost of the assistance to government.
The theory of strategic trade suggests that if the government commits itself to
subsidising its companies, foreign competitors will be forced out of the international
market. This theory is based on the assumption that other governments do not
retaliate, and that the rents can be shifted. With economies of scale, incremental costs
fall as producers move down their learning curve. Therefore the long run viability of
the companies will be ensured by subsidising the sunk costs of setting up large
operations with spare capacity. Should the foreigners contest the market, firms could
simply undercut their prices by cranking up volume and achieving lower unit costs.
Strategic trade policy would enable firms to capture rents in imperfectly competitive
markets at the expense of their rivals
The policy is essentially a "beggar-thy-neighbour" policy. Where room for only one
industry to operate profitably, a subsidy provided by the government to the domestic
industry will give that firm a strategic advantage and the opportunity to become the
sole producer at the cost of the foreign firm that will be loss making.
Strategic trade policy is a sophisticated mercantilist argument for protection. In
theory, the government is led to subsidise large domestic corporations in pursuit of
taking rents from trading partners. It promotes the subsidy game. The countries that
have the most resources will subsidise their large corporations so long as smaller
countries do not stop subsidising their companies and abandon the market. One
consequence of this subsidy war is that the targeted markets are more likely to be
closed to small and medium size economies such as South Africa.
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5.8.1 An assessment of strategic trade policy for South Africa
"...It is important for those who live in the smaller open economies to appreciate fully
the ' strategic trade policy' argument, both at the logical and empirical level, as it is
being used in the large industrial countries. As these arguments are important inputs
into the formation of trade policy within the United States, the European Common
Market, and Japan, it is certain that those policies will affect our own country, and in
ways that we may not fully understand." (Harris, 1989:753).
The rent that a country will enjoy is the most important aspect of the strategic trade
policy debate. In South Africa's case, what monopoly rent is the policy aiming to
shift? It is important to know whether the future world markets in new products would
have monopoly rents. These would be the profits, according to strategic trade policy,
that each national government would find in its interest to capture. Even with a
subsidy from the South African government, it not clear how long South African
companies would remain successful in deterring foreign competition. In profitable
markets, there is always a probability of new entries. Subsidies create dependency that
will be funded from the fiscus. Policy prescriptions should be limited to situations
where firms are unable to capture these rents on their own. Strategic trade policy
proponents argue that the government is able to make irreversible commitments that
give domestic firms a strategic advantage against foreign firms and that the domestic
firms would be unable to replicate such strategic moves by themselves.
If a government announces a policy for export promotion in an emerging industry, the
policy will be anticipated and firms will enter. Although there will be successful
domestic firms, there will also be losers.
The adoption of strategic trade policy enables the targeted industry to expand by
drawing resources from other industries in the economy. Resources and workers
employed by these (high technology) industries are generally in short supply, which is
especially true in South Africa's case. Other industries, although they may have
excellent export prospects, must therefore contract, at least over the short term. In an
economy-wide sense, targeting specific industries can indirectly hurt other exports
through the misallocation of resources. Some of these industries might also be
oligopolistic and their strategic position will be worsened. Economy-wide
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considerations radically increase the difficulty of formulating interventionist trade
policies and make it even more unlikely that these policies will do more harm than
good.
The political economy of strategic trade policy show that concentrated special interest
groups in established industries benefit while ignoring the dispersed groups of
consumers and newly emerging industries. Established industries may point to one
niche or the other of their business as the "emerging" industry and lobby for
protectionist or retaliatory trade policy measures. There is the danger that trade policy
may be used by entrenched interests rather than promoting "winners".
Strategic trade policies are beggar-thy-neighbour policies. If South Africa attempts to
use such policies it will probably provoke retaliation. It will certainly lose any benefits
it receives from the GSP offered by many of the OEeD countries. Further, a trade war
will leave warring countries worse off than if a hands-off approach was adopted.
Brander (1995) accepts that slight differences in the model can lead to "strikingly
different" trade policy implications. It can be expected that as strategic trade policy
becomes more popular and gains respectability as increasingly academic papers and
journal articles emerge, these arguments will be used to pressure the WTO to "accept"
export subsidies under certain circumstances. Lobbying groups will in turn, coerce
governments to introduce subsidies for export. "After several years of theoretical and
empirical investigation, ...it has become clear that the strategic trade argument, while
ingenious, is probably ofminor real importance." Krugman (1993).
5.9 The political economy aspects of subsidies
5.9.1 Bureaucratic costs
When the GElS was introduced in April 1990, the aim was to have a system that was
simple and easy to administer. In fact, the Board of Trade and Industries
recommendations regarding the implementation of Structural Adjustment
Programmes were rejected by the Department of Trade and Industry because they
would be too difficult to administer. Initially the GElS system was relatively simple.
A claim form was to be submitted together with a few supporting documents.
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However, as the Department of Trade and Industry became aware of certain
shortcomings and fraud (see 5.9.3) more and more requirements were made on the
exporters to prove that their claims were legitimate. Small and medium exporters were
especially detrimentally effected. All exporters are required to submit an auditor's
certificate. The cost of obtaining such a certificate could exceed a quarter of the
amount claimed. Together with the costs of putting the claim together (often
consultants had to be used) the effort and the cost of submitting claims was raised.
The Department of Trade and Industry has a staff of approximately 30 officials who
undertake verifications of GElS claims. In 1995 an amount of R63 million was
recovered and R95,9 million and RI04,8 million for 1993 and 1994 respectively. The
reduced recoveries can be ascribed to the fact that, although there were more
investigations undertaken, the improved control systems, seminars and assistance to
exporters and accountants improved the quality of the claims submitted. The cost of
undertaking these verifications in 1995 was R2,7 million. Although it reduces abuse
and fraud, it is an additional dead-weight cost to both the Government and the
exporter, and does not contribute to increased productivity.
5.9.2 Rent seeking and lobbying activities
As with all subsidies, there are two groups, those who receive the benefit and those
who give the benefit. Both these groups expend a considerable amount of effort in
justifying the continuation, extension, or introduction of new schemes. The Private
Sector Export Advisory Committee (PSEAC) was set up to advise government on the
implementation of the schemes. In effect, the PSEAC became a lobbying body to
maintain whatever benefits were given and to motivate for additional benefits. The
Director-General of the Department of Trade and Industry has suggested that if firms
spent only half the resources and time they were giving to lobbying for protective
tariffs and retention of GElS benefits, and channelled the rest into a critical
examination and international bench-marking of their production, South Africa could
reach a growth rate of five per cent before 1999 (Sapa, 17May 1995).
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5.9.3 Bribery and corruption
Any bounty is bound to attract attention and there will always be those who will try to
benefit without complying with all the requirements . The various subsidies granted
were bound to be the subject of fraud. Customs had experienced problems in the past
with administering rebates given under section 470,03. Traditionally Customs do not
examine exported consignments . Revenues were on the import side and therefore all
the resources of Customs and Excise were used to verify that the customs duties were
collected. In addition, Customs were short staffed and did not even have enough
personnel to check imports thoroughly. A confidential report by the international
accounting firm, Deloitte and Touche, which has not yet been released, highlighted
these facts and uncovered irregularities such as exporting an empty box. (Engineering
News, 11 August 1995)
5.9.4 Countervailing duties
Countervailing duties are a constant threat, especially if the subsidy is successful and
generates volumes of exports that threaten the local industry in the foreign market.
This was highlighted in May 1996, when the US Commerce Department determined
that circular welded non-alloy steel was sold at a lower price in the US than in South
Africa. South Africa was "fortunate" in that between 1986 and 1991 there were no
countervailing duties imposed - because steel and other products were subject to
sanctions. The Robor case highlights the fact that South African products are subject
to countervailing actions and that foreign interest will not hesitate to use this form of
protection should they feel their interests are harmed (Barber, 1996).
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6. The South African trade model
"There are few econometric studies of the effect of export incentives on export
performance. This fact reflects the difficulties of establishing a statistical relationship
between the two variables. In a time series framework, the shortness of the time series,
the lack of observation on changes in incentives to import substitution that provides
an alternative to exports, and the difficulties involved in quantifying the effects of
other influences on exports make estimation difficult. In turn, in a cross-section
framework, the lack of stability of the incentive system and lags in adjustment to
incentives create problems in statistical estimation. Nevertheless, studies available for
several of the countries under consideration show the existence of a positive
relationship between export incentives and export growth." (Balassa, 1978).
As has been previously discussed, it will be assumed that any measure designed to
stimulate exports can only be judged worthwhile if it leads to an increase in national
prosperity. This is defined as a sustained increased in the Gross National Product.
Therefore the export support measures should indeed do more than simply increase
exports. The net effect on the entire economy is important. Thus the cost to the fiscus
should be taken into consideration as well as any other direct benefits. (le, 1992).
However, such a model is beyond the scope of this study. The purpose of this model is
to determine the effects of GElS in increasing the volume of exports. The model will
look at the factors that determine trade and then estimate what effect GElS had on
exports. The period used will be from 1988 to 1994 using quarterly data. 17
6.1 Factors determining trade
There are many factors which effect trade. These include non economic factors such
as political, geographic, social, and historic and more importantly the economic
reasons. Political factors such as the imposition of sanctions and various other boycott
actions, both imposed on South Africa by law and individuals, have had a definite
17 In 1988, the new Harmonised System replaced the old CCCN classifications and data is more readily available
from this date. The South African Standard Industrial Classificat ions (SIC) have been used to determine the
sectors to be studied . Trade data and the GElS data, which is published using the Harmonised System (HS),
have been converted to SIC using the Central Statistic Services (CSS) concordance (conversion) tables.
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impact on both exports and imports. Sanctions affected both the price (as exports were
often subject to discounts) and quantity.
The propensity of a country to export can be effected by many factors: the size of the
economy, location in relation to that of its natural trading partners and its main
competition, natural resource endowment and the diversity of its industry.
Government policy will naturally also affect manufacturers' decisions. A free-market
determined exchange rate will not influence exports in the long term. However , many
countries , including South Africa, have maintained a strong exchange rate. This has
no doubt caused exports to be too expensive and resulted in fewer sales. In the case of
South Africa, exporters were not able to compete on a normal business basis. Often
goods had to be sold at a discount even when there were no official sanctions limiting
trade.
6.1.1 Non-economic factors
Historical factors such as South Africa 's past links with Britain explain why trade
with her remains so strong. South Africa's distance from the major industrial
countries has also negatively affected South Africa 's trade. Also included under
geographical factors is that a large percentage of the industrial output is in Gauteng.
There is thus an extra cost involved in exporting products from this region that
obviously has had a negative impact on trade. The social factors in South Africa have
also had their influences. Productivity is lower because of the distance labour has to
travel from their home to work. The education system resulted in a level of technology
which, in some cases, can be exported. However much of the technology used has
been bought abroad. There are often restrictions limiting the licence holder from
exporting. Other political factors that have economic consequences are tariff and non-
tariff trade barriers. The fact that Britain joined the EU resulted in a decline in trade.
Other trade blocs will no doubt also affect South African exports. However, trade with
neighbouring countries will increase as a result of the various agreements in Southern
Africa. Many of South Africa 's major trading partners have extended General System
of Preferences (GSP). These will positively influence trade. Most of the above factors
cannot be quantified or are very difficult to quantify or there are no reliable data
available and therefore cannot be included in the model. As has been discussed above,
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institutional factors such as the formation of trade blocs will have an impact on trade.
It is difficult to measure the impact with aggregated trade figures. To keep the model
simple it has therefore been decided to ignore these factors.
6.1.2 Economic factors
Balassa et al (1986) argued that export supply exhibits a significant response to a
change in relative prices. Sachs (1989), on the other hand concludes that strong export
growth occurs mainly in the presence of large unemployment of domestic resources.
The macro-environment in which firms operate will influence their export
performance. These conditions will affect exporters differently although the direction
of effect of the changing parameter can be determined a priori. Even factors such as
education will affect the type of exports. "Increasing the education of the population
will be crucial for expanding higher-value-added manufactured exports, increasing per
capita incomes and reducing earnings inequality in South Africa" (Ismail, 1995).
The issues surrounding the behaviour of exporters are difficult to understand. In the
South African environment it are not only the normal complexities of determining
what the capacity is, how the prices are moving etc., but economists have to take
additional factors such as sanctions, over-invoicing export sales to claim additional
export incentives and under-invoicing export sales and over invoicing of imports to
avoid the stringent currency controls regulations.
Porter (1990), identifies four factors, the determinants of national advantage, which
will affect the volume of exports in the medium to long term. These factors are:
• Factor conditions, which include the factors of production, i.e. the nation's
natural endowment - human resources , physical resources, knowledge
resources, capital, and infrastructure.
• Home demand conditions, which include both the quality and the quantity of
goods demanded - firms can achieve economies of scale if the quantities are
sufficient and also sell into niche markets (monopolistic competition) if the
quantity is sufficient to spur the development of new products or features.







• Related and supporting industries provide assistance to the final exporter to
produce a product that can in fact compete on the international market.
• The firm strategy, structure and rivalry plays a profound role in the process
of innovation.
Buiter (1986) identified some of the issues involved in the design of stabilisation
policy in developing countries when faced with an external shock. The six most
important external economic parameters of developing countries are: the terms of
trade; the growth of world markets; the cost and availability of private external
finance; the cost and availability of official and other concessionary finance, including
aid; the world rate of inflation; and the exchange rates between the currencies of the
major industrial countries.
The demand and supply are affected by the various policy instruments (monetary and
credit policy, the entire array of fiscal instruments, exchange rate policy, the use of
exchange and capital controls and incomes policy).
The stabilisation responses to external shocks such as a deterioration in the terms of
trade, a slow-down in the rate of growth of export demand, an increase in the interest
rate at which developing countries borrow abroad, and an increase in the external rate
of inflation all affect the level of exports. The prevalence of repressed financial
markets and credit rationing makes effective demand and effective supply responses
to monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy quite different from what they are in most
of the industrial world.
6.1.3 Demand side of the export function
Probably the most important factor on the demand-side, is the level of economic
activity in the international markets. In the short-run, as foreign income increases so
should the demand for South Africa's products. This is especially true if industrial
output increases because most of South African exports are raw materials used as
inputs in industry. In the long-run it is not clear what the impact on South African
level of exports will be. However, as substitutes are found for the raw materials used
and as other international companies respond to the increased international demand,
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the demand for South African exports will decline. This will however be difficult to
verify because of the lack of reliable trade figures and it will not be possible to
determine the exact impact trade sanctions had.
South Africa's trading partners ' capacity to import is important. Factors such as
availability of foreign exchange will influence the capacity to imports. The fact that
her neighbours ' capacity to import is low has definitely had a negative impact on
South Africa's level exports and influenced the pattern of trade. With markets to the
north demanding products and where South Africa generally has a competitive
advantage, the lack of foreign exchange has hampered the export drive. South African
exporters have investigated various options for bridging this problem. Nevertheless,
trade to this region should grow. It will, however, remain low as long as there is a
shortage of hard currency. However, most of major South Africa 's trading partner's
currencies are considered hard. Most of our trading partners have also removed
exchange control and importers are free to buy foreign currency and remit it to foreign
suppliers without too many problems. The capacity to import has therefore not been a
problem for most of South Africa 's exporters.
How do South African exporters set prices? - If they use a cost-plus approach, the
impact which South African exporter would have on the world markets is negligible
and nor will there be an effect on the South African market. Whether South African
exporters sell in oligopoly markets or not is also debatable. Many small and medium-
sized exporters sell into niche markets where there is minimum competition. Although
most of South African exporters may trade in oligopolistic markets with differentiated
goods, it is assumed the exporter will sell on a cost-plus basis and will not try to
maximise profits any further. However, the price the exporter asks (without
incentives) will not necessarily be the same as the price in South Africa.
Relative prices have affected South African exporters. The inflation rate in South
Africa has been higher than that of trading partners. This fact has not always been
revealed in the exchange rate. For this reason, the REER is used in the model. The
changes in the relative prices nevertheless affect demand through the effects on the
real income. There is also a substitution effect.
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6.1.4 Supply side of the export function
The two most important factors determining the behaviour of the exporter are the
profitability of exports and the pressure of demand. The effect of the subsidies was to
increase the profitability of exports and thereby increase the volume of exports and
hopefully increase the production capacity to meet the new found markets.
From a country's perspective, factors that will affect export supply in the short term
are: Price of its products that are partially affected by the level of inflation and the
exchange rate; the level of subsidies given; manufacturing capacity; and under utilised
capacity due to lack of demand.
6.1.4.1 Pressure of demand
When South African exporters or manufacturers face an increased demand in South
Africa, the trend has been for them to forsake the foreign markets in favour of the
home market. The foreign market either is perceived as not as profitable as the local
market or is less desirable for effort and risk. It is not sure exporters calculate the cost
of losing a foreign customer in that when the market in South Africa contracts, extra
efforts will have to made to find new markets or in trying to recapture old markets.
The latter is often more difficult to do because the exporter is perceived as being
unreliable in that he is only willing to supply when South Africa is in a recession or
contractual phase of the economic cycle. Although many exporters act in this manner,
and this behaviour would obviously affect the markets supplied by the South African
exporters, it will be too difficult to obtain all the information especially for
disaggregated information. It is assumed, to keep the model simple, that the marginal
capacity utilisation is constant. In other words, a one per cent increase of spare
capacity at 98 per cent utilisation will have the same impact as a one per cent increase
of capacity at 80 or 70 per cent capacity utilisation.
Supply can be positively stimulated by pressure of international demand. For example
with the increased requirements for catalytic converters, South African manufacturers
responded by creating the capacity to meet the demand. As manufacturers get more
exposure to the foreign market, so they will identify trends and determine needs that
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they can fill. The pressure of international demand in a post-apartheid South Africa
should therefore be positive.
6.1.4.2 Profitability
For the South African manufacturer, the relative profitability of selling in the foreign
market or the South African market is the important factor. Exporting is perceived to
be more risky and less profitable and therefore not as desirable as selling in the home
market. In the short run, a firm will switch capacity from the South African market to
the foreign market if the foreign market becomes more profitable. In the long run
however, the capacity should increase in response to foreign markets becoming more
profitable.
Many firms are aware of the non-budget sheet items that add to their competitiveness
by exporting. These factors include new product development, improved marketing
techniques and increased home sales because of the "if foreigners are willing to buy it
- it cannot be bad" syndrome.
The rationale and impact of domestic and export subsidies were discussed in Chapter
3, and the arguments will not be repeated. Suffice to say the profitability is enhanced
if firms use the export incentives and supply should therefore be effected by level of
the incentive, to whom it is given as well as how the incentive is structured.
Firstly, it is generally more profitable in South Africa to produce for the domestic
market than for exports. South Africa has a complicated trade regime. Protection has
been granted to domestic manufacturers almost as they have demanded it. "Although
the Government, through a series of commissions, has emphasized the need to use
trade policy to move toward a more export-oriented and open structure, the need to
protect existing industries and utilize domestic resources as inputs has interfered with
these objectives" Fallon et al (1994) Secondly, protection has made exporting firms
less competitive internationally by raising the price of input costs.
Chowdhury (1993) found that the effect of exchange rate volatility on the trade flows
of the G-7 nations did not display any sign of parameter instability. Data covered the
period 1973-90, beginning with the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime.
He demonstrated that exchange rate volatility had a significant negative effect on
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export volume. Assuming that market participants are risk averse implied that
exchange rate uncertainty causes them to curtail activities, change prices, or shift
sources of demand and supply to minimise exposure to the effects of exchange rate
volatility. This can change the distribution of output across many sectors in the market
participants. The surprisingly weak link between trade flows and exchange rate
volatility reported in several earlier studies may have been due to insufficient attention
to stochastic properties of the relevant time series.
6.1.4.3 Raw material and input costs
The availability and cost of raw material also influence the supply of exports. As
discussed in section 5.1, the anti-export bias was a result of an increased price of
inputs that made exporting difficult. The Timber Product Exporters Association
(TPEA) have complained that the export of timber by the South African Lumber
Millers Association (SALMA) has created a shortage of timber and consequently
pushed the prices up, making the export of timber furniture uncompetitive. This
situation is aggravated by the high level of protection afforded to manufacturers and
producers in South Africa. Nevertheless, to maintain simplicity these factors will be
excluded.
6.1.5 Firm-level factors
It is however firms which export. Although the macro-environment has definite
influence on exporters, it is at the micro-level where the decisions are made. Policy
makers should be aware what the motivating factors are, before drafting trade-policy.
Cavusgil and Zou (1994) developed an operational model to examine the marketing
strategy-performance relationship for export ventures. Each venture was assigned a
four-factor composite performance measurement, and potential explanatory variables
for an export venture's success were categorised into five groups: export marketing
strategy, firm characteristics, product characteristics, industry characteristics, and
export market characteristics. It was found that performance in export marketing is
enhanced when management has international competence, is committed to the export
venture, adapts the product to meet export customer requirements, and provides strong
support to its foreign distributor or subsidiary. Calof (1994) attempted to determine
the direct and indirect effects of firm size on export behaviour by examining the
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propensity to export, and countries to which they export. The relationship between a
firm's size (considered both in terms of sales and number of employees) and its
propensity to export was tested using discriminate and ANOVA analysis, with
differences between size and classes tested using Duncan' s range test. The results
indicated that the size of the firm had a very limited association with a firm's
propensity to export, number of countries served, and export intensity. Yang and
Alden (1992) developed a probabilistic model to identify currently non-exporting
manufacturers with a relatively high potential for future exports. The model included a
time dimension of firm behaviour and attitudinal constructs such as perceived barriers
to exporting. Lim, Sharkey and Kim (1991) verified that the export process proceeds
in four steps, moving from awareness through interest and intention to adoption.
According to the framework of the model, if a company's management is unaware of
the benefits of exporting the provision of information may develop an interest. Once
management is interested in exporting, intention might be developed by linking the
firm's management with the management of similar companies that export. Once
management adopts the intention of exporting, creating opportunities and providing
the necessary guidance to succeed may move the firm to actually export. This study
will not attempt to determine the influence that firm behaviour has on exports.
Types of exporters
There are various "types" of exporters each of which has different needs. Exporters
achieve economies of scale and have to export because the local South African market
can never hope to take up all their production. Others, such as gold producers, rely on
natural resources and international demand. On the other end of the scale are small
manufacturers who export occasionally. Export houses, such as the soga shosa in
Japan, have played an important role in development of exports. They provide
services to manufacturers ranging from simply consolidating consignments and
shipping them through to the development of products that can be sold on the
international markets. The number of small or medium exporters in South Africa is
small compared to international standards. Calof and Viviers (1995) estimated that
less than 3 per cent of SMEs are exporters and account for less than 1 per cent of
exports, while in the figures are: Italy - 80 per cent, USA - 37 per cent, Canada 14 per
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cent, and the UK 20 per cent. SMEs also represent significant export turnover (Korea -
40 per cent, Taiwan 56 per cent, and Italy 53 per cent).
Lack of export culture
As manufacturers export more the costs associated with marketing, product
development and negotiation costs reduce. This "learning by doing" is important. For
a number of years, South African exporters have either had to face sanctions or the
threats of sanctions. The costs involved in developing new markets weighed against
the potential benefits were too high. This combined with the traditional reasons why
manufacturers do not export under a protected trade regime hindered the development
of an export culture. Manufacturers remained inward looking, rather serving the local
South African market than the international market.
"According to the stages model of internationalization, a firms first export market will
be the one which is culturally and psychologically closest to the home market." Calof
and Viviers (1995) In South Africa 's case, except for its direct neighbours , very little
in the way of exports was permitted. South African manufacturers tended to target the
triad markets of North America, Europe, and Japan. This was because of trade
restrictions and lack of buying power in Africa.
Businesses therefore never developed an export culture. Exporting is undertaken only
when the conditions in the local market are down and there is spare capacity.
6.2 Review of economic models
There are a large number of models internationally. In the US the better known
models are: the Tinbergen Model developed in 1939 and the first to model business
cycles in a quantitative manner; the Klein Models developed by Prof. Lawrence Klein;
the Wharton Model which was a descendant of Klein 's models; the Brooking 's
Model ; the Chase Econometric Model; and the St. Louis Model. Most other countries
also have models. Project Link is an ambitious attempt to model the international
economy. (Kohler, 1991)
There are a number of economic models in South Africa. These include: the
University of Stellenbosch's Bureau for Economic Research 's model that is
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essentially a demand oriented model; the Standard Bank Model that emphasises
monetary and interest variables; the Keynesian-based Econometrix Model; the Rand
Afrikaans University's Model; and the South African Reserve Bank Model.
This research will use applied econometric techniques to develop and evaluate an
export model of the South African economy. It will look at economic aggregates to
determine the appropriateness of the model and determine the impact of the export
support measures introduced by government.
6.3 Export model for the South African economy
The purpose of the export model is simply to ascertain the effects of GElS. This was
achieved by developing a model and estimating the factors influencing exports,
including GElS.
Determining an accurate export model for the South Africa economy is very difficult
because of the lack of reliable economic data. The most important of which is the lack
of trade figures, which during 1986 - 1992 were never published comprehensively
because of sanctions and the threat of sanctions. At the best of times, trade data was
unreliable. Customs officials, who collect the data, rely on the exporter completing the
forms. The forms are often incorrectly completed, sometimes to categorise the product
in a more advantageous position (i.e. to gain more GElS or to pay lower duties) or
simply because the systems of categorisation are complex and open to different
interpretations.
There are also numerous variables that cannot be quantified but which have an
important impact on exports. These would include factors such as an export culture
and the level and type of education. Winters (1981:29) ascribe the lack of success to:
"lack of sales effort, which includes deficient advertising, small sales staff, poor
market-research and packaging, and poor after sales services." He also cites poor
technical specification (NEDO, 1977), limited credit and finance (Parkinson, 1966),
the role of foreign investment (Krause, 1968) and foreign aid (Broadbent, 1970).
This research will use applied econometric techniques to develop and evaluate an
export model of the South African economy. It will look at economic aggregates to
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determine the appropriateness of the model and determine the impact of the export
support measures introduced by government.
6.3.1 Assumptions
In developing an Export Model we have to make certain assumptions: Firstly, the
world markets, except in a few commodities, are not affected by South African
exports; Secondly, most of South Africa's manufacturers find themselves in an
oligopolistic market selling differentiated products.
As with any economic model, not all the variables can be included or measured. Other
variables, because of the cost of obtaining the data are not included, but proxies are
used in the estimation. These assumptions are discussed below:
6.3.1.1 Negligibility assumptions
These are assumptions that have such a small impact on the model and the cost of
collecting the data is so large that they are ignored. There are also numerous variables
that cannot be quantified but which have an important impact on exports. These are
discussed above in 6.3 above. (Winters, 1981: 29)
6.3.1.2 Domain assumptions
These state that the model will remain accurate providing these assumptions remain
true. It will be assumed that both the South African and World economies are
unaffected by the level of South African exports. South Africa is a small exporter by
international standards and there are no manufacturing sectors in which South Africa
supplies more than 2 per cent (Monitor, 1995). This is confirmed by Appendix A
showing South Africa's market-share per sector of the major trading countries in the
world. Clearly, the increased volume of South African exports should not have an
effect on the international trading position although it could in individual countries
where South Africa does have a more significant market share. However, there could
be shortages of raw materials or products in South Africa due to increased exports.
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6.3.1.3 Heuristic assumption
This type of assumption models something as definitely different from the way it is in
the real world, but under the supposition that the unrealism of the assumption will not
effect the result.
South African exporters operate in many different markets, each of which has a
number of factors that would influence imports into that market. It is difficult even to
group the countries together effectively. Factors that would influence export sales to
the OECD countries , such as the level of economic activity or level of manufacturing
would not be as important in African countries where the propensity to import would
be determined more by the availability of foreign exchange than the level of economic
activity. The type of products exported also varies. African countries would import
more basic consumer goods that are relatively price inelastic. These would include
medical products and foodstuffs. On the other hand exports to OECD countries would
include more luxury goods and raw materials for their manufacturing processes. It will
be assumed that the level of economic activity in OECD is one factor determining the
quantify of exports to keep the model simple.
Factors such as South Africa 's corporate tax policies and long run economies of scale
or learning by doing are assumed to remain steady over the period and are not
included. The tax rate was reduced, but at the same time GElS was made taxable. The
net effect for a South African manufacturing exporter would be minimal as the
percentage of their turnover exported is not that large.
6.3.2 Variables identified and data used
An econometric model requires time series data of the various economic variables
deemed to influence the behaviour to estimate the parameters. In this study, quarterly
data is used to estimate the model. The lack of reliable economic data made the
determination of a model difficult. As has been discussed above, there are also
numerous variables that cannot be quantified but which have an important impact on
exports. The model was deliberately kept as simple as possible , however retaining the
main features to test the hypothesis that GElS has had minimal impact on the level of
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South African exports. This research used applied econometric techniques to develop
and evaluate an export model of the South African economy.
6.3.2.1 Exports
South Africa's export statistics are collected by the Commissioner for Customs and
Excise (C&E). The period used will be from 1988 to 1994 using quarterly data. In
1988, HS replaced the old CCCN classifications Data was more readily available from
this date. The South African Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) has been used to
determine the sectors to be studied. Customs and Excise were unable to provide the
data electronically, nor did they have their original computer tapes. The Central
Statistic Services (CSS) maintained sectoral data that were aggregated at a two digit
SIC level and therefore not suitable. The data eventually used, were purchased from
the IDC who also aggregated the data at a three digit SIC level suitable for the trade
model, making it possible to analyse 26 manufacturing sectors.
6.3.2.2 GElS data
This was obtained from the Department of Trade and Industries database. It was
downloaded on a disaggregated basis, using the original HS classifications. These data
were converted to SIC using the CSS concordance (conversion) tables. Although it
would have been interesting to analyse the growth in category 4 exports, it was not
possible to obtain the export data (dependent variable) from the IDC in a
disaggregated basis. Sectors were therefore analyse in aggregate and not according to
GElS category. Since GElS claims take some time to be submitted by the exporter
and then to be verified by the Department of Trade and Industry, only data from the
inception of the scheme until 1994 were used as this ensured that all claims were
covered.
6.3.2.3 Prices and the exchange rate
Although export prices are determined per sector, these were only available on an
annual basis and therefore unsuitable for constructing this model. Exporters sell to
many countries, with contracts denominated in various currencies. It was therefore
decided to use a REER, which took care of the variation in the fluctuation in the
various currencies as well as the different inflation rates. This was therefore used as a
proxy for price.
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Two sets of Real Effective Exchanges Rates were available. The South African
Reserve Bank has calculated this and publishes the series quarterly. The IDC has
calculated the REER per sector for use in their General Equilibrium Model, the
IDCGEM. Both series were used and selection depended on which gave the better
statistical fit.
6.3.2.4 Capacity utilisation
The South African economy developed by means of a policy of import substitution.
This made it more profitable to sell locally than to export. Clearly, manufacturers will
only export if the South African market is not taking up all their production. To test
the "vent for surplus", spare capacity is used. The capacity utilisation index is
compiled quarterly at a three digit SIC level by CSS. There are a number of
components to this series. Firstly, the industries capacity utilisation. The reasons for
the spare capacity are then given. Certain bottlenecks are identified. However,
unutilised capacity due to lack of demand is the factor that would drive exports.
6.3.2.5 International factors
Many factors influence a COU?try's propensity to import. These would include factors
such as taste, availability of the product, disposable income, exchange rate,
perceptions about the future. As these would have to be weighted per sector and
country to make a sound estimate, it would add greatly to the complexity and cost of
the model. It was therefore decided to use the OECD's GDP as a proxy for these
factors. In most sectors' exports, the OECD corresponded closely to South Africa's
trading partner profile. This profile is however changing for certain sectors.
These series used compiled by the GECD and is published in nominal dollars and real
1990 dollars.
6.3.2.6 Seasonal and dummy variables
Certain products are exported seasonally and seasonal dummy variables were used.
Sanctions were imposed on certain products that were lifted. A dummy variable is
therefore included in selected sectors.
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The textile industry also benefited from the SAPs. Although no values were put to
these, clearly changes in the SAP/duty credit system had an impact on exports. A
dummy was therefore used to measure the impact of the "announcement effect".
6.3.3 Verification of data
No attempt was made to verify the data provided by the CSS, although there are
known flaws. Export data provided by the IDC could not be verified since the
concordances used in aggregating the HS trade data into SIC data is complex. Where
necessary, the data were smoothed using exponential smoothing techniques . The
Department of Trade and Industry's database was used to download the GElS data. It
was therefore felt that the data were accurate, at least for exports that took place
before December 1994. Claims for exports taking place would not necessarily have
been submitted or processed by the Department of Trade and Industry.
6.3.4 The export equation: a quantitative approach
It is hypothesised that the level of exports is dependent on the price received for the
exports (the REER is used as a proxy); the spare capacity available (both capacity
utilisation and spare capacity due to lack of demand were tested); the demand for
South African exports (the OECD's GDP was used as a proxy); and the export
incentive measure (GElS).
where
X, is the level of exports;
GEISt is the value of export assistance given under the General Export Incentive
Scheme;
REERtis the real effective exchange rate;
CAPUTt is the capacity utilisation;
UUDEM t is the spare capacity due to lack of demand; and
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OECDGDP t is the OECD's GDP
And it is expected that:
ax ax (0 fJ _ ax
fJ2 = aGEIS )0, fJ3 = aREER ,4 - aCAPUT
GElS
> °fJ - ax )0
< ' 5 - aOECDGDP
Obviously, as GElS is an export subsidy, one would expect that GElS would
contribute to greater exports. This is especially true, as GElS is a performance-
based export incentive and exporters are paid on actual exports .
REER
As the REER determine the relative price of the export product, the larger the
REER, the greater the detrimental impact on exports will be.
CAPUT
Since most South African firms manufacture for the local market and export their
surplus capacity, it would be expected that industries with a greater spare capacity
would export more. If however, the industry exports a substantial portion of total
production, it can be expected that a drop in international demand would lead to an
increase in surplus capacity.
OECDGDP
As South Africa's major trading partners (The GECD countries) incomes grow,
they would be expected to consume more. This additional consumption will be
imported and it can be assumed that South Africa would supply a part of this.
6.3.5 Determinants: a qualitative approach
Interviews were conducted with a number of exporters, in order to determine their
perceptions of export determinants. As was expected, all the exporters answered that
without GElS they either would not have exported or would have exported
considerably less and that without GElS they would export less or not at all. These
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views were almost universal. Without direct access to the firms' financial statements
and costing sheets, the views expressed were not considered scientific and therefore
not included in this study.
A large European motor car manufacturer however indicated that although they
welcomed benefits such as GElS and Phase VI, their international experience had
indicated that such schemes had a short lifetime. They therefore undertook all
feasibility studies and investments without calculating such benefits.
6.3.6 Software
The Eviews software package, the Window's version of Micro-TSP, was used to
estimate the parameters. This package consists of a number of procedures that allow
manipulation of the data and statistical methods to estimate the model parameters.
6.3.7 Estimation techniques
The parameters were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. Similar results were
achieved using the Two-Stage Method and the Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Method.
The Durbin-Watson test was used to test first order auto-correlation. With low
Durbin-Watson values, the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test was used to
check for serial correlation and was corrected using autoregression techniques (AR).
6.3.8 Food (SIC 311-312)
This sector consists of meat processing, dairy products, canning and preserving of
fruit and vegetables, canning and preserving of fish, animal and vegetable fats and
oils, grain mill products, bakery products, sugar, chocolates and sugar confectionery,
prepared animal feeds and other food products. South Africa enjoys the advantage
being in the Southern Hemisphere and therefore being able to supply products to the
Northern Hemisphere, out of season.
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6.3.8.1 Structure of the food manufacturing sector
Although this sector includes many small producers , the industry is dominated by
large groups. These groups are responsible for much the exports. Although small
producers have very successfully entered foreign markets , the branded goods have
been the most successful.
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Source: Sec toral Data Series: Manufa cturing, IDC. 1995.
The production of food has increased constantly in real terms. It is a significant
industry, responsible for approximately 17,5 per cent of South Africa's total
manufacturing, having risen from 14 per cent in 1980.
6.3.8.2 International comparison
Appendix A shows the international demand for South African products and indicates
how South African exporters performed internationally, using revealed comparati ve
advantage analysis and calculating a competitive indicator. It also shows South
Africa's share of the world market. A competitive indicator (Cl) value of 0 above
shows that a sector's competitiveness in terms of growth of exports , has achieved
average growth relative to other exporters. If it is positive there has been an above
average growth. IS South Africa has therefore improved its position in live animals ,
dairy products, and fish. Sugar and animal feed have lost ground.
18 The Competitiveness Indicator has been calculated as follows : for product i., SACUj and partner country k,
Cij=[(I +import trendij)( I+ import trend ;world)- I] * 100, with the import trend being the least-square trend of
growth of imports of all reporting countri es from 1990 to 1994.
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The revealed comparative advantage (RCA)19compares the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU) to other upper-middle countries. If the RCA>1 the subsector has a
revealed comparative advantage. The only subsector that displays both a positive
RCA and Cl is Fish.
South Africa's food and agricultural sectors are very dependent on climatic
conditions. This would explain why sugar, which has a revealed comparative
advantage, has lost market-share.
Table 6-1 Protection and anti-export bias"
EPC Effective protection on exports Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I(ld) i(lw) I(ld) IIw) I(Id) 'Iw) I(Id)
Food 1,05 1,47 10,90 1,00 10,43 0,71 11 ,61 0,71 12,44
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assumtng that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values
added was calculated at assuming that inputs are purch ased at domestic prices.
Source: Belli et al. 1993 and IDC, 1990.
From the above it can be deduced that exporters who can purchase their inputs at
world prices, are competitive internationally. However, with or without GElS, and not
having access to inputs at world prices, this sector is at a disadvantage . Large
manufacturers who have the necessary bargaining power do negotiate with suppliers
of inputs are competitive. Amongst others, the South African Sugar Association
provides rebates on their sugar to manufacturers who export in order to bring the
sugar price in line with international prices. Small exporters should play a valuable
role in this sector suffer from not knowing about such rebates or not having the
negotiating strength to reduce their input prices. It is therefore important to reduce the
anti-export bias to promote exports.
Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 show the extent of government assistance to the export sector
in the past.
19 SACU's RCAijk for product i, SACU j , all other middle income countries k and imports of the partner country
M is RCAijk = (Mi Mj )/(Mik/Mk)
20 If policies raise value for domestic production more than for export, the anti-export bias coefficient is greater
than one. If policies are neutral the coefficient is one.
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Table 6-2 Total Categories A and By A and B assistance: 1982 to 1985 (R millions)
Sector Catecorv A
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Food 15,08 I 12,92 12,72 I 9,25
Catecorv B
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Food 14,21 I 11,45 16,11 I 21 ,67
Source: Board ofTradeand Industry, 1987.
Table 6-3 Categories a/GElS incentives p aid per subsector, headings per tariff
Sedor GElS Primary Beneficiated Material Manufadurm
exclusions products primary intensive
Meat processing 3111 44 0 48 8 0
Dairy product 3112 0 0 57 41 2
Canning of fruit 3113 6 0 12 76 6
and vegetables
Canning and 3114 0 0 37 63 0
preserving of fish
Animal and 3115 0 0 89 11 0
vegetable oil
Grain mill products 3116 0 0 99 1 0
Bakery products 3117 0 0 0 26 74
Sugar factories 3118 0 0 99 1 0
and refineries
Cocoa chocolate 3119 0 0 30 25 45
and confectionery
Other food 3121 0 0 49 51 0
products
Prepared animal 3122 0 0 56 44 0
feeds
Source: iDC, 1993.
Bakery products and chocolates received category 4 of export incentive. Most of the
other subsectors however received only category 2 or 3 assistance. From section
6.3.8.4 below it can be seen that exports from these subsectors have been rising over
the past few years.
6.3.8.3 Exports of processed food products
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Clearly, the long-term trend for food exports IS down. Certain subsectors have
performed well during the past few years.
6.3.8.4 Food subsectors
Table 6-5 Nominal levels ofpr otection
Percentage oftariff headings




3111 5 47 43 93 27
processinq
Source: ux: 1992.
Unfortunately, meat from South Africa is not permitted in many European or North
American markets. Safety and health concerns are cited as reasons for the prohibition.
The sector is however very protected. This would explain the long-term downward
trend where less than five per cent of South Africa's production is exported.
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The canned food industry was hampered by official sanctions from 1985 until 1990.
The marketing of South African consumer products, which could easily be identified
as being of South African origin, suffered since the late-1970s because of consumer
boycotts . This sector as with most of the food sector is dependent upon the weather.
Exports as a percentage of production fluctuated with the level of production.













Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDe , 1995.
Sugar does not suffer from lack of demand. The South African Sugar Association that
markets most of South Africa 's sugar internationally has signed long-term
agreements . Prices are usually fixed internationally. South Africa has had a quota into
the USA since 1991 that gave better prices . Therefore even during the periods of
drought South Africa exported sugar to the USA.
Figure 6-6 Export ofcocoa. chocolate, and sugar
confection ery
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Chocolates , sugar confectionery and biscuit exports seem to have benefited from
GElS. This is a combination of the opening of the African markets to South Africa
and the positive effects of GElS have resulted in considerable export growth.
Factories have expanded in response to GElS. In addition, this industry also enjoys
rebates from the South African Sugar Association that have given it world input
pnces.
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Figure 6-8 Exp ort ofother f ood produ cts
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
6.3.8.5 South Africa's food markets
The graph below shows that Europe remains the major market for South African food
products. Since 1992, Africa has become a more significant trading partner. This trend
should continue, especially in processed food products.
Figu re 6-9 Export ofpreparedf ood products
Source: Commissioner fo r Customs and Excise
6.3.8.6 Results of the regression for the food sector
To determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the food sector, the following
export function was estimated:
X90FOOD =
with:
2,2569638e+08 - O,86221729*GEIS90FOOD - 22784103*UUDEMFOOD +
522966,51 *REERFOOD + 21492,156*OECDGDP90 - 66693182*SEAS1 + 27337154*SEAS2
+ 45827498*SEAS3
X90FFOOD = The real value of food exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
GEIS90FOOD = The Real GElS payments (1990=100) tofood exporters
REERFOOD = The REER forthe food sector
UUDEMFOOD = The percentage spare capacity of the food sector due tolack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
SEAS1/2/3/4 = Dummy variable totest seasonal variations
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-10 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for processed food relative to the right hand scale, while the
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residual is given on the left hand scale. The function gives a good representation of
processed food exports.
Complete data were not available at the 4-digit level and the sector was therefore
analysed as a whole.
LS 11 Dependent Variable isX90FOOD
Sample: 1988:11994:2

























































Figure 6-10 Residuals, actual and fi tted real values off ood exports
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Retaining the principle of parsimony, maintaining the model as simple as possible, the
R-squared of 0,739587 is acceptable. With the F-statistic of 7,030 we can reject the
hypothesis that the slope coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero at the 99 per
cent level. The Durbin-Watson value of 1,868752 provides an inconclusive test for
serial correlation, and the null hypothesis cannot therefore be rejected. The Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test was applied which allowed the rejection of the
null hypothesis that there was serial correlation. The Akaike Information Criterion, or
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AIC, is a guide to the selection of the number of terms in an equation. It is based on
the sum of squared residuals but places a penalty on extra coefficients. The Schwarz
criterion is an alternative to the AIC with the same interpretation but a larger penalty
for extra coefficients.
The individual T-tests of significance shows that only the industry's capacity
utilisation explains the levels of exports at the 99 per cent level of significance. When
there is a drought, the industry 's total capacity will be lower and therefore so are
exports. Many of the food products that South Africa exports are not essential.
Further, we can confidently predict, at 99 per cent level of significance, that exports in
the first quarter will be lower.
6.3.9 Beverages (SIC 313)
This sector consists of three subsectors: distilleries and wineries; malt liquors and
malt; and soft drinks and carbonated waters. Wine, however, is the major exporting
subsector. Although the South African wine industry has a long history stretching
back to 1679, since the mid-1980s the demand for "New World Wines" from
countries such as America, Australia, Chile, and South Africa has increased. Wines
were boycotted during the sanction years. The volume of wine exported has increased
since. South African wine producers have nevertheless responded to the international
demand and increased production. Despite sanctions, exports as a percentage of
production have nevertheless increased since the late-1980s.
6.3.9.1 Structure of the beverage industry
The distilleries and wineries, and the malt liquor sectors are controlled by the Liquor
Act, 1989 (Act number 27 of 1989). Consequently, the number of producers is
limited. The industry was further hampered by exporters required to obtain permission
to export. Import regulations in most countries are complex and serve as a non-tariff
barrier.
6.3.9.2 International comparison
From Appendix A, a picture of the international trade from 1990 to 1994, and South
Africa's role can be drawn. South Africa only has a small share of the world market of
0,4 per cent. As can be expected, after official sanctions were lifted, and South Africa
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became an accepted member of the international community, South African wine was
in great demand. South African wine exports increased by 36,4 per cent per annum
while the world trend was only 3,1 per cent. Consequently, the competitiveness
indicator is also positive. South African beverages have a revealed comparative
advantage of 1,55 indicating a comparative advantage relative to other upper-middle
income countries.
6.3.9.3 Development assistance
Table 6-6 Nominal levels of protection of distilleries and wineries, malt liquors and malt, soft drinks and
carbonated water
wine malt soft drink
Average nominal protection 20 5 20
Ad valorem (% oftariff headings)) 16 23 76
Formula (% oftariff headings) 89 47 100
Import control (% oftariff headings) 94 77 100
Import surcharge (% of tariff headings) 84 23 100
Source: /DC, / 992.
The nominal protection of 20 per cent give to the distilleries, wineries, and soft drink
producers on 15 May 1992 was in line with the manufacturing sector' s nominal
protection. Malt on the other hand received considerably less nominal protection. The
industry is however very regulated.
Table 6-7 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cateqorv ARmillion
1982 I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Beveraqes 0,06 I 0,10 I 0,03 I 0,01
Category BRmillion
1982 I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Beverages 1,24 I 1,82 I 1,55 I 1,42
Source: Board of Trade and Industry, / 987.
In 1995 this sector received less than 0,02 per cent of total Category A payments and
0,01 per cent of Category B. The sector is estimate to have received R5,6 million
Category D (Section l lbis) assistance of R231 million given to exporters in 1985.
There were however only 4 exporters who used these benefits.
Table 6-8 Protection and anti-export bias
Note. Iw indicates that value was calculated assumtng that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: Belli et ai, 1993 and /DC, / 990.
Effective protection on exports
EPC Anfl-ext ortbias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (lw) I (Id) (lw) 1 (Id) Ow) I (Id) (Iw11 lid)
Beveraqes 1,13 1,771 1,55 1,001 0,78 0,631 0,72 0,631 1,44
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Protection on inputs was estimated at 14,6 per cent on inputs and 13,8 per cent on
output. The industry would be competitive if it obtains its inputs at world prices, with
or without GElS. However, the industry would not be able to compete internationally
without GElS and purchasing at local prices. (Belli et aI, 1993)
Table 6-9 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid to soft drink, spirits and wine, and malt liquor exports in
1992
Soft drinks spirit and wine Malt
GElS exclusions %oftariff headlnqs 0 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0 0
Primary products %of tariff headinos 0 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headings 37 3 77
lorimarv oroduct %ofexport value 0 0 0
Material intensive %oftariff headinqs 25 10 8
%of export value 84 23 0
Manufactured %of tariff headinqs 38 87 15
%ofexport value 16 77 100
Phase VI %oftariffheadinos 0 0 0
%of export value 0 0 0
Source: toe, 1992.
Assistance provided to the industry under the GElS regime advantageous as most
products were classified under either Category 3 or 4.
6.3.9.4 Export of beverages









. .. EXPORTS· -+--- EXPQRTSM "Of PROOJCTION
Fig ure 6-13 Soft drinks
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" . " EXPORTS"--EXPORTSAS%Of PROCUCTX:lN
Over the past decade , with perhaps the exception of 1992 and 1993, the industry as a
whole are exporting more each year of their production. Exports take place to a
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number of countries , with Southern African countries taking up more South African
exports.
6.3.9.5 Results of regression for the beverage sector
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the beverage sector, the
following export function was estimated:
X90BEV =
with:
-5,3955125e+08 - 0,73406948*GEIS90BEV - 1465451 ,5*UUDEMBEV + 555661 ,7*REERBEV +
37780,834*OECDGDP90 - 29008726*SEAS1 - 825862,25*SEAS2 - 19769760*SEAS3
X90BEV = The real value ofbeverage exports (R million 1990=100)
GEIS90BEV = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REERBEV = The REER forthe beverage sector
UUDEMBEV = The percentage capacity utilisation ofbeverage industry
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
SEAS = The dummy variable totest seasonal variations
The regression results are set out below.
Figure 5-14 below shows the actual and fitted real export figures for beverage exports
relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is given on the left hand scale. The
function gives a good representation of beverage exports.
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LS 11 Dependent Variable is X90BEV
Sample: 1988:1 1994:2
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In this simple model the R-squared of 0,793119 is acceptable. As there is no lag
dependent variable, the Durbin-Watson statistic of 2,200314 indicates that serial
correlation is not present. No further tests were applied. The F-statistic of 9,858077
allowed the rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients are simultaneously
equal to zero at the 99 per cent level.
Seasonal fluctuations are a very strong, as can be expected in this industry. However,
the GEeD's GDP is significant at the 99 per cent level and has had an impact on the
sector. As income increased and the taste moved away from spirits and malts, the
export of South African wines improved. Although most of the products in this
industry enjoyed a category 4 status, GElS proved to be insignificant in the promotion
of exports. Funds spend on promoting exports would have been better employed
creating additional capacity or improving productivity.
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6.3.10 Tobacco (SIC 314)
This sector covers the manufacture of tobacco products such as cigarettes, cigars,
smoking, chewing and homogenised tobacco, and snuff.
6.3.10.1 Structure of the tobacco industry
This sector is largely dependent on agricultural conditions and contributes represents
approximately half a per cent of total South African manufacturing. Despite concerted
campaigns to dissuade consumers from using tobacco products, the international
demand has not decreased.
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6.3.10.2 International comparison
Table 6-10 International demandfor South African exports
SITC Product Imports from SACU trend 90·World trend 90· Market· Competitive RCA
SACU 1994 94 %p.a, 94 %p.a. share % Indicator %
US$m
Source: ITC. 1996.
From Table 6-10 International demand for South African exports South Africa's
exports have shown a growth rate of 5,8 per cent and have only been slightly above
the world average growth of 5,5 per cent and therefore the competitiveness indicator is
positive but very small. This table also indicates that South Africa does not have a




Table 6-11 No minal levels ofprotection
Averagenominal protection 40
Ad valorem (%oftariff headings) 50
Formula (% of tariff headings) 80
Import control (% of tariff headings) 90
Import surcharge (% of tariff headings) 100
Source: toe, /99 2.
Table 6-12 Protection and anti -export bias
EPe Effective protection on exports Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales I(lw) 1(ld) I(lw) I(ld) I(lw) 1(ld) I(lw) 1(ld)
Tobacco 1,56 1,221 1,12 1,001 0,90 1,281 1,40 1,281 1,74
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assumtng that inputs are purchased at world prtc es. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: Belli et al, 1993 and !DC , /990 .
This sector has a very high average nominal rate of protection and hence there is an
anti-export bias irrespective whether they have access to inputs at world prices or
GElS.
The entire sector benefits from category 3 GElS incentives.
6.3.10.4 Export
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Unti l 1989, exports in this sector were improving with most of the production
consumed in Southern Africa. The volume of exports of tobacco products has grown
constantly from the late-1970s until early 1990s with the imposition of GElS. The
production in this sector has declined from 1987.
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6.3.10.5 Results of regression for tobacco products
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the tobacco sector, the
following export function was estimated:
X90TOBSM =
with:
4756192,8+ 0,70347744*X90TOBSM(-1) +44,778302*GEIS90TOB +
54108,82*UUDEMTOB + 60350,119*REERTOB - 679,88773*OECDGDP90·
906599,17*SEAS4 + [AR(1) =-0,35379371]
X90TOBSM = The real value of tobacco exports smoothed using exponential
smoothing techniques (Rmillion 1990=100)
GEIS90 = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REERTOB = The REER forthe tobacco sector
CAPUT = The percentage capacity utilisation of tobacco sector
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. The function gives a good representation of
tobacco exports.
LLS 11 Dependent Variable isX90TOBSM
Sample (adjusted): 1988:21994:2
Included observations: 25 after adlusfin end oints
C -7806894, 11604942 -0,672722 0,5092
X90TOBSM(-1) 0,646586 0,160758 4,022116 0,0007
GEIS90TOB 30,75566 20,49870 1,500371 0,1500
UUDEMTOB 54967,40 82985,77 0,662371 0,5157
REERTOB 39173,86 56575,95 0,692412 0,4971
OECDGDP90 295,6160 832,3594 0,355154 0,7264
R-squared 0,890405 Mean dependent var 4054551,
Adjusted R-squared 0,861564 S.D. dependent var 2929418,
S.E. of regression 1089948, Akaike info criterion 28,00884
Sum squared resid 2,26E+13 Schwarz criterion 28,30138
Log likelihood -379,5840 F-statistic 30,87305
Durbin-Watson stat 2,348353 Prob(F-statistic) 0,000000
The R-squared of 0,890405 is good, and this together with a F-statistic of 30,87305
indicates that the variables explain the reasons for this sector's exports. The Durbin-
Watson statistic of 2,348353 would indicate that there is no serial correlation had
there not been a dependent lagged variable. The Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation
LM test was applied which confirmed that there was serial correlation, which was
corrected using First Order Autoregressive (AR) procedures.
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistlc Prob.
C 4769981 , 10529677 0,453004 0,6566
X90TOBSM(-1) 0,703014 0,143162 4,910600 0,0002
GEIS90TOB 44,88685 24,02621 1,868245 0,0802
UUDEMTOB 54072,79 70027,19 0,772168 0,4513
REERTOB 60165,85 56476,11 1,065333 0,3025
OECDGDP90 -679,5754 796,6426 -0,853049 0,4062
SEAS4 -907229,9 574226,6 -1 ,579916 0,1337
















Sum squared resid 1,85E+13
Log likelihood -362,4817
Durbin-Watson stat 2,130272
Inverted AR Roots -.35
The significance of the lagged dependent variable indicates that once the market for a
product has been established, it is maintained and strengthened. Since most of this
industries products are branded and heavily advertised, it is to be expected that they
would retain their market-share.
The coefficient for GElS is significant at 90 per cent. Further, this estimation has a
very high coefficient that would indicate GElS did play a role in promoting exports.
Since it appears that once a market is established, it is kept, and further developed, the
funds spend on promoting tobacco, should result in increased exports in the long term.
6.3.11 Textiles, excluding clothing and footwear (SIC 321)
This sector includes spinning and weaving of textiles , made-up textile goods such as
household furnishings , hosiery knitting mills, carpets and rugs, and cordage rope and
twine. The fabrics produced range from standard grey cotton cloth to highly
specialised fabrics used in the parachute industry.
6.3.11.1 Structure of the textile industry
There are almost 700 manufacturers producing textiles. Together they employ 68 000
workers. On average each producer has Rl ,8 million invested in fixed assets.
(Clothfed, 1996).
Output increased since the late-1970s , peaked in 1982, and has gradually declined
since. Exports have declined along with the decline of output.
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The Textile industry is one of the "sensitive" industries m international trade.
Traditionally , in developed countries, this industry has provided considerable
employment. Exports from ASIan countries have increased over the past two decades
and therefore developed countries have imposed additional protection in the form of
the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA). The international conditions, which face South
African exporters, are therefore tough. Technology in the textile industry has also
responded to the increased competition. Before World War II English spinning and
weaving technology of natural fibres was dominant. From the mid-1930s to the 1960s
USA technology of synthetic and blended fibre dominated the market. Both these
periods were characterised by labour intensive manufacture. Since the 1950s there has
been considerable improvements in the technology and it was "nigh impossible for
any but the most technically advanced textile firms to develop all the requisite skill"
to compete internationally. (Maree, 1995)
South Africa's textile industry was established m 1891 with the manufacture of
blankets but really only developed after World War II with state assistance; finance
was provided by the IDC and protection was given by the Board of Trade and
Industry. However over the past two decades, capital investment in the textile industry
has lagged behind capital investment in industry in South Africa as can be seen in
Figure 6-18 below. As a result the age ofthe machinery in South Africa is old.
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Table 6-13 Comparative age a/textile machinery,1988
%of machinery more than tenyears old


























































South Africa has therefore fallen behind in international trends and is therefore unable
to face up to international competition.
Labour productivity
In the late-1970s productivity improved. Productivity gradually declined until 1990.
Largely because of an improvement in labour productivity, this trend has reversed
since 1990.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufa ctur ing; IDC, 1995.
6.3.11.2 International comparison
Table 6-1 4 International demandf or South African textile exports
SITC Product Importsfrom SACU trend World trend Market-share Compel. % RCA




26 252,7 -13,6 0,1 1,1 -13,7 2,36
Source: 1TC (1996)
Although the South African Textile industry enjoys a revealed comparative advantage
relative to other upper-middle countries, exports have decreased over the 1990 to 1994
period.
6.3.11.3 Development assistance
Table 6-15 Nominal levels of protection.
Percentage 01' tariff headings
Sector ave.nominal Ad valorem Formula Import Import
protection control suchar e
Wool and cotton 32110-32113 10 44 0 16 16
processing
Spinning and 32114-32116 40 99 80 84
weaving of textiles
Made-up textile 3212 35 95 30 22 97
goods
Garment and hosiery 32130 80 96 74 76 94
knitting mills
Other knitting mills 32139 55 99 12 0 95
Carpets and rugs 3214 30 100 12 0 100
Cordage rope and 3215 20 100 25 0 80
twine
Other textile 3219 20 82 11 7 51
Source: /DC (1992)
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Table 6-16 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cate~ory A
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Textiles 0,44 I 0,61 0,70 I 0,80
Cate~ ory 8
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Textiles 1,27 I 1,77 2,31 I 2,87
Source: Board of Trade and Industry (1987)
Table 6-17 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection onexports
EPC Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
Textiles 1,66 1,901 0,88 1,001 -0,02 0,871 1,88 0,871 -106,10
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assumtng that inputs are purchased at world prices, Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: /DC (1990)
Even if it could purchase inputs at world prices, the industry suffers from an export
bias. GElS benefits to the industry do not neutralise the anti-export bias if inputs are
purchased locally. It is therefore important that the industry be given access to inputs
at international prices.
Table 6-18 GElS and Phase VI export inc entives paid in 1992 p ercentage oftariffheadings
Sector Geis Primary Beneficiated Material Manaufactu
exclusions products primary intensive red
Wooland cotton processing
Spinning and weaving of textiles
Made-uptextile goods
Garment and hosiery knittingmills
Other knitting mills
Carpets and rugs
Cordage rope and twine
Other textile
Source: IDC (1992)
3211 0- 14 0 70 16
32113
32114- 0 0 0 99
32116
3212 0 0 0 20
32130 0 0 0 1
32139 0 0 0 100
3214 0 0 0 0
3215 0 0 0 100








































Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufa cturing, IDC, / 995.
Figure 6-21 Exports of spinning and weaving of
textiles
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Figure 6-22 Exports ofmade-up textile goods
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Source: Sectora l Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
Figure 6-23 Exports of garment and hosiery
knitting mills
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Figure 6-24 Exp ort ofother knitting mills
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Figure 6-25 Exports ofcarpets and rugs
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Figure 6-27 Export ofother textiles
. • . - EXPORTS· ---- EXPORTS AS'lll OFPROOJCTON
Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manuf acturing. IDC. /995
Figure 6-26 Exports ofcordage. rope and twine
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Exports from most of the textile subsectors have improved; exceptions are cordage
and other knitting mills. Exports from the spinning and weaving subsectors represent
the largest portion of exports from the textile industry. Exports as a percentage of
production have increased consistently since 1988 and exports now comprise almost
40 per cent of the industry production.















Source: Customs and Excise
Since 1975, the exports to Europe have gradually decreased, however this market
remains South Africa's largest. The Asian and African markets are becoming more
significant. The American market improved until the mid-1980s when sanctions put
an end to that market. The growth in this market should become more significant as
textile manufacturers venture into the Americas.
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6.3.11.5 Results of regression for textiles
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the textile sector, the
following export function was estimated:
X90TEXT = 1,3671648e+09 +0,734361 05*GEIS90TEXT +4277123,4*UUDEMTEXT +309621 O,3*REERTEXT -
100235,5*OECDGDP90 - 12483487*SEAS1 +6695739,4*SEAS2 - 18895845*SEAS3 + [AR(4)=-
0,43310906)
with:
X90TEXT = The real value oftextile exports ( Rmillion 1990=100)
GEIS90 TEXT = real GElS payments (1990=100)
REER TEXT = The REER for the textile sector
UUDEM TEXT = The percentage unutilised capacity of textiledue to lack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index ofthe OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-29 below shows the actual and
estimated real export figures for textiles relative to the left hand scale, while the error
term is given on the right hand scale. The function gives a good representation of
textile exports.
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LS 1/ Dependent Variable isX90TEXT
Sample: 1989:11994:2
Included observations: 22 after adjusting endpoints
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The R-squared of 0,821992 is acceptable. With the F-statistic of 7,503785 at least one
of the variables will not be zero. Before correcting for serial correlation, the Durbin-
Watson statistic of 1,475653 indicated that there is no serial correlation was present.
The Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test confirmed this and First Order
Autoregressive correction techniques were used to correct the problem.
GElS played an insignificant role in the development of exports in the textile sector.
The capacity utilisation on the other hand appears to be significant. The REER does
not influence exports as strongly as one would have determined a priori.
The OECD's GDP has played a completely opposite role as can be expected. This can
perhaps be explained as follows: As the OECD GDP increases consumers ' demand
improved higher-grade fabrics and clothing. Advanced machinery is needed to
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manufacture these fabrics. Foreign firms have therefore kept pace of technological
developments and have been able to meet the new needs. South African firms have
not upgraded their machinery nor improved the technology and have consequently lost
market-share. They have retained the lower end of the market and are able to supply
this sector when demand for higher-grade fabrics decrease.
6.3.12 Clothing, excluding footwear (SIC 322)
This sector covers the manufacture of clothing by cutting and sewing fabrics, leather,
fur, plastic, rubber, and other materials and the making of hoods, hats, and other
accessones.
Clothing is generally seen as an important employer of lower skilled workers. It is
usually targeted as a potential industry in developing countries. Because of its status
as an employer, the industry is generally protected in industrialised countries. In South
Africa, the clothing industry has also been the focus of government intervention. In
the early 1920s, the clothing industry was seen as an ideal vehicle to generate work
for poor white women. Later, through the decentralised policies, the clothing industry
again received attention. "The state promoted its development with the
implementation of import substitution policies, as was the norm in many countries at
that time." (Altman, 1994).
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Table 6-19 The evolution ofprote ction ofthe clothing industry in South Africa


























Ad valorem & Specific
Ad valorem & Specific
Ad valorem & Formula
Ad valorem & Formula
Ad valorem &Formula
Ad valorem & Specific
Ad valorem &specific
Revenue





Higher fabric duties and labour costs
Simplified duty structure
Disruptive competition due to Rand appreciation
due togold export boom
Asian competition
High cost of local fabric
New tariff schedule inconjunction with SAP
In expectation of end of SAP Hatty committee
In expectation of Long-term restructuring
committee
Source: Altman, 1994, (Based on Bell (1992) and Cassim (1991) Government Gazettes, Zarenda (1977)) and lDC
(1996))
6.3.12.1 Structure of clothing industry
This sector consists of approximately 1 600 manufacturers and employs 170 000
workers. (Clothfed, 1996). Barriers to entry are low which would explain why there
are so many start up companies , several of which fail each year. The clothing industry
only forms three per cent of the South Africa's manufacturing. The industry is
threatened by cheap (often illegal) imports . Branded goods enjoy higher consumer
demand and therefore higher prices. The cost of creating a job in the clothing industry
is cheap (RIO 000 per employment opportunity). (Altman, 1994).
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Production of CLOTHING (ISIC 322) - -. - - - - Production as a % ot total manufactur ing
Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manuf acturing, IDC, 1995.
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Although the clothing industry is perceived as consisting of many small firms, in fact
a number of large firms dominate the industry. Larger firms though not
manufacturers, control the industry through their power in marketing clothing.
6.3.12.2 International comparison
An important trend in the clothing industry internationally, is that developing
countries are exporting more proportionately to industrialised countries, while
industrialised countries have lost market-share in both their home and export markets.







(IC = Industrialised country, DC = Developing counties, and ETA = Economies in transition)
Source: De la Torre (/ 994) and The South Africa n Clothing Handbook 1995 (/ 995)
6.3.12.3 Development assistance
The South African clothing industry provides a large percentage of local demand.
Historically, the industry has enjoyed high levels of protection against imports as can
be seen in Table 6-21 below.
Table 6-21 Nomina l levels ofprotection as at 15 May 1992
Average nominal protection 70
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings)) 97
Formula (% of tariff headings) 50
Import control (% of tariff headings) 61
Import surcharge (% oftariff headinqs) 98
Source: IDC, 1992.
Although the nominal tariffs are very high, there are duty free permits offered by the
SAP export promotion scheme (Duty Credit Scheme). The industry has also been
plagued by illegal imports due to the high levels of protection, which has rendered the
protection ineffective , especially in the lower end of the market.
Although GElS payments of approximately 19 per cent were available to the clothing
industry, it was insufficient to compensate for the higher costs of inputs and export
sales were so unprofitable as to render value added in exports negative. The clothing
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industry therefore has a negative anti-export bias coefficient and exports take place at
the cost of domestic sales.
Table 6-22 Protection and anti-exp ort bias
Effective protection onexports
EPC Anti-ex ortbias
domestic withGElS without GElS withGElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
Clothing 3,39 2,84 I 1,60 1,00 I -0,24 1,19 I 2,12 1,19 T -14,21
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assum ing that inputs are purchased at world prices, Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: Belli et ai, 1993 and IDC. 1990.
Table 6-23 below gives the actual nominal payment to the clothing industry of
Category A and Category B incentives. The nominal level of export development
assistance determined by the Board of Trade and Industry (1987) was six per cent for
the clothing and footwear industry, while the effective rate was more than double at
17 per cent.
Table 6-23 Total Category A an d Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cateqorv A 'R millions)
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Clothinq and footwear 1,31 I 1,32 2,90 I 3,02
Cateqorv B 'R millions)
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Clothinc and footwear 1,63 I 1,62 4,17 I 5,22
Source: Board ofTrade and Industry, 1987.
The clothing industry has enjoyed category 4 GELS assistance (there are a few items
which qualify for category 3), however, the industry also enjoyed additional benefits
given under the SAP (Duty Credit Scheme). Clothing therefore enjoyed more benefits
than any sector other than those benefiting from Phase VI.
Tab le 6-24 GElS and Phase VI export ince ntives paid in 1992
GElS exclusions %of tariff headings 0
%ofexport value 0
Primary products %oftariff headings 0
%ofexport value 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headinqs 0
lorirnarv product %ofexport value 0
Material intensive %of tariff headinqs 4
%ofexport value 6
Manufactured %oftariff headinqs 96
%ofexport value 94





Since the mid-1980s the value of exports has dropped but recovered again in the early
1990s. This drop was probably a result of sanctions and consumer boycotts aimed at
South African products. Clothing was a very visible consumer item and in most
developed countries, labels indicating the country of origin had to be placed in a
conspicuous place inside the garment. In most countries the textile and clothing
manufacturers lobby is strong and therefore clothing was an unfortunate victim of
South Africa's apartheid policies. Figure 6-31 shows the Southern African Customs
Unions exports on a monthly basis since 1988.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, /DC, /995.
Table 6-25 International demand for South African clothing exports
SITC Product Imports SACU World Market· Cl % RCA
from SACU trend 90-94 trend 90-94 share %
1994US$ % pa, % pa,
26 Textile fibres
65 Textile yarn, fabric, etc,




















South Africa's exports have increased at a faster rate (11,5 per cent) for the 1990 to
1994 period than the world trend (six per cent). This is reflected by the
competitiveness index of 5,2 per cent. This growth is from a very small base. South
Africa has less than 1/10 per cent of the $170 billion world market (Clothfed, 1996).
South African clothing exporters also faced sanctions and consumer boycotts during
the late-1980s and early 1990s.
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The South African clothing industry does not have a positive revealed comparative
advantage.
6.3.12.5 Results of regression for the clothing industry
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the clothing sector, the
following export function was estimated:
X90CLOTH =
with:
-82735838 - 0,022714207*X90CLOTH(-1) +3,4504333*GEIS90CLOTH +
5597888,3*UUDEMCLOTH(-1) +307505,46*REERCLOTH +2958,9389*OECDGDP90·
4752782,4*SEAS4
X90CLOTH = The real value ofclothing exports (R million 1990=100)
GEIS90 CLOTH = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REER CLOTH = The REER for the clothing sector
UUDEM CLOTH = The percentage unutilised capacity ofclothing due tolack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index ofthe OECD countries
SEAS4 = The dummy variable for the 4th quarter
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-32 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for clothing relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is
given on the left hand scale. The function gives a good representation of clothing
exports.
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LS fI Dependent Variable isX90CLOTH
Sample: 1988:2 1994:2
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It would seem as though the most important factor in exports of clothing is the spare
capacity in the industry. There are a few peaks and troughs in the export pattern as can
be seen in Figure 6-33 below:
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However there are rather violent fluctuations in the third quarter of 1992, the second
quarter of 1993 and the first quarter of 1994. This is caused by "announcement"
effects. Not only has clothing benefited from receiving category 4 GElS , but also from
the Structural Adjustment Programmes and later the Duty Credit Scheme. (See section
3.3.6.2.) In anticipation of the announcement , exporters would either export more or
hold out an export later to qualify for the benefit. The lack of a medium or preferably
a long-term strategy for the clothing industry has been disadvantageous. The lack of
vision has been complicated by the fact that the clothing lobby is very strong and in
perpetual conflict with the textile industry. Further, an additional factor to the lack of
a coherent policy was the fact that there have been regular changes in the Minister of
Trade and Industry. New Ministers have to be briefed on policies and then given time
to make decisions. 21
The following equation was estimated using a dummy variable to make provision for
the "announcement effect";
21 The folowing ministers have controlled trade policy in recent years: DJ de Villiers (1985), DW Steyn (1988),
KDS Durr (1990) , G Marais (1991) , DL Keys (1993), TA Manuel (1994), A Erwin (1996) . (Source:
Department of Trade and Industry Annual Reports - Minster on 31 December of the respective year.)
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X90CLOTH =-1,082674e+08 + 3,638521 *GEIS90CLOTH +3878695,2*UUDEMCLOTH(-1) +
160359,11*REERCLOTH +6203,2006*OECDGDP90 + 24249751*DUMMYCLOTH
LS /I Dependent Variable isX90CLOTH
Date: 11/15/96 Time: 10:47
Sample: 1988:21994:2
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std.Error T-Statistic Prob,
C -1,08E+08 1,18E+08 -0,920190 0,3690
GEIS90CLOTH 3,638521 2,204513 1,650487 0,1153
UUDEMCLOTH(-1) 3878695, 1917915, 2,022350 0,0574
REERCLOTH 160359,1 640190,9 0,250486 0,8049
OECDGDP90 6203,201 9763,146 0,635369 0,5328
DUMMYCLOTH 24249751 12658274 1,915723 0,0706
R-squared 0,748973 Mean dependent var 42476805
Adj R-squared 0,682914 SD Dependent var 25264159
SE of regression 14226357 Akaike info criterion 33,14678
Sum squared resid 3,85E+15 Schwartz criterion 33,43931
Log likelihood -443,8082 F-statistic 11,33783
Durbin-Watson stat 2,084727 Prob{F-statistic) 0,000036
The R-squared of 0,748973 is good and together with the F-statistic of 11,33783 we
can say that at least one variable is not zero at 99 per cent significance . The Durbin-
Watson statistic of 2,084727 indicates that there is no serial correlation. This is also
confirmed by Figure 6-34 below.
Figure 6-34
.----- --..1.2E+08
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The dummy variable is significant at 95 per cent confidence level. Although GElS is
significant at the 88 per cent level, the spare capacity is the main driving force in this
industry. Excessive levels of protection have helped to create this spare capacity.
Neither price (REERCLOTH) nor demand (OECDGDP90) are relevant III
determining South Africa's clothing exports. This would seem to confirm Belli's
(1993:23) finding that the anti-export bias is such that exports are so unprofitable as to
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render the value added in exports negative. Manufacturers therefore only sell into
foreign markets when there is spare capacity and exports help keep the factory going
during the slump.
6.3.13 Leather and leather products (SIC 323)
This sector covers tanning, currying, finishing, embossing and japanning, bleaching
and dyeing of leather. It also covers the manufacture of products such as luggage,
handbags, saddlery, harnesses and similar articles made from leather, plastic and other
leather substitutes.
6.3.13.1 Structure of the leather and leather products sector
The sector is very small relative to the South African manufacturing sector and
represents less than 0,5 per cent of total manufacturing.
The quantity of leather in South Africa available for local consumption and exports is
limited by natural factors. South Africa did have an absolute advantage in the
production of ostrich leather, being the only producer internationally . Regrettably,
ostrich leather was dependent on international fashions. In the mean time the ostrich
farming has developed internationally and will provide competition to South African
producers.






















--Production of LEATHER PRODUCTS (ISIC 323)
•• - - -. - Production as a % of total manu facturing
Source : Sectoral Data Series: Manufa cturing, IDe, 1995.
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6.3.13.2 International comparison
SITC Product Imports from SACU trend World trend Market-share CI% RCA

















Raw hides and skins have lost market-share internationally even though the sector
enjoyed a revealed comparative advantage. It would seem as though the raw hides
have been beneficiated into leather and leather products since even though the
revealed comparative advantage is average, the average growth has been 13,2 per cent
compared to world growth of only 4,2 per cent.
6.3.13.3 Development assistance
Table 6-26 N om inal lev els ofprotection
Averace nominal protection 25
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings)) 98
Formula (% oftariff headings) 6
Import control (% of tariff headings) 0
Import surcharge (% oftariff headings) 100
Source: /DC, 1992.
The average nominal protection for the leather sector was 25 per cent at 15 May 1992,
which was higher than the manufacturing sector's average of 20 percent. Table 6-27
below gives the effective level of protection and shows the anti-export bias. GElS was
able to neutralise the anti-export bias and a neutral trade regime existed with GElS
and purchases at local prices. Exporters able to purchase at world prices benefited and
exporting was more profitable than local sales.
Table 6-27 Protection an d anti-export bias
EPC Effective protection on exports Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales 71w) l(Id) !(lw) I(Id) (Iw) 1(ld) IIw) 1(ld)
Leather 1,22 1,32 11 ,22 1,00 10,90 0,92 11 ,00 0,92 11,35
Note. lw indicates that value was calculated assumtng that inputs are purchased at world pri ces, Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: /DC (1990)
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Table 6-28 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
GElS exclusions %of tariff headinqs 0
%ofexport value 0
Primary products %oftariff headinas 0
%ofexport value 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headinas 0
lprimarv oroduct %ofexport value 0
Material intensive %oftariff headinas 0
%ofexport value 0
Manufactured %oftariff headinas 100
%ofexport value 100
Phase VI %oftariffheadincs 0
%ofexport value 0
Source: IDC, 1992.
Although the IDC calculated that all the exports from this sector received category 4
assistance, leather car seats were exported and claimed Phase VI benefits.
6.3.13.4 Export
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Source: Sectoral Data Ser ies: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995
In 1980 the sector expanded production, which was preceded by an increased export
demand as shown in Figure 6-36Export of leather and leather products. Exports
increased steadily until the mid-1980s, since when they represented between 15 and
23 per cent of total production. Figure 6-38 below shows most of the growth came
from products of leather and not the raw products. This sector had therefore started
with beneficiation of raw material before GElS was introduced, there has nevertheless
been a more pronounced increase in the export of manufactured products since 1990.
Figure 6-37 Export oftannery and leather finishing
industry (SIC 323I)
. . . . EXPORTS' ------EXPORTS AS% OFPRODJCTION
Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDe, 1995.
Figure 6-38 Exports ofleather products and
substitutes





This sector began exporting in the early 1980s. Most of the exports are sent to Italy
(35 per cent), and the USA and Japan (each with approximately 18 per cent). These
products are raw leather falling under category 2 or 3 while raw hides are excluded
from receiving any export benefit.
6.3.13.5 Results of regression for the leather and leather products sector
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the leather sector, the
following export function was estimated:
XMANLEAT =
with:
-93,604959 + 0,096253773*GEISXLEAT + 0,009045442*UUDEMLEAT(-1)-
0,41526432*REERLEAT + 0,0099068663*OECDGDP90 + 2,4742209*SEAS4 +
[AR(1 )=0,25331863)
XMANLEAT = Exports of leather asa proportion of total manufacture
GEISX LEAT = GElS asa proportion ofexports
REER LEAT = The REER forthe leather sector
UUDEM LEAT = The percentage unutilised capacity of leather manufacturing due to lack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below, Figure 6-39 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for the leather sector relative to the right hand scale, while the
residual is given on the left hand scale. The function gives a fair representation of
leather exports.
From the regressions below, GElS did not contribute significantly to the development
ofleather exports. The REER and the DEeD's GDP were contributing factors.
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LS II Dependent Variable isXMANLEAT
Sample: 1988:2 1994:2
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints




























































Inverted AR Roots ,33
The R-squared and adjusted R-squared are acceptable. The F-statistic indicates that at
least one of the variables is not zero. Serial correlation that was indicated by the
Durbin-Watson statistic was corrected using First Order Autoregression techniques.
The T-tests, conducted at the both the 90 and 95 per cent levels, indicated that both
the GElS and spare capacity variables had coefficients that were statistically not
different from zero. This leads us to conclude that neither GElS nor spare capacity had
an influence on the leather sector's level of exports. Although GElS has not had
significant impact on the exports of the sector, there has been a move away from
exporting raw hides to the export of leather and leather products. It would therefore
appear as though GElS did achieve one of its objects in increasing the export of value
added products. Leather exports are influenced by the REER. Although the impact of
the growth of the OEeD countries GDP was significant the coefficient is quite small
and, therefore will not have such an impact. Exports are dependent seasonal
fluctuations,.
167
Figure 6-39 Residuals, actual and jitted real values fo r the export ofleather exports
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6.3.14 Footwear (324)
This sector covers the manufacture of leggings, gaiters and footwear from leather,
fabrics and other materials excluding rubber and plastic. The manufacturing of boot
and shoe cut stock is included.
6.3.14.1 Structure of the footwear manufacturing sector
The footwear industry is relatively small comprising less than 1,5 per cent of South
Africa's total manufacturing. Output has however increased by almost fifty per cent
from 1985 to more than R3 000 million in 1990. The volume of production has
however decreased by almost 30 per cent from 1990 to 1994. Imports have risen from
R40 million per quarter in 1990 to R140 million in the fourth quarter of 1994.
Figure 6-40 Production off ootwear
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDe , 1995.
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South Africa 's consumption trend is toward lower value shoes such as footwear with
plastic, rubber, synthetic and fabric uppers,
The industry is centred around KwaZululNatal and the Western Cape with four
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South Africa has virtually no share of the world footwear market, Exports have
however grown at ten times the world rate for the period 1990 to 1994. This has
resulted in a very favourable competitiveness index of 45 per cent. South Africa does
not a have a revealed comparative advantage.
6.3.14.3 Development assistance
From Table 6-30 below the footwear sector has enjoyed nominal protection of 35 per
cent, considerably higher than the industry average of 20 per cent,
Table 6-30 N ominal levels ofprotection
Averaoe nominal protection 35
Ad valorem (% oftariff headinqsl 87
Formula(% oftariff headings) 51
Import control (% oftariff headlnos) 2
Import surcharce (% oftariff headlnus) 75
Source: IDC, 1992.
The sector does suffer from an anti-export bias and GElS is needed for the sector to
export if inputs are purchased at domestic prices . However, with inputs at world
prices, South African footwear exports should compete internationally.
Table 6-31 Pr ote ction and anti-export bias
EPC Effective protection on exports Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales "Iw) \(ld) l'Iw) I(ld) 'Iw) I(ld) I(lw) I(ld)
Footwear 1,87 2,52 11,94 1,00 10,43 0,74 10,96 0,74 14,38
Note. lw indicates that value was calculated assuming that inputs are purchased at world pri ces, Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic pr ices.
Source : Belli, 1993 and IDC, 1990.
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The Board of Trade and Industry (RSA, 1987) determined that the footwear and
clothing industries received nominal export assistance of six per cent but enjoyed
effective rate of export assistance of 17 per cent. Of all the sectors manufacturing final
products, it had the lowest export development assistance.
Table 6-32 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cateqorv A Rmillion
1982 I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Clothing and footwear 1,31 I 1,32 I 2,90 I 3,02
Category BRmillion
1982 I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Clothing and footwear 1,63 I 1,63 I 4,71 I 5,22
Source: Board ofTrade and Industry, 1987.
Under the new GElS, most footwear products enjoyed category 4 assistance and
therefore received the maximum incentive permitted under the scheme.
Table 6-33 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
GElSexclusions %oftariff headinos 0
%ofexport value 0
Primary products %oftariffheadings 0
%ofexport value 0
Beneficiated %oftariffheadinqs 0
primary product %ofexport value 0








The sector is not at all export oriented, exporting between three and four per cent of
production, This percentage has grown steadily since the 1970s when only one per
cent of production was exported.
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Figure 6-41 Exports offootwear
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Source: Sectora l Data Series: Manufa cturing, 1DC, 1995.
South Africa's export market for footwear IS shifting to African countries, with
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Reunion, and Malawi accounting for 20 per cent of export
turn over. The UK, USA, and Germany remain the important customers, taking 45 per
cent of South Africa's exports,
6.3.14.5 Results of regression for the footwear sector
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the footwear sector, the
following export function was estimated:
X90FOOT = -73897972 +2,8657302*GEIS90FOOT + 170258,1 *CAPUTFOOT - 138389,57*REERFOOT
+ 5109,6287*OECDGDP90 + [AR(1)=0,60381501)
with:
X90 FOOT = The real value of footwear exports (R million 1990=100)
GEIS90 FOOT = Real GElS payments (1990=100) tofootwear sector
REER FOOT = The REER forthe footwear sector
CAPUT FOOT = The utilisation capacityof footwear manufacturing
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-42 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for footwear relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is




exports of footwear have grown at a faster rate than the world rate. Although this is
from a low base, it would appear as though an export culture has developed in the
sector and the sector could benefit from further supply-side measures in order to
develop its competitiveness.
6.3.15 Wood and wood products. excluding furniture (SIC 331)
This sector covers the sawing, planing of wood and the manufacture of wooden and
canes containers.
6.3.15.1 Structure of the timber industry
Local production meets most of South Africa's needs. There are approximately 120
sawmills in South Africa, 16 pulp and board mills, 32 mining timber manufacturers,
and two match factories. Although there are a number of timber farmers, many of the
plantations are own by large conglomerates such as Sappi or Mondi, and the State.








The sector contributes less than 1Y:! per cent of total manufacturing. Production has
remain steady in real terms, which is understandable as a new plantation takes a
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Source: ITC, 1996.
South African timber exports have grown by over 25 per cent per annum since 1990.
This is considerably better than the world average of 6,2 per cent. However,
manufactured products of wood performed worse on the international markets than the
world average. The raw materials therefore have a competitive indicator of 19,4 per
cent while manufactured products have a negative indicator. Neither the raw material
nor the manufactured products have a revealed comparative advantage. Possible
reasons for this discrepancy are discussed below. However, the fact that GElS was
given to raw materials at a category 3 level could have contributed to the fact that the
raw products have a high competitive indicator while the manufactured products are
negative.
6.3.15.3 Development assistance
Table 6-34 Nominal levels ofprotection
Average nominal protection 20
Ad valorem (% oftariff headings)) 71
Formula (% oftariff headings) 10
Import control (%oftariff headings) 17
Import surcharge (% oftariff headings) 41
Source: IDC, 1992.
Table 6-35 Total Category A and B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Source. Board ofTrade and Industry, 1987.
Sector Catec ory A
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Wood 0,17 I 0,17 0,17 I 0,31
Cate orv B
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Wood 0,58 I 0,79 0,74 I 0,73
Table 6-36 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection onexports
EPC Anti-ex ortbias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
Wood and wood products 1,38 1.60 I 1,22 1,00 1 0,62 0,86 I 1,13 0,86 I 2,.21
Note. lw indicates that value was calculated assuming that tnputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: !DC (1990)
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Table 6-37 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
GElS exclusions %oftariff headinas 0
%ofexport value 0
Primary products %oftariffheadinas 6
%ofexport value 1
Beneficiated %oftariff headinas 35
lprimarv oroduet %ofexoort value 54
Material intensive %oftariff headinas 34
%ofexport value 18
Manufactured %oftariff headinas 24
%of export value 27
Phase VI %oftariff headinas 1
%ofexport value 0
Source: toe, / 992.
Over half the exports, in rand terms received category 2 assistance and therefore
received at least 2'i'2 per cent of the fob of their export value. Almost a third received
the full category 4 assistance and the remainder category 3 assistance.
6.3.15.4 Export
Figure 6-44 Export ofwood and wood products
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDe , /995.
The value of exports increased gradually since 1972 until the late-1970s when the
volume decreased. It increased again in the mid-1980s until, in the late-1980s it
reached the previous levels in real terms. The increase in exports in the mid-1980s
was as a result of exports to Asia. Much these exports consisted of wood chips that
were processed and exported from Richard 's Bay. Approximately 40 per cent of
exports are to diversified countries . The UK buys approximately 23 per cent of South
Africa 's sales; South Korea approx . 10 per cent; Germany, US, and Mozambique
between 5 and 10 per cent each.
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6.3.15.5 Results of regression for wood and wood products
In order to determine the effect GEl S has had on the export of the wood and wood
products sector, the following export function was estimated:
X90WOOD=
with:
-6463145,6+ O,18770465*X90WOOD(-1) - O,54697963*GEIS90WOOD +
123426,23*CAPUTWOOD -1266675,5*REERWOOD + 10514,808*OECDGDP90-
12236815*SEAS1- 6065377,1 *SEAS2 - 1981636,9*SEAS3 + [AR(1) =0,42734676]
X90 WOOD = The real value ofwood exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
GEIS90 WOOD = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REER WOOD = The REER forthe wood sector
CAPUTWOOD = The percentage capacityofwood utilised
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-46 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for wood relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is given
on the left hand scale. The function gives a good representation of wood exports.
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LS 11 Dependent Variable isX90WOOD
Sample: 1988:3 1994:2
Included observations: 24 after adjusting endpoints
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The volume of production in this sector has gradually declined.
The Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that serial correlation was present and this was
corrected using First Order Autoregression techniques. Price as indicated by the
REERWOOD variable was significant at the 99 per cent level, while seasonal
variations were also significant. The OEeD's GDP was significant at the 10 per cent
level. GElS played an insignificant role in this sector. The REER was much more
prominent indicating that the industry responded to price.
There are excellent opportunities for further beneficiation of timber. GElS hindered
rather than contributed to the beneficiation. Assistance should have been aimed at
making the paper and furniture sectors more competitive and creating capacity for
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further beneficiation. The volume of timber produced internationally is limited by
nature. Demand for timber-based products continually increases. South Africa will
maximise its welfare if these products can be manufactured rather than exporting of
raw material. Firstly, international demand was such that subsidies were not necessary
to promote exports, and secondly the policies to promote exports in this sector was
counter-productive when evaluating the aim of the GElS scheme to promote
beneficiated products.
6.3.16 Furniture (SIC 332)
This sector covers the manufacture of all household, office, professional and
restaurant furniture and fixtures (excluding certain items made of metal). Also
included are the manufacture of upholstered furniture, mattresses and window and
door screens and shades.
Although South Africa is not blessed with abundant natural forests, the furniture
industry is one of its oldest manufacturing industries. Forests have in the meantime
been planted and contributed to the development of this industry. The industry has
developed an outward orientation since the early 1980s probably in response to the
Categories A and B schemes and the devaluation of the South African currency.
6.3.16.1 Structure of the furniture industry
The relatively small South African furniture industry accounts for just over one per
cent of total manufacturing output. The industry grew rapidly in the late-1970s until
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SITC Product Imports SACU trend World trend Market Cl% RCA
from SACU 90-94 % 90-94 % share %
1994 US$ p.a. p.a.
Source: ITC, 1996.
The export of furniture has grown by 31,3 per cent from 1990 to 1994, almost ten
times the world trend albeit from a small base. This gives South Africa a high
competitiveness index for furniture. In addition, the industry also has a revealed
comparative advantage.
6.3.16.3 Development assistance
The furniture industry received nominal protection of 25 per cent that was higher than
the industry average of20 per cent in May 1992.
Table 6-39 Nominal levels a/protection
Average nominal protection 25
Ad valorem (% oftariff headings) 90
Formula (% oftariff headings 7
Import control (% oftariff headings 0
Import surcharge (% of tariff headings 100
Source. IDC, 1992.
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GElS effectively removed the anti-export bias experienced by the furniture industry.
However, the incentive to export would have been higher if inputs could be purchased
at world prices .
Table 6-40 Protect ion and anti-export bias
Effective protection on exports
EPC Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id)
Furniture 1.45 2.11 I 1.83 1,00 I 0,72 0,69 I 0,80 0,691 2.03
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assumtng that inputs are purchased at world pr ices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: Belli et al (/993) and /DC (1990)
According to the Board of Trade and Industry (1987), furniture and accessones
enjoyed nominal export assistance at 10 per cent and an effective protection rate of 25
per cent.
Table 6-41 Total Categ ory A and Ca teg ory B ass istance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Caleoorv A R million
1982 . I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Furniture 0,19 I 0,19 I 0,21 I 0,17
Cateqorv BR million
1982 I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Furniture 0,57 I 0,50 I 0,40 I 0,44
Source: Board a/Trade and Industry, 198 7.
Under the 1990 export incentive package, the furniture industry is classified as a
category 4 exporter, although a few products do qualify for Phase VI assistance.
Tab le 6-42 GElS and Ph ase VI export incentives paid in 1992
GElS exclusions %of tariff headinqs 0
%ofexport value 0
Primary products %of tariff headings 0
%ofexport value 0
Beneficiated %of tariff headinos 0
[primary product %ofexport value 0
Material intensive %of tariff headings 0
%of export value 0
Manufactured %of tariff beadinqs 97
%ofexport value 99





The volume of exports has been rising constantly since 1988. The sector has become
far more aware of the export markets. It has exported almost eight per cent of
production in 1993 compared to only approximately one per cent in 1972.
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South Africa's largest export market is the UK, which buys approximately 40 per cent
of total exports. The USA follows with approximately ten per cent and France with
five per cent. The Southern African markets are also significant customers and buy
approximately 20 to 25 per cent of South Africa's furniture exports.
Pine furniture is successfully been exported to Europe and the USA. South African
pine furniture manufacturers have carefully developed this market. They have formed
the Timber Product Exporters Association, which has successfully negotiated with
shipping lines for reduced freight costs. It has also lobbied the South African Lumber
Millers Association for reduced raw material prices. Generally all the firms are
relatively small and yet have successfully penetrated the European pine market that
was dominated by Scandinavian countries.
6.3.16.5 Results of regression for the furniture sector
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the furniture sector, the
following export function was estimated:
LX90FURN = 4,8925883 + 0,01018872*LGEIS90FURN + O,23943804*LUUDEMFURN -




X90Furn = The real value offurniture exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
GEIS90 Furn = real GElS payments (1990=100)
REER Furn = The REER forthe furniture sector
UUDEM Furn = The percentage unutilised capacity of furniture due to lack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-49 below shows the actual and
estimated real export figures for furniture relative to the left hand scale, while the
error term is given on the right hand scale. The function gives a good representation of
furniture exports. With R-squared of 0,823960 and F-statistic of 13,37289 we can say
with 99 per cent confidence that the coefficients of the estimation are not
simultaneously zero.
LS II Dependent Variable is LX90FURN
Sample: 1988:11994:4
Included observations: 28
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Approximately ten per cent of South Africa's furniture output is exported. The vast
majority of furniture exported is relatively low-value knock-down pine furniture. The
significant negative response to unutilised capacity due to lack of demand indicates
that firms are manufacturing for the export market. This was confirmed in interviews.
The industry has not been responsive to DEeD's GDP. Forty per cent of the exports
are destined for the UK. The rest of the exports are to Southern Africa countries. The
South African manufacturers have targeted the lower utility-end of the market and this
could explain the incorrect sign. The products seem to be income inelastic.
Figure 6-50
The industry has complained that its members have not been able to obtain raw
materials. Exporters of timber planks received incentives under category 3. This
unfortunately resulted in higher South African prices of raw materials. Selective
export incentives therefore may be preferable. The quantity of wood produced in
South Africa is limited and providing incentives to the raw material producers
hampered down stream exports. Other problems hampering exports in this sector are
lack of effective managerial skill, lack of suitable quality raw material and inadequate
training and development in the industry. (NPI, 1994)
6.3.17 Paper (SIC 341)
This sector consists of three subsectors: pulp, paper and paperboard, containers of
paper or paper substitutes, and other pulp and paper products such as envelopes,
stationery, wallpaper, paper towels, toilet paper, straws, patterns, and paper mache.
Starting with a single small paper mill, relying on imported pulp in 1920, the South
African paper industry saw considerable growth and is now considered one of the
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country's industrial success stories. The paper industry provides 85 per cent of paper
consumed domestically and exports a third of its production. South African companies
such as Sappi and Mondi are important international companies and have even
acquired foreign mills in Germany, Austria, and the UK.
South Africa is devoid of natural forests and there are only a few subtropical areas in
the Eastern and Western Cape where commercial forests have been planted during the
last century. Until the 1960s, most of the new forests were planted by the state. Since
1920, more than a million hectares of commercial timber were planted transforming
South Africa from a net importer of timber to a net exporter. There are currently 1,37
million hectares of commercial plantations - about 1,1 per cent of the country's total
surface area. Nearly three quarters of the forests are privately owned.
South African pulpwood has a number of comparative advantages: Its pulpwood
grows quickly; plantations are well managed; and the quality of the timber is suited to
the production of pulp.
However the future for additional development is poor because of limited natural
resources (land and water), land disputes and the environmental impact. Furthermore,
pulpwood prices will face upward pressure due to the commercialisation of state
forests and unionisation oflabour. (Bethlehem, 1994).
6.3.17.1 International comparison
South African paper exporters have been losing both market share and are exporting
less than the world trend. Pulp on the other hand, although growing slowly, has gained
market share, as the world trend is downward. Both pulp and paper exhibit revealed
comparative advantages. It would therefore appear as though GElS has not had the
desired effect ofpromoting the export of manufactured goods in this sector.
6.3.17.2 Development assistance
This sector as a lower nominal protection than the manufacturing average of 20 per
cent as determined by the lDC on 15 May 1992.
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Table 6-43 Nominal levels ofprotection
Pulp and Container Other pulp
paper ofpaper and paper
Average nominal protection 10 15 15
Ad valorem (% oftariff headings)) 71 92 60
Formula (% oftariff headings) 17 30 24
Import control (% of tariff headings) 44 0 7
Import surcharge (% oftariffheadings) 1 100 31
Source: toe, 1992.
Even though the sector does not have high levels of nominal protection, there is an
anti-export bias which although neutralised by GElS, presents a problem to exporters
once GElS has ceased and who do not have access to raw materials and other inputs at
world prices.
Table 6-44 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection onexports
EPC Anti-ex ortbias
domestic withGElS without GElS withGElS withoutGElS
Sector sales (lw) (Id) (lw) (Id) (lw) (Id) (lw) (Id)
Paper and paper 1,31 1,88 1,56 1,00 0,68 0,70 0,84 0,70 1,92
products
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assum ing that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are p urchased at domestic prices.
Source: WC (1990)
Table 6-45 Total Category A and Category B assis tance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cate: oryA
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Paper and paper products 1,74T 2,11 2,30 I 2,00
Cate ory B
1982 I 1983 1984 1 1985
Paper and oaoer products 1,32 I 0,96 2,44 I 7,08
Source . Board of Trade and Industry, 1987.
Table 6-46 GElS and Phase V1 export incentives pa id in 1992
Pulp and Container of Other pulp
paper paper and paper
GElS exclusions %of tariff headinqs 0 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0 0
Primary products %oftariff headinqs 0 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headinos 6 0 0
lorimarv oroduct %ofexport value 9 0 0
Material intensive %oftariffheadinqs 92 8 80
%ofexport value 91 7 71
Manufactured %of tariffheadincs 2 92 17
%ofexport value 0 93 20
Phase VI %of tariffheadincs 0 0 3
%ofexport value 0 0 9
Source . IDC, 1992.
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6.3.17.3 Export
Since 1988, the value of this sector's exports has grown substanti ally and has become
more export oriented , relying less on the local market and more on the export market.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.




























Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
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6.3.17.4 Results of regression for paper and paper products
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the paper sector, the
following export function was estimated:
LX90PAPER =
with:
-5,7964893 - 0,053569809*LGEIS90PAPER +4,3878046*LCAPUTPAPER-
0,075732591 *LREERPAPER + 1,4917821*LOECDGDP90
LX90 paper = The real value ofpaper exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
LGEIS90 = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
LREER paper = The REER for the paper sector
LUUDEM paper = The percentage unutilised capacity of paper due to lack ofdemand
LOECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-55 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for paper and pulp relative to the right hand scale, while the
residual is given on the left hand scale. With a R-squared of 0,638749 the function
gives good representation of paper and pulp exports. The F-statistic of 10,16691
indicates that at least one of the coefficients is not zero at the 99 per cent confidence
level.
LS II Dependent Variable isLX90PAPER
Sample: 1988:11994:4
Included observations: 28






















The coefficient for GElS
0,638749 Mean dependent var 8,493693
0,575923 S.D. dependent var 0,078476
0,051104 Akaike info criterion -5,787342
0,060068 Schwarz criterion -5,549448
46,29251 F-statistic 10,16691
2,686629 Prob(F-statistic) 0,000069
is not statistically significantly different from zero that
allows the conclusion that GElS has contributed very little to the export of paper.
Although GElS forms as much as 50 per cent of the profit rate of some of the
companies, many of the plants are of such a scale that the companies would have had
to export in any event. Investment incentives have also played an important role in the
sector's development. Many of the plants were established in decentralised areas when
the benefits were at their highest. There were also favourable tax allowances on
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capital equipment. It would therefore seem as though these factors rather than GElS
were the main contributing factors to the development of the industry and its exports.
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Figur e 6-56 Real exports and spare capacity due lack of demand
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The industry seems to act differently than can be expected regarding the spare
capacity. A positive coefficient would be expected. The industry has matured and is a
committed exporter. This is probably due to the fact that large investments have been
made and the industry exports as much as it can without selling below its average
price. The REER on the other hand is significant. This would confirm that the industry
is indeed very price sensitive .
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Figure 6-57 Real exports and the REER
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Exports went to many different markets. Although obviously, the DEeD countries
were major customers, no single country bought more than 10 per cent of South
Africa 's exports. As is the case with many commodities, pulp and paper experience a
boom and bust cycle. New mills tend to be large, as they are the most efficient. This
results in large amounts of additional production coming on line simultaneously. The
boom and busts results in both volatile prices and erratic profit margins.
6.3.18 Printing and publishing (SIC 342)
The printing industry in South Africa is very diversified. Products include: stationery,
business forms, newspapers, labels, business forms, magazines, envelopes, greeting
cards and advertising material. There are over a thousand companies involved in this
industry although it is dominated by four or five major players. Exports are marginal
as the majority ofthe output is sold on the local market.
Equipment is outdated both in the upper end and in the lower end markets. Although a
training college has been established for the printing industry and will probable
contribute to improved productivity, it has been late in coming and has hampered the
development of the industry. Because of cost, many books exclusively published for
the South African market are often printed in the Far East where manufacturing costs
are lower, even when taking the transportation costs into account.
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6.3.18.1 Structure of Printing and publishing industry
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Production has increased very gradually over the past few years. Exports as a
percentage production has in fact decreased since 1972, although it has remained
constant during the past few years. The fact that production has decreased is
regrettable as the population has grown and per capita production has therefore
decreased substantially.
6.3.18.2 Development assistance
The nominal protection received by this sector is low. At 15 May 1992, the IDC
calculated the nominal level of this sector to be only 10 per cent compared with an
industry average of 20 per cent.
Table 6-47 Nominal levels ofprotection
Source. IDC, 1992.
Average nominal protection 10
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings)) 61
Formula (% of tariff headings) 29
Import control (% oftariff headings) 12
Import surcharge (% of tariff headings) 61
The Board of Trade and Industry (1987) indicated that this sector received no
Category A or B assistance. The industry exhibits an anti-export bias. However, since
most of the products exported under this heading were category 4, GElS contributed
in neutralising this bias.
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Table 6-48 Protect ion and anti-exp ort bias
EPC Effective protection on Anti-export bias
exports
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
PrintinQ and publishinq 1,15 2.021 1.88 1,001 0,85 0,571 0,61 0,57\ 1,35
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assuming that inp uts are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are p urchased at domestic prices.
Source: /DC (1990)
Table 6-49 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
Source: /DC. 1992.
GElS exclusions %of tariff headings 0
%ofexport value 0
Primary products %of tariff headings 0
%ofexport value 0
Beneficiated %of tariff headinqs 0
prmary product %ofexport value 0
Material intensive %of tariff headings 14
%ofexport value 1
Manufactured %of tariff headings 85
%ofexport value 99
Phase VI %of tariff headinqs 1
%ofexport value 0
6.3.18.3 Export
From the late-1970s, this sector has exhibited a long-term downward trend in its
exports. The industry produces mainly for home consumption, with exports
accounting for less than one per cent of production in 1993.
F igure 6-59 Exports ofprinted produ cts
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
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6.3.18.4 Results of regression for printing and publishing
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the printing sector, the
following export function was estimated:
XMANPRINT =
with:
-0,8630753 - 0,067846098*GEISXPRINT •O,0098262022*CAPUTPRINT -
0,036839086*REERPRINT +0,00055535505*OECDGDP90 - 0,1858409*DUMMYAB -
0,022570184*CAPUTPAPER(-1) +0,080998795*SEAS4
XMANPRINT = The real value ofprinting exports (R million 1990=100)
GEISXPRINT = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REERPRINT = The REER forthe printing sector
UUDEMPRINT = The percentage unutilised capacity ofprinting due to lack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-60 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for printing products relative to the right hand scale, while the
residual is given on the left hand scale. The function gives a good representation of
printed products exports.
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LS 11 Dependent Variable isXMANPRINT
Date: 11/06/96 Time: 11 :33
Sample: 1988:2 1994:2
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Although statistically significant, the printing and publishing sector's coefficients for
the OECDGDP90 was low. This was probably due to the fact that South Africa's
major customers are Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, the UK, and Malawi.
The REER has a low but significant coefficient. The printing of publications IS
internationally very competitive. Many US and European publishers use Asian
printers to print and as technology improves, this trend will continue. The problem of
sending proofs across the globe is reduced by the electronic technology. The publisher
therefore will retain control until the final print is done.
Although the majority of the products covered in this sector are category 4, GElS did
not have a significant impact. As there were no incentives for the service sector,
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exporters such as correspondence schools simply invoiced the tuition fees and the
"text books" separately and were therefore entitled to receive GElS payments on the
export of the text books. As South Africa spend more on education and therefore more
textbooks are printed, it would be expected that, using marginal costing, the sector
would be able to sell more into anglophone Africa.
6.3.19 Chemicals (SIC 351-354)
There are almost ten million chemicals know to man and many thousands more being
developed each year. It is a complicated industry making analysis in aggregate
difficult. The sector consists of fertilisers and pesticides; synthetic resins and plastics;
paints vanishes and lacquers; medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations; cleaning and
toilet preparations and cosmetics ; and other various other chemical and basic chemical
products.
6.3.19.1 Structure of the chemical industry
The South African chemical industry developed from the need to supply mines with
explosives and agriculture with fertilisers . South Africa also developed a process
converting coal to oil (Sasol). This developed at the time South Africa was pursuing a
policy of import substitution. It was given further impetus due to security needs of a
country which was facing a "total onslaught". The South African chemical industry is
dominated by three groups: Sasol, Sentrachem, and AECI. Due to the development of
Sasol (mainly 2 and 3), the development of the South African petro-chemical has
tended to move away from oil as a feed-stock to using coal. The Sasol and Mossgas
projects were undertaken at large expense and have resulted in deteriorating
productivity.
South Africa 's chemical producers have lacked economies of scale and together with
the reason mentioned above are high cost producers.
GElS export incentives are applicable to polymer exports at Category 2 level (lower
value added type products) and are not regarded as significant as the payments are
very limited. It is probable that polymer producers would have exported with or
without GElS incentives , an example of GElS's non-selective design" (Crompton,
1995) This is confirmed by the econometric analysis below.
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Figure 6-61 Production ofchemica l products
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6.3.19.2 International comparison
The industry is concentrated in the EU, USA, and Japan with sales of $350 billion ,
$258 billion, and $188 billion respectively in 1989. This traditional dominance is now
being challenged by Saudi Arabia, South East Asia, Nigeria, Trinidad, Thailand,
Brazil , and Indonesia. South Africa on the other hand had only $10 billion turnover in
1989. (Crompton, 1995).
Figure 6-62
SITC Product Imports SACU World Market- Cl % RCA
from SACU trend90-94 trend90-94 share %
1994 US$ %p.a. % p.a.
27 Crude fertilizer, mineral 481,7 -1,6 -1 ,2 3,4 -0,4 7,43
32 Coal, coke, briquettes 1 681,4 -0,3 -2,2 8,5 1,9 91 ,47
33 Petroleum, petrol. Product 199,6 22,7 -4,1 0,1 28,0 0,07
51 Organic chemicals 212,2 20,3 4,4 0,2 15,2 0,63
52 Inorganic chemicals 359,9 -3,8 1,5 1,3 -5,2 4,10
53 Dyes, colouring materials 58,4 16,3 5,0 0,2 10,7 1,17
54 Medicinal, pharm. products 13,8 10,5 11 ,8 0,0 -1 ,1 0,24
55 Essentl.oils, perfume, etc. 14,0 9,2 8,9 0,1 0,2 0,35
56 Fertilizer, except grp272 39,4 17,1 -1,3 0,3 18,6 0,96
59 Chemical materials nes 66,6 12,0 4,4 0,2 7,3 0,97
Source: trc, 1996.
South Africa has a positive competitiveness index III the petroleum, orgamc
chemicals, and fertiliser subsectors indicating that her exports in these fields have
been growing faster than the world trend. In the case of petroleum product s, African
markets have opened up since 1990 and South Africa has captured market share from
other countries.
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The production of fertiliser has been declining since the early 1980s. The increased
exports are therefore due to lower demand by South African due the various droughts.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufa cturing, IDC, 1995.
South Africa has a revealed comparative advantage in crude fertiliser, inorganic
chemicals, and dyes and colouring materials. However it is only in the dyes and
colouring materials subsector where South Africa has both a positive competitiveness
index and a revealed comparative advantage.
6.3.19.3 Development assistance
Table 6-50 Nominal levels ofprotection as at 15 May 1992
Fa1tff S;fih:t;re&1s Pei15ad M:d::i'Iaad ere-
ad~ VCli:te:; ctmtas
Average nominal protection 15 30 25 20 15
Ad valorem (% oftariff headings)) 30 44 77 48 58
Formula (% of tariff headings) 20 26 26 10 13
Import control (% oftariff headings) 43 51 0 26 4
Import surcharge (% oftariff headings) 0 0 71 37 39
Source. IDC, 1992.
The nominal protection given to the chemical industry is not exceptionally high
compared with the industry average of 20 per cent. The IOe (Belli et aI, 1993)
calculated the protection of inputs at 4,8 and 13,3 per cent for industrial and other
chemicals respectively and the protection on output was 14,8 and 21,5 per cent. The
anti-export bias makes exporting unprofitable without GElS if manufacturers purchase
at domestic prices. However, if other chemical manufacturers could purchase inputs at
world prices, they would not require any export incenti ves.
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Table 6-51 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection on exports
EPC Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales lOw) IOd) I/lw) IOd) lOw) I/ld) IIIW) Id)
Industrial chemicals 1,54 1,20 1,01 1,00 0,81 1,28 1,52 1,28 1,91
Other chemicals 1,30 1,47 1,34 1,00 0,86 0,88 0,97 0,88 1,50
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assuming that inputs are purchased at worldprices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: Belli et al (1993)
Chemical products enjoyed both Categories A and B assistance. The nominal rate of
assistance however was only between 4,1 and 6,2 per cent. (BTl, 1987)
Table 6-52 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cate orv A
1982 1983 1984 1985
Chemical and chemical 3,44 3,33 0,96 1,97
products
Catee ory B
1982 1983 1984 1985
Chemical and chemical 15,23 10,74 9,72 15,22
products
Source: Board of Trade and Industry, 1987.
Under GElS, most of the products qualify for category 3 assistance, with a few
classified under categories 2 and 4.
Table 6-53 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
Fertilizer Synthetic Paints and Medicinal Other
resins/plastic vanishes Ipharmaceutical chemicals
GElS exclusions %of tariff headings 0 4 0 0 1
%ofexport value 0 20 0 0 1
Primary products %oftariff headings 0 0 0 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0 0 0 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headings 6 89 0 35 9
lprirnsry product %ofexport value 5 80 0 16 12
Material %oftariff headings 51 7 0 18 51
intensive %ofexport value 59 0 0 32 82
Manufactured %oftariff headings 43 0 100 47 39
%ofexport value 36 0 100 52 5
Phase VI %oftariff headings 0 0 0 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0 0 0 0
Source. IDC, 1992.
6.3.19.4 Export
The graph below shows South Africa's chemical exports in constant 1993 Rand and
the percentage this represents of the industries' output. The industry has in fact fallen
behind compared to the rest of the world's chemical exporters. South Africa's exports
as a percentage of output were 7 per cent in 1972 while internationally the figure was
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16 per cent. South Africa's exports to sales improved to 8,8 per cent in 1990, while
internationally it rose from 16 to 30 per cent over the same period. (Crompton, 1995)
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Figure 6-65 apart of fert ilisers and pesticides (SIC
3512)
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Figure 6-66 apart of synthetic resins and plastic
materials (SIC 3513)
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Figure 6-67 Exports of paints, varnishes and
lacquers (SIC 3521)
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Exports of chemical products have hovered around the R3 000 million since the late-
1990s and averaged approximately 15 per cent of production. Other chemical products
(SIC 3529) is the largest subsector and therefore the trend is similar to the total
chemical industry. Exports of fertilisers have risen consistently since the early 1980s.
The exports of synthetic resins has also increased since the mid 1980s.









Source: The Commissioner for Customs and Excise
The export of chemicals to the Americas, Asia and to a lesser extent Europe has
grown proportionately at the expense of exports to Africa. It can be expected that
exports of consumer chemicals such as medicinal and pharmaceuticals; cleaning and
toilet preparations and cosmetics; and paint, varnishes and lacquers will increase as
exporters establish and re-establish marketing channels.
6.3.19.5 Results of regression for the chemical industry
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the chemical sector, the
following export function was estimated:
X90CHEM =
with:
·6,8402104e+09 +4,0587746*GEIS90CHEM . 11 094968*UUDEMCHEM .






The real value ofchemical exports (R million 1990=100)
Real GElS payments (1990=100)
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REER CHEM = The REER forthe chemical sector
UUDEMCHEM = The percentage unutilised capacity ofchemical due tolack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-72 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for the chemical industry relative to the right hand scale, while the
residual is given on the left hand scale. With a R-squared of 0,850776 and a F-statistic
of 17,10405, the function gives a good representation of chemical exports and it can
be said that at the 99 per cent confidence level, the coefficients will not
simultaneously equal zero. Serial correlation was corrected using First Order
Autoregression techniques.
LS 11 Dependent Variable isX90CHEM
Sample: 1988:21994:2
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints
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The coefficient for the OECDGDP is statistically significant at the 99 per cent
confidence level and it would therefore appear as though the economic growth of the
OECD countries had the major impact on the export of chemicals.
There are large fluctuations in the spare capacity due to lack of demand domestically .
The response of the industry to spare capacity is not expected. Although not
statistically significant, the coefficient is positive , capacity usage rose as exports rose,
indicating that the industry is a maturer exporter in that it does not export when there
is spare capacity. The fertiliser subsector exports a third of its production, which
would tend to confirm this hypothesis.






X95CHEM ..... -. UUDEMCHEM I
Source: IOC, ess
As was expected, the REER was significant and did have an impact on the export of
chemicals. The elasticity is rather low however at 0,02.
6.3.20 Rubber products (SIC 355)
This sector consists of the manufacture of tyres, tubes, and other rubber products such
as gloves, mats, packings, pipes, sponges, and other vulcanised articles.
6.3.20.1 Structure of the rubber sector
Although the industry is relatively small, contributing only 1,3 per cent of South
Africa's total production, there is an upward trend.
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Exports in this sector have grown rapidly since 1990 at 27 per cent per annum in US
dollar terms, outstripping world growth of 5,3 per cent. The base from which this
growth took place was low however. Therefore, even though there is a high
competitiveness indicator, the industry does not have a revealed comparative
advantage.




















Source: Commissionerfor Customs and Excise
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Surprisingly, this sector has not increased its exports proportionately to Africa. Both
the European market and the especially the Asian market are taking more market
share.
6.3.20.3 Development assistance
The levels of nominal protection afforded the sector are greater than the average for
the total manufacturing sector according the lDC (1992). However, there are certain
restrictions regarding the import of tyres which would account for the effective
protection being higher.
Table 6-54 Nominal levels of protection
Tyres and Other rubber
tubes products
Average nominal protection 35 25
Ad valorem(%of tariffheadings)) 74 74
Formula (% of tariff headings) 82 25
Importcontrol (%of tariffheadings) 100 79
Importsurcharge (% oftariff headings) 100 62
Source: IDC, 1992.
Table 6-55 Protect ion and anti-exp ort bia s
Effective protectiononexports
EPC Anti-ex ortbias
domestic with GElS without GElS withGElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
Rubber products 1,57 1,281 0,98 1,001 0,70 1,231 1,60 1,231 2,24
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assuming that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added :
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices .
Source: IDC (/990)
Table 6-56 Total Categ ory A and Categ ory B assistance: 1982 to J985
Sector Cater oryA
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Rubber products 0,19 I 0,23 0,25 I 0,12
Cateeory B
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Rubberproducts 0,48 I 0,49 0,47 I 0,16
Source. Board ofTrade and Industry, 1987.
This sector was not a major exporter and therefore the level of assistance received
under the Categories A and B schemes was minimal. Even if the industry was able to
obtain all its inputs at world prices, GElS was not enough to reduce the anti-export
bias. Perhaps if more of the products qualified for either as category 4 products or for
Phase VI assistance, the anti-export bias may have been overcome.
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Table 6-57 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
Tyres and other rubber
tubes Iproducts
GElS exclusions %of tariffheadings 0 3
%ofexport value 0 0
Primary products %of tariff headings 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headings 0 24
primary product %ofexport value 0 18
Material intensive %of tariff headings 20 55
%ofexport value 5 65
Manufactured %of tariffheadil}9s 80 14
%ofexport value 95 8
Phase VI %oftariff headings 0 4
%ofexport value 0 9
Source : IDC, 1992.
6.3.20.4 Export
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
Figure 6-76 Tyres and tubes Figure 6-77 Exports 0/other rubber products
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6.3.20.5 Results of regression for rubber products
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the rubber sector, the
following export function was estimated:
X90RUB = -1 ,1769604e+08 +0,82932589*GEIS90RUB - 1530285,9*UUDEMRUB + 681684,18*REERRUB +
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5859,1192*OECDGDP90 +5863434,5*DUMMYAB - 6982479,5*SEAS1 +3988233,3*SEAS3
with:
X90RUB = The real value of rubber exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
GEIS90 RUB = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REERRUB = The REER forthe rubber sector
UUDEMRUB = The percentage unutilised capacity of rubber manufacturers due to lack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
DUMMYAB = Adummy variable representing Categories Aand B incentives
The regression results are set out below.
Figure 6-78 below shows the actual and fitted real export figures for rubber relative to
the right hand scale, while the residual is given on the left hand scale. The function
gives a fair representation of rubber exports .
LS /I Dependent Variable isX90RUB
Sample: 1988:11994:2
Included observations: 26 after adkrsffn
C -1,18E+08 57107670 -2,060950 0,0541
GEIS90RUB 0,829326 2,453615 0,338002 0,7393
UUDEMRUB -1530286, 643576,9 -2,377783 0,0287
REERRUB 681684,2 415077,1 1,642307 0,1179
OECDGDP90 5859,119 3344,280 1,751982 0,0968
DUMMYAB 5863435, 4838196, 1,211905 0,2412
SEAS1 -6982480, 2360261, -2,958351 0,0084
SEAS3 3988233, 2393479, 1,666291 0,1130
R-squared 0,692156 Mean dependent var 23528044
Adjusted R-squared 0,572439 S.D.dependentvar 7201473,
S.E. of regression 4708912, Akaike info criterion 30,97759
Sum squared resid 3,99E+14 Schwartz criterion 31 ,36470
Log likelihood -431 ,6011 F-statistic 5,781591
Durbin-Watson stat 1,939743 Prob(F-statistic) 0,001256
Figure 6- 78 Residuals, actual and jitted real values/or the export a/ rubber products
,---- ----,-50000000
.1 0000000,~);""""=.....-.:-;:;:::-.......-:r~-r.='""=..,.."..j
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I~ Residual -- + - Actual - _-- Fittedl
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With the T-statistic of -2,377783, it can be concluded that at the 95 per cent
confidence level, spare capacity is an important cause of exports in this scenario.
Nevertheless, the OECD's GDP and the REER are important at the 90 per cent level.
Tyre manufacturing is an important subsector in the rubber sector and therefore enjoys
Phase VI benefits . This would explain why GElS is insignificant. Categories A and B
are relatively more significant than GElS. Further , most of the rubber sector 's exports
are destined to Southern African countries and therefore the GECD's GDP will not be
a factor. The European and Asian markets are however taking up more of South
Africa's exports which would account for most new export sales.
6.3.21 Plastics products (SIC 356)
The sector covers the manufacture of products by process of extruding or moulding
resin, plastic, raw materials , or a combination of resin and glass fibre. It also includes
the manufacture of plastic products such as film and sheets, kitchenware, furniture and
footwear.
6.3.21.1 Structure of plastic products
This industry is characterised by a wide diversity of technologies and markets
contributed just less than three per cent to the total production of the manufacturing
sector in 1993. Compared with other newly industrialised countries, South Africa's
performance is lagging, although there has been rapid growth especially since 1986.
The largest single market is for packaging, contributing 50 per cent of turn over. In the
injection moulding industry, the barriers of entry are low resulting in a number of new
entrants who are mainly small businesses.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
6.3.21.2 International comparison
Since the end of World War II, the plastics industry has grown faster than any other
industry. (Kuper and Cassim, 1996) This is probably because plastic technologies are
new and rapid development and are therefore able to create and satisfy new markets
for these products, However, even though South Africa's growth has outpaced that of







Plastic, non- rima form
Imports SACU World Market Cl% RCA
from SACU trend 90-94 trend90-94 share %




The IDC have calculated that at 15 May 1992 the nominal protection of 40 per cent is
higher than the manufacturing industry average of 20 per cent.
Table 6-58 Nominal levels ofprotection
Average nominal protection 40
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings)) 78
Formula (% of tariff headings) 34
Import control (% of tariff headings) 54
Import surcharge (% of tariff headings) 99
Source: IDC, 1992.
Although almost a third of the exports from this sector qualify for category 4
assistance, it is insufficient to compensate for the higher cost of inputs, and export
sales are so unprofitable as to render value added in exports negative. Domestic
207
prices, higher due to protection, have therefore subsidised exports and have made a
higher capacity utilisation possible. "This has led to some bizarre consequences. One
plastic converter interviewed re-imports South African polymer from Zimbabwe
because prices are lower than domestic prices." (Crompton, 1995:160)
Table 6-59 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection on exports
EPC Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
Other plastic 3,13 3,661 2,46 1,001 -0,19 0,861 1,27 0,861-16,37
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assuming that inputs are purchased at world prtces. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic pr ices
Source: /DC (1990)
Table 6-60 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in /992
GElS exclusions %oftariff headings 0
%ofexport value 0
Primary products %oftariff headings 0
%ofexport value 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headings 0
primary product %ofexport value 0
Material intensive %oftariff headings 73
%ofexport value 36
Manufactured %of tariff headings 27
%ofexport value 64




Exports in this sector increased from the mid 1980s. The sector did not respond
greatly to GElS. The REER and the OECD's GDP have had the greatest influence on
the quantities exported.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
The exports, as can be expected with such a high anti-export bias, form a very small
percentage of this sector's total turnover. An upward trend has been exhibited since
approximately 1983. Africa remains the major market, although market share has
shifted away from Africa to Asia and a lesser extent Europe.



















6.3.21.5 Results of regression for plastic products
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the plastic sector, the
following export function was estimated:
X90PLAS =
with:
-1,0223437e+08 - 0,41063451*GEIS90PLAS + 137869,29*CAPUTPLAS +
230296,26*REERPLAS +6088,9332*OECDGDP90 - 8005700,1 *SEAS1
209
X90PLAS = The real value ofplastic exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
GEIS90PLAS = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REERPLAS = The REER forthe plastic sector
UUDEMPLAS = The percentage unutilised capacity ofplastic due to lack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index ofthe OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-82 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for plastic relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is
given on the left hand scale. With a R-squared of 0,669645 and a F-statistic of
8,108168 we can conclude that with 99 per cent confidence that at least one of the
coefficients is not zero and the function gives a good representation of plastic exports.
LS 1/ Dependent Variable is X90PLAS
Sample: 1988:11994:2
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Although South Africa exports a fairly large percentage of the this sector to African
countries, the OECD GDP growth is significant at the 95 per cent level. This would
indicate that OECD exporters of plastics would abandon the African markets when
there is a boom leaving the markets open for South African exporters. The exports of
this sector are hampered by the fact that there are no economies of scale as most firms
established to serve only the South African market. Ageing machinery and poor
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training and skills are responsible for a decline in the total productivity. Access to raw
material at world prices and lower cost capital goods as well as improving the
productivity will result in improved export performance. (Crompton , 1995).
6.3.22 Pottery, china and earthenware (SIC 361)
This sector consists of the manufacture of vitreous and semi-vitreous china, table and
kitchen articles; earthenware plumbing and bathroom fittings and fixtures; porcelain
electrical supplies; art and other ornaments; industrial and laboratory pottery,
stoneware and course earthenware; and florists ' articles of pottery , china or
earthenware.
6.3.22.1 Structure of the pottery, china and earthenware industry
This is one of South Africa's smallest sectors with manufacturing representing bearly
1/10 of a per cent. Since the sector is so small, fluctuations are common.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufa cturing, IDC, 1995.
6.3.22.2 Development assistance
The IDC calculated that the sector received almost double the nominal rate of
protection than did the total manufacturing in May 1992. This would explain the anti-
export bias in Table 6-62. Buying inputs at domestic prices is high. With access to
inputs at world prices, the anti-export bias is considerably less. GElS almost
compensated for the anti-export bias.
211
Table 6-61 Nominal levels ofprotection
Average nominal protection 35
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings) 88
Formula (% of tariff headings) 24
Import control (% of tariff headings) 6
Import surcharge (% of tariffheadings) 100
Source: ux: 1992.
Source: Board ofTrade and Industry, 1987.
Table 6-62 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection on exports
EPe Ann-exoort bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) 1 (Id)
Pottery, china 5,21 5,591 5,17 1,001 0,58 0,931 1,01 0,931 8,99
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assuming that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inp uts are purc hased at domestic pr ices.
Source: /DC (1990)
The entire sector enjoyed category 4 GEl S incentives.
Table 6-63 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
GElS exclusions %oftariff headlnqs 0
%ofexport value 0
Primary products %of tariff headings 0
%of export value 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headinqs 0
primary product %ofexport value 0
Material %of tariff headlnqs 0
intensive %ofexport value 0
Manufactured %oftariff headings 100
%ofexport value 100
































- - - - . - . EXPORTS' • EXPORTSAS % OF PRODUCTION
212
Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDe, 1995.
6.3.22.4 Results of regression for pottery
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the pottery sector, the
following export function was estimated:
X90POT =
with:
-30281796 - 0,18776687*GEIS90POT + 149313,35*REERSARB +91398,371*CAPUTPOT +
742,79939*OECDGDP90 -1356413,3*SEAS1
X90POT = The real value ofpottery exports (R million 1990=100)
GEIS90 POT = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REER POT = The REER for the pottery sector
UUDEM POT = The percentage unutilised capacity ofpottery due tolack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index ofthe OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-85 Residuals, actual and fitted real
values for the export of pottery below shows the actual and fitted real export figures
for pottery exports relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is given on the
left hand scale. The function gives a fair representation of pottery exports. The R-
squared of 0,693029 is acceptable. Since there is no lag-dependent variable, the
Durbin-Watson statistic of2,267527 indicates that there is no serial correlation.
I
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LS 11 Dependent Variable is X90POT
Sample: 1988:11994:2

















































Figure 6-85 Residuals, actual and jitted real values for the export of pottery
~ ~6000000
I~ Residual ... •... Actual ...... , _. Fitted I
It would seem as though exports in this sector were opportunistic. Both the REER and
the capacity utilisation have significant but incorrect sign. The volume of exports is
low. It might be speculated that pottery exporters would go on holiday when their
factories have done well, i.e. high capacity and go overseas when the rand is strong.
Opportunistic exports would then arise. It is therefore not possible to estimate an
export function for this industry.
6.3.23 Glass and glass products (SIC 362)
The sector consists of glass, glass fibres, glass products, and the processing of glass
such as bevelling, engraving and polishing.
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6.3.23.1 Structure of glass industry


















--Production of GLASS AN D GLAS S PR ODUC TS (ISIC 362)
_. - - - - - Production as a % of total m anufacturing
Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
The glass and glass products industry is relatively small and contributes less than 1,2
per cent to South Africa's total manufacturing. The growth, which the sector
experienced since 1985, resulted in almost a doubling of output by 1990 worth
R3 000 million.
6.3.23.2 Development assistance
The industry has only received an average of 15 per cent nominal protection that was
lower than the industry average of 20 per cent on 15 May 1992. (IDe, 1992)
Table 6-64 Nominal levels ofprotection
Average nominal protection 15
Ad valorem (% oftariff headings)) 81
Formula (% oftariff headings) 2
Import control (% oftariff headioqs) 0
Import surcharge (% of tariff headings) 85
Source: IDe , 1992.
The industry suffers from an anti-export bias irrespective of whether inputs are
purchased locally or at world prices. GElS has reduced the anti-export bias but never
completely neutralised it.
Table 6-65 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection on
EPe ex~orts Anti-ex ortbias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id)
Glass 1,25 1,1911 ,13 1,00 I 0,94 1,05l1 ,11 1,05 I 1,34
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Note: Iw indicates that value was calculated assuming that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic pr ices.
Source: IDC (1990)
The industry has developed a niche in the export of safety laminated glass for the
automotive industry. These products qualified for Phase VI assistance. The rest of the
products, with only a few exceptions , are material incentive and therefore only receive
category 3 assistance,
Table 6-66 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
GElSexclusions %of tariffheadings 0
%of export value 0
Primary products %of tariff heacinos 0
%of export value 0
Beneficiated %of tariffheadings 5
primary product %of export value 0
Material %of tariffheadinqs 55
intensive %of export value 57
Manufactured %of tariff headings 38
%of export value 5
Phase VI %of tariff headinqs 2
%of export value 38
Source: IDC. 1992.
6.3.23.3 Export
Exports increased sharply in 1976 until 1980 when the volume again decreased. South
Africa has a trade deficit in this sector. Imports consist mostly kitchen or table
glassware. The largest markets are the USA (25 per cent), the UK (12 per cent), and
Germany (10 per cent). Exports to Southern Africa countries represent approximately
20 per cent of the local production.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDe , 1995.
6.3.23.4 Results of regression for glass and glass products
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the glass and glass
products sector, the following export function was estimated:
X95GLASS=
with:
-2,1274486e+08 - 890523,15*GEISXGLASS +74408,12*UUDEMGLASS +
572774,71*REERGLASS + 11667,703*OECDGDP90 - 6922818,8*SEAS1
X90GLASS = The real value ofglass exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
GEIS90 GLASS = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REER GLASS = The REER forthe glass sector
UUDEM GLASS = The percentage unutilised capacity ofglass manufacturers due to lack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-88 Residuals, actual and fitted real
values for the export of glass and glass products below shows the actual and fitted real
export figures for glass exports relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is
given on the left hand scale. The function gives a good representation of glass exports.
LS 11 Dependent Variable isX90GLASS
Sample: 1988:11994:2
Included observations: 26 after adiusfin
C -2,13E+08 42013777 -5,063693 0,0001
GEISXGLASS -890523,2 1163206, -0,765577 0,4529
UUDEMGLASS 74408,12 223348,6 0,333148 0,7425
REERGLASS 572774,7 421504,0 1,358883 0,1893
OECDGDP90 11667,70 2909,052 4,010827 0,0007
SEAS1 -6922819, 2504214, -2,764468 0,0120
R-squared 0,762805 Mean dependent var 23419571
Adjusted R-squared 0,703506 S.D.dependentvar 9550475,
S.E. of regression 5200356, Akaike info criterion 31 ,12765
Sum squared resid 5,41E+14 Schwartz criterion 31 ,41798
Log likelihood -435,5518 F-statistic 12,86374
Durbin-Watson stat 2,049834 Prob(F-statistic) 0,000011
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Figure 6-88 Residuals, actual and fitted real values for the export of glass and glass products
.-- ----:-, -,50000000
/ \ 40000000
A :~::,~ ./:-::::i:~\..fy\j ::::::
1500000O ,I' ..'" "/'1:~1 ....,,;. .A
10000000 >:: :::;.~ ~~/..r Ii 10000000
f\ 0
500000O \ 1\ I1 . ! \
o I, . / \J 1 1\ I \
\...-...-" V V I ~ ---" i " J Il !-5000000 V-~ ',i \I
-10000000 k
'1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
I~_. Residual • .. Actual FittedI
With aT-Statistic of 4,764468, the only significant factor influencing this sector's
exports is the GECD's GDP, although seasonal fluctuations do seem to play a role.
GElS again has had no influence, while the spare capacity is also insignificant. There
is evidence that especially the auto sector is developing an export culture and
therefore exports as part of their total marketing strategy and not simply as a vent for
surplus.
6.3.24 Other non-metallic mineral products (SIC 369)
This sector consists of structural clay products; cement; and other non-metallic
products such as slate, cut-stone products, asbestos, and graphite products .
6.3.24.1 Structure of non-metallic mineral products
Ngoasheng (1995) estimated that the number of brick works In South Africa has
declined from 450 in 1980 to 105 in 1995. The industry is dominated by Corobrick,
which has a market share between 30 and 50 per cent. Bricks are not generally traded
on the world market. However, the South African brick industry has been successful
in marketing to the Far East.
Internationally, the cement industry has grown since the end of World War H. Unlike
other commodities , very little of the production is exported. As in South Africa, in
most other countries the ownership of the industry is tightly controlled. The lack of
competition has resulted in above average price increases and also above average
profits.
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6.3.24.2 International comparison
SITC Product Imports SACU trend World trend Market Cl % RCA
from SACU 90-94 % 90-94 % share %
1994 US$ m p.a. p.a.
Source: ITC, 1996.
Internationally this sector has grown by more than two per cent, while the value of
South Africa' s exports has decreased. South Africa has therefore not only exported
less but has lost market share. The industry nevertheless does have a revealed
comparative advantage.
Products from this industry have a low weight to value ratio and therefore have
relatively high transport costs. It is therefore not surprising to see that in 1994, 30 per
cent of exports were destined for Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Twenty five per cent
of the exports were sold to the Far and Middle East, DAE, Japan and Thailand.
6.3.24.3 Development assistance
Table 6-67 Nominal levels ofpro tection
Structural Cement Othernon-
clay prod metal
Average nominal protection 30 10 15
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings)) 39 17 61
Formula (%of tariffheadings) 18 0 12
Importcontrol (% of tariff headings) 0 0 0
Importsurcharge (%of tariffheadings) 39 0 67
Source: toe. 1992,
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In May 1992 nominal protection for bricks was higher than the manufacturing
average. The other two subsectors, however, had a lower nominal protection. The
cement industry was formed into a cartel and the nominal protection is therefore not
relevant.
Table 6-68 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection on exports
EPC Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales j(lw) lid) Iw) rod) IIw) lid) I(lw) I(Id)
Other non-metal 1,34 1,14 1,09 1,00 0,95 1,18 1,23 1,18 1,41
mineral products
Note : lw indicates that value was calculated assuming that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added
was calcu lated at assuming that inputs are p urchased at domest ic prices.
Source: /DC (1990)
Although GElS assisted in reducing the anti-export bias, it was not successful in
reducing it completely. GElS assistance was however very low, with most products
only receiving category 2 assistance and only a few qualifying for category 3. The
assistance was minimal, which explains why GElS did not reduce the anti-export bias
completely.
Table 6-69 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Catecory A
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Non-metal mineral products 1,32 I 1,58 1,21 I 1,11
Cate orv B
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Non-metal mineral products 1,63 I 2,06 1,33 I 2,37
Source: Board ofTrade and Industry, 1987.
Table 6-70 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
Clay products Cement Other
GElS exclusions %of tariff headinqs 0 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0 0
Primary products %of tariff headinos 0 0 0
%of export value 0 0 0
Beneficiated %of tariff headncs 28 83 34
primary product %of export value 38 13 79
Material intensive %of tariff headings 68 17 65
%of export value 61 87 21
Manufactured %of tariff headinqs 4 0 0
%of export value 1 0 0
Phase VI %of tariff headinqs 0 0 1
%of export value 0 0 1
Source. /DC. 1992.
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Most of the products in this group attracted category 2 assistance. In terms of value of
exports, the majority is category 3. Therefore as a whole the industry was not
meaningfully assisted.
6.3.24.4 Export
Because of the large weight to value ratio , transport costs are high, and raw materials
are readily available in most countries, these commodities are not generally traded
internationally. However, products such as Italian tiles have a relatively higher value
to volume ratio, and can therefore be easily exported.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series : Manufa cturing, IDe, 1995.
The decline in the export of non-metallic products, was the result of the poor
performance of the cement exports. This is probably due to cement production coming
on-line in other African countries and export sales going to these countries rather than
South Africa.
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Figure 6-93 Exports ofother non-metallic mineral products
. . .. • . • EXPORTS* --+-- EXPORTS AS'" OF PROOJCTOO
Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, 1DC, 1995.
Bricks were exported to Botswana and the Far East. Singapore was going through a
building boom and required more bricks than they could produce. Once Corobrick
could satisfy the importer that they could produce the quality and style required, they
competed on price against other foreign exporters .














Source: Commissionerfor Customs and Excise
6.3.24.5 Results of regression for other non-metallic mineral products
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the other non-metallic
mineral products sector, the following export function was estimated:











The real value ofother non-metallic mineral products exports (R million 1990=100)
Real GElS payments (1990=100)
The REER for the other non-metallic mineral products sector
The percentage unutilised capacity ofother non-metallic mineral products manufacture due
tolack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index ofthe GDP index ofthe OECD countries







0,806930 Mean dependent var
0,770155 S.D. dependent var












Figure 6-95 below shows the actual and fitted real export figures for non-metallic
mineral sector relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is given on the left
hand scale. The function gives a good representation of non-metallic mineral exports.
C -1 ,58E+08 59159767 -2,664753 0,0145
GEIS90NONMET 5,463457 6,543361 0,834962 0,4131
UUDEMNONMET 919370,3 494146,0 1,860523 0,0769
REERNONMET -295547,8 284102,2 -1 ,040287 0,3100
OECDGDP90 13990,29 4039,637 3,463254 0,0023
R-squared 0,806930 Mean dependent var 34814937
Adjusted R-squared 0,770155 S.D.dependentvar 12000091
S.E. ofregression 5753107, Akaike info criterion 31 ,30154
Sum squared resid 6,95E+14 Schwartz criterion 31,54348
Log likelihood -438,8125 F-statistic 21,94219
Durbin-Watson stat 2,291790 Prob(F-statistic) 0,000000
Figure 6-95 Residuals, actual andfitted real values/or the export a/non-metallic products
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Exports from this sector are influenced by the OEeD's GDP growth (with a
confidence level of 99 per cent) and by the spare capacity in the industry (with a
confidence level of 95 per cent). This has been confirmed by interviews with the
industry, although price is also an important factor inducing foreign importers to
purchase. It is doubtful whether this industry, because of the impracticalities involved
223
in exporting the product, would ever develop capacity for export markets other than
those in Southern Africa. GElS therefore never contributed to sustainable exports.
6.3.25 Iron and basic steel industries (SIC 371)
This sector covers the manufacture of primary iron and steel products, consisting of
all process from smelting in blast furnaces to the semi-finished stage in rolling mills
and foundries.
6.3.25.1 Structure of the iron and steel industry
lscor began producing iron and steel in 1934 to supply a growing secondary industry
with raw steel and steel products. The industry has grown to a point that in 1993 it
represented six per cent of total manufacture.
Figure 6-96 Produ ction oj steel and iron
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6.3.25.2 International comparison
South Africa's exports have grown by almost eight per cent per annum since 1990.
This is very favourable compared to the world trend of 2,3 per cent. It probably
represents the South African industry recapturing the US market after sanctions were
lifted. South Africa enjoys about 1,5 per cent of the world market share. This
translates into a positive comparative advantage.
Table 6-71 The compe titiveness index and reveal comparative advantage of iron and steel
SITC Product Imports from SACU trend World trend Market share Cl% RCA
SACU 1994 90-94 %p.a. 90-94 %p.a. %
US$ m
Source: ITC, /996.
7,9 2,3 1,5 5,5 2,83
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6.3.25.3 Development assistance
In May 1992, the IDC (1992) calculated that the sector had a nominal level of
protection of only ten per cent, compared with an industry average of 20 per cent.
Table 6-72 Nominal levels ofprotection
Average nominal protection 10
Ad valorem (%of tariff headings) 90
Formula (% of tariff headings) 69
Import control (% of tariff headings) 12
Import surcharge (% of tariff headings) 12
Source: toe, 1992.
The anti-export bias is negligible if the inputs are supplied at world prices. However,
even with GElS, there is still an anti-export bias if inputs are bought at domestic
pnces.
Table 6-73 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection on exports
EPC Anti-ex ortbias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) · (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
Basic iron and steel 1,27 1,24 I 1,13 1,00 I 0,90 1,02 I 1,12 1,02 I 1,42
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assummg that inputs are purchased at worldprtc es. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: IDC (1990)
The effective rate of export assistance given to this sector was calculated at 8,4 per
cent in 1985. (Board of Trade and Industry , 1987) This was below the average given
to the industry of 15,2 per cent.
Table 6- 74 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cateqorv A Rmillion
1982 I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Basic metals 10,15 I 10,78 I 11 ,32 I 18,60
Cateqorv BRmillion
1982 I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Basic metals 14,12 I 19,87 I 35,02 I 64,50
Source: Board of Trade and Industry, 1987.
Six per cent of the sector's exports were excluded from GElS benefits. This was
largely due to the agreement between the South African and US governments, that
iron and steel exports would not receive any GElS benefits. GElS was countervailable
and the South African government therefore did not have much option but to agree to
the US request. The vast majority of iron and steel export qualified for category 3
assistance and a few received category 2. None however, received category 4
assistance.
225
Table 6-75 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
GElS exclusions %oftariff headings 6
%ofexport value 38
Primary products %of tariffheadings 0
%ofexport value 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headinos 2
primary product %ofexport value 10








Since the early 1980s the iron and steel exporting sectors have consistently increased
the value of exports from R3 000 million in 1982 to almost R8 000 million in 1993,
measured in 1993 rand. The percentage exports of production increased from just over
ten per cent to 45 per cent in 1993. The industry has become outward focused and has
developed an export culture.
Figure 6-9 7 Exports of iron and steel
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
This sector has wide market spread and exports to many countries. However, exports
to European and American markets have proportionately lost ground to exports to
Asia. Thailand was responsible for 18 per cent of South African foreign purchase,
while Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea each purchase between five and ten per cent of
South Africa 's total exports.
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6.3.25.5 Results of regression for basic iron and steel products
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the basic iron and steel
sector, the following export function was estimated:
X90lRONSM =
with :
-2,2731555e+09 +0,78252507*GEIS90IRON + 13422702*CAPUTIRON +
3210281*REERIRON + 126146,03*OECDGDP90 + 16363803*SEAS1 -14974330*SEAS2 +
23246274*SEAS3
X90 = The real value of iron exports (R million 1990=100)
GEIS90 = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REER = The REER forthe iron sector
UUDEM = The percentage unutilised capacity of iron due to lack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-99 below shows the actual and fitted
real export figures for iron relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is given
on the left hand scale. The function gives a poor representation of iron exports. The
adjusted R2 is 0,3159 and the equation therefore does not include all the factors that
will influence this industry. A dummy variable to test for the impact of sanctions was
used , as was a dummy for Categories A and B incentives. Neither of these improved
the R2• Although the Durbin-Watson statistic is also very low, the Breusch-Godfrey










































































The OEeD's GDP is significant and positively contributes to the export of iron
products as would be expected. Although only significant at the 10 per cent level, the
spare capacity exhibits a positive sign. This industry has therefore become export
oriented, has provided capacity for exporting, and does not simply export as a vent for
surplus. As can be seen, the spare capacity is so large, that any sales, exports or local,
are welcome, whenever they occur. As the sector becomes more export oriented the
spare capacity plays less of a role and the firm would concentrate on producing at a
point where the marginal cost is equal to the average cost. In other words the exporter
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6.3.26 Non-ferrous metal basic industries (SIC 372)
This sector producers primary non-ferrous metal products, covenng the smelting,
alloying and refining, rolling, drawing, founding and casting for the manufacturing of
bars, sheets, strips, rods, tubes, pipes, and wire rods and castings and extrusions.
6.3.26.1 Structure of the non-ferrous metal basic industries
Figure 6-101 Production ofnon f errous metal
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing. /DC, / 995.
6.3.26.2 International comparison
SITC Product Imports SACU trend World trend Market Cl% RCA
from SACU 90-94 % p.a. 90-94 % p.a. share %
1994 US$
07,0 8,0 1,0 3,0 7,1 5,89
Since 1990, the value of world exports of non-ferrous metal has declined by one per
cent. South Africa's exports have declined by eight per cent, resulting in a decline in
international market share. South Africa does however have a revealed comparative
advantage in this sector.
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6.3.26.3 Development assistance
Table 6-76 Nominal levels a/ protection
Average nominal protection 10
Ad valorem (% oftariff headings)) 58
Formula (% of tariff headings) 20
Import control (% of tariff headings) 8
Import surcharge (% oftariff headings) 20
Source: /DC, 1992.
This sector was given only half the nominal protection of the total manufacturing
sector on the 15 May 1992.
Table 6- 77 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector CaterorvA
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Basic metals 10,15 I 10,78 11 ,32 I 18,60
Gate orv B
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Basic metals 14,12 I 19,87 35,02 I 64,50
Source: Board a/Trade and Industry, 1987.
Table 6-78 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection on
EPG exports Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
Basic non-ferrous metal 1,16 1,03 I 0,98 1,00 I 0,95 1,13 I 1,19 1,13 I 1,23
Note: Ill' indicates that value was calculated assumtng that tnputs are purchased at world prtces. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: /DC (1990)
The effective protection on domestic sales coefficient was 1,16, indicating that the
price of the product sold was higher than the world market price. Since this was an
important input in many down stream products, these were made uncompetitive
internationally. GElS had very little impact in reducing the anti-export and profits on
the local market were greater locally than on export products. As can be seen from
Table 6-79 below, most of the products manufactured by this sector were excluded
and the remaining received category 3 assistance. Exporters in this sector felt that the
difference between Category 3 and Category 4 assistance granted was too large and
motivated that a "Category 3W' bridging the two categories. They received less under
GElS than under the old Category A and Category B assistance.
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Table 6-79 GElS and Phase VI export incentives pa id in 1992
GElS exclusions %of tariff headinqs 23
%ofexport value 88
Primary products %of tariff headlnos 0
%ofexport value 0
Beneficiated %of tariff headinQs 10
Iprimary oroduct %ofexport value 0
Material intensive %of tariff headinas 66
%ofexport value 12
Manufactured %of tariff headinas 1
%ofexport value 0
Phase VI %of tariffheadinas 0
%of export value 0
Source : IDC. /9 92.
6.3.26.4 Export
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Source : Sectoral Data Series : Manufa ctur ing. IDC, / 995.
6.3.26.5 Results of regression for non-ferrous metals
In order to determine the effect of GElS has had on the export of the non-ferrous
metal sector the following equation was estimated:
X90NONFER = 5,5493104e+08 - 45,728627*GEIS90NONFER + 1642461 1*REERSARB +









= The real value of non-ferrous metal exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
= Real GElS payments (1990=100)
= The REER for the non-ferrous metal* sector
= The percentage capacity utilisation of non-ferrous metal* industry
= The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
= London Metal Exchange (LME ) price of aluminium sheet metal
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The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-103 Residuals, actual and fitted real
values for the export of non-ferrous metals below shows the actual and fitted real
export figures for non-ferrous metal exports relative to the right hand scale, while the
residual is given on the left hand scale. The function gives a good representation of
non-ferrous metal exports.
The R-squared of 0,800139 and adjusted R-squared of 0,683553 indicate that the fit is
good. The F-Statistic of 6,86309 indicates with a 99 per cent confidence that at least
one coefficient is not zero. The serial correlation was corrected with First Order
Autoregression techniques.
LS // Dependent Variable isX90NONFER
Sample: 1989:31994:2
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints
























0,800139 Mean dependent var
0,683553 S.D. dependent var
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GElS again proved to be insignificant in the export of aluminium. The important
market factors for aluminium are: world demand; production; and inventories. The
LME price of aluminium is a determining factor with aT-Statistic of 2,467636 and
confidence of 95 per cent. The REER is also significant at the 90 per cent level which
confirms that price is an important factor determining the level of exports. The
London Metal Exchange maintains large stock that helps to stabilise the price.
Electricity is one of the major components in the cost of producing electricity.
Producers in high cost areas would therefore be marginal.
6.3.27 Metal products (SIC 381)
This Sector covers the manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware;
furniture and fixtures of metal; structural metal products; shipping containers; metal
cans; and other fabricated metal products.
6.3.27.1 Structure of metal products
This sector covers a number of important subsectors, nevertheless production in real
terms has been declining in real terms.
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6.3.27.2 International comparison
SITC Product Imports SACU trend World trend Market Cl% RCA
from SACU 90-94 % p.a. 90-94 %p.a. share %
1994 US$
69 Metals manufactures, nes 1 ,
6.3.27.3 Development assistance
Table 6-80 Nominal levels a/protection
Cutlery, Furn iture Structural Other
hardware ofmetal metal metal
products
Average nominal protection 20 25 15 15
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings)) 88 100 61 75
Formula (% of tariffheadings) 12 30 3 13
Import control (% of tariffheadings) 2 5 16 8
Import surcharge (% of tariff headings) 94 100 100 93
Source: IDC, 1992.
Table 6-81 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cater orv A
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Metal products 0,86 I 0,96 1,03 I 1,23
Cate: orv B
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Metalproducts 3,13 I 2,70 2,85 I 3,57
Source: Board of Trade and Industry, 1987.
Table 6-82 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection on exports
EPC Anti-ex ortbias
domestic withGElS without GElS withGElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
Metal products 1,27 1,89 I 1,68 1,00 I 0,79 0,67 I 0,76 0,67 I 1,61
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assumtng that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic pr ices.
Source: IDC (1990)
Table 6-83 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
Source. IDC. 1992.
Cutlery, Furniture of Structural Other metal
hardware metal metal products
GElS exclusions %of tariffheadings 0 0 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0 0 0
Primary products %of tariff headings 0 0 0 0
%of export value 0 0 0 0
Beneficiated %of tariff headings 0 0 0 1
[primary product %ofexport value 0 0 0 0
Materialintensive %of tariffheadings 4 0 6 51
%ofexport value 1 0 44 38
Manufactu red %oftariffheadings 92 100 94 40
%ofexport value 79 100 56 19
Phase VI %of tariff headings 4 0 0 8
%of export value 20 0 0 43
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6.3.27.4 Export
Figure 6-105 Export ofmetal products
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Source: Sectoral DataSeries: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.
Figure 6-106 Export of cutlery, hand tools and
general hardware
Figure 6-108Exp ort offurniture andjixture of metal
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Figure 6-107 Export of structural metal products
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6.3.27.5 Results of regression for metal products
From the following equation, it is clear that GElS did not have an impact on this
sector as the T-statistic is not statistically significant and neither is the coefficient.
The R-squared and the F-statistic are sound and the equation is therefore statistically
good. The Durbin-Watson statistic is inconclusive, at the 5 per cent level of
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significance, in determining whether there is serial correlation. The Breusch-Godfrey
test was then administered which indicated that there was no serial correlation.
X90MET = -6, I349007e+08 + 0, I65991 26*X90MET(-1) - 0,075523796*GE1S90MET + 1702348,9*REERMET
- 128 I3962*UUDEMMET + 46690,057*OECDGDP90 - 82 I09406*SEAS 1
LS /I Dependent Variable isX90MET
Sample(adjusted): 1988:21994:2




























































Both the OEeD's GDP and the spare capacity due to lack of demand proved to be
statistically significant factors influencing the level of exports, while GElS and the
REER had little if any influence. Many of the exporters in this sector sell into niche
foreign markets and therefore will not be price elastic hence the low significance of
GElS and the REER. Lastly, the seasonal dummy has a significant coefficient.
6.3.28 Machinery (SIC 382)
This sector consists of a variety of non-electric machinery including engines and
turbines; agricultural machinery and equipment; metal and woodworking machinery;
special industrial machinery; office and accounting machinery; and other non-electric
machinery.
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6.3.28.1 Structure of machinery
Figure 6-110 Production ofmachinery and equipment
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC. 1995.
6.3.28.2 International comparison
SITC Product Imports SACU World Market Cl% RCA
from trend90- trend 90- share %
SACU 94% p.a. 94% p.a.
1994 US$
71 Power generatng. machines
72 Special. indust. machinery
73 Metalworking machinery
74 General industl. mach.nes
75 Office machines, ad mach
Source: ITC (/996)
6.3.28.3 Development assistance


























Engines Agriculture Metal and Special Office and Other non-
and machinery wood industrial accounting electrical
turbines working
Average nominal protection 15 5 10 3 5 10
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings)) 38 11 52 31 41 62
Formula (% of tariff headings) ° 2 3 3 1 12Import control (% of tariff headings) 0 37 15 2 ° 8Import surcharge (% of tariff headings) 96 67 100 95 99 98
Source. /DC, 1992.
Nominal protection in this sector was low. Engines and turbines attracted the highest
nominal protection at 15 per cent, which was lower than the industry average of 20
per cent. The other sub sectors attracted considerably less.
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Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assumtng that inputs are purchased at world prtces . Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Table 6 85 Protect ion and anti-export bias-
Effective protection on exports
EPG Anti-export bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I Od) (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id)
Machinery and eauio 1,07 1,99 I 1,80 1,00 I 0,81 0,54 I 0,60 0,54 I 1,33
Source: /DC (1990)
The effective protection coefficient on domestic sales is only 1,07. GElS was
significant in reducing the anti-export bias. The coefficient dropped to such a level
that the sector enjoys a pro-export bias. However, the same result could be achieved
had the industry been able to access raw material at world prices.
Table 6-86 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Gatecorv A
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Machinery (excl. elec.l 0,70 I 0,42 0,49 I 0,34
Cater orv B
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Machinery (excl. elec.) 1,91 I 1,66 2,24 I 2,12
Source: Board ofTrade and Industry, / 987.
All the subsectors except for engines and turbines and other non-electrical machinery
enjoyed a maximum benefit under GElS. Therefore Engines and turbines, and other
non-electrical enjoyed either category 4 or Phase VI assistance and hence enjoyed at
least 18 per cent benefit on the fob export value.
Table 6-8 7 GElS and Ph ase VI export incentives paid in 1992
Engines and Agricu ltural Metal and wood Special Office and Other non-
turbines machinery workinq industrial accountino electrical
GElSexdusions %of tariff headinos 0 0 0 0 0 0
%ofexoortvalue 0 0 0 0 0 0
Primary products %oftariff headinos 0 0 0 0 0 0
%ofexoort value 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headinos 0 0 0 0 0 0
orimarv oroduct %ofexoort value 0 0 0 0 0 0
Material intensive %of tariffheadings 0 0 0 0 0 2
%of exoort value 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manufactured %oftariff headinos 90 100 100 100 100 90
%ofexoort value 10 100 100 100 100 83
Phase VI %oftariffheadings 32 0 0 0 0 8
%ofexport value 68 0 0 0 017
Source. /DC, 1992.
6.3.28.4 Export
This sector developed largely as a result of South Africa's agriculture and mining.
Many products were made in South Africa under licence and had restrictions placed
on their export by the licensing company. The main destinations of this sector's
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exports are Southern Africa, Germany , USA, and the UK. South America is beginning
to import more mining equipment.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDC, 1995.













6.3.28.5 Results of regression for machinery and equipment
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the machinery and
equipment sector, the following export function was estimated:
LX90MACH = -2,6820052 - 0,0087520336*LGEIS90MACH + 0,032047563*LUUDEMMACH-
O,047487492*LREERMACH + 3,1177069*LOECDGDP90 - O,93075625*LSALEAD-







The real value ofmachinery and equipment exports (R million 1990=100)
Real GElS payments (1990=100)
The REER forthe machinery and equipment sector
The percentage unutilised capacity ofmachinery and equipment due to lack ofdemand
The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-118 below shows the actual and
fitted real export figures for machinery relative to the right hand scale, while the
residual is given on the left hand scale. As the R-squared is only 0,6549 and the
adjusted R-squared 0,534123, the function gives a fair representation of machinery
exports. The F-statistic is 5,422176 and therefore at the 99 per cent confidence level
we can conclude that at least one of the variables is not zero. The Durbin-Watson
statistic is 2,667419 and as the dependent variable is not lagged, it can be assumed
that there is no serial correlation.
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LS 11 Dependent Variable isLX90MACH
Included observations: 28

























































Figure 6-118Actual and fi tted real export figu res for machinery
-0.2 +-r-~"""",...,.,~--r-r~....--~....,.-.~...,....-.-<
88 89 90 91 92 93 94
I~ Residual ...ok H' Actual __"_00Fitted I
Besides the seasonal dummy variable, none of the other variables was statistically
significant above the 95 per cent level. At the 90 per cent level, the OECD's GDP is
significant. As the log variable is high, it can be concluded that the GECD's GDP was
consequential.
6.3.29 Electrical machinery (SIC383)
This sector covers electrical industrial machinery; radio, television and
communication equipment; electric appliances and housewares ; switches; globes;
tubes; lamps; wiring devices and conduits; and electrical insulators.
14 000
12 0 00 4" - - -











6.3.29.1 Structure of the electrical machinery sector
The electrical machinery industry grew to provide the domestic market, especially the
mining sector. For low technology, items there are a number of small firms involved.
However, the world electrical machinery industry is dominated by a small number of
large producers. Three South African electrical engineering groups dominate the
electrical distribution market: Powertech (owned by Altech and part of Anglo
American Corp.), GEC (part of Barlow Rand through Reunert) , and Siemens. (Goode,
1995) In the appliances subsector there are only a few major dominant players. This is
probably because consumers prefer products with well-known brand names.
(Baumann, 1995)
Although it is an important sector III the South African industry , supplying
components needed for downstream manufacture comprises only 4,5 per cent of total
South African manufacture.
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufacturing, IDe , 1995.
6.3.29.2 International comparison
This sector did not have a revealed comparative advantage in 1994. South Africa has
not performed well in this sector relative to other countries , both developing and
developed countries. Between 1960 and 1987, the rate of growth of South African
exports was below both developing and developed countries. The trend of exports
from developing countries was five times than that achieved by South Africa. (Goode,
1995)
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Telecomm. sound equip etc
Elec mcha ar, parts, nes
SITC Product Imports SACU World Market Cl % RCA
from trend 90- trend 90- share %
SACU 94 %p.a. 94% p.a.
1994 US$
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Sour ce: IrC. 1996.
The volume of exports since 1990 to 1994 has grown faster than the world trend. The
sector therefore has a positive competitiveness indicator.
6.3.29.3 Development assistance
The IDC calculated the average nominal protection as at 15 May 1992. The average
for the manufacturing industry was 20 per cent. The nominal average protection rate
was therefore on par or lower than the industry average.
Table 6-88 Nominal levels ofpr otection
Industrial Radio, TV, Appliances Other electrical
machinery communication apparatus
Average nominal protection 15 20 20 15
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings)) 84 74 93 86
Formula (% of tariff headings) 10 20 7 18
Import control (% of tariff headings) 13 15 2 19
Importsurcharge (% oftariff headings) 100 96 98 99
Source : IDC, 1992.
Belli et at (1993) indicate that the anti-export bias has been neutralised by GElS and
would not be a factor if inputs were available at world prices.
Table 6-89 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protectiononexports
EPC Anti-ex!ort bias
domestic withGElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id)
Electrical machinery 1,22 1,67 I 1,52 1,00 I 0,85 0,73 I 0,80 0,73 I 1,43
Note. lw indicates that value was calculat ed assum tng that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added
was calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic prices.
Source: IDC (1990)
The Board of Trade and Industry (RSA, 1987) found that exports of electrical
machinery received a nominal assistance of 14 per cent. The effective rate of
assistance was 28 per cent.
Since 1990, this sector has enjoyed mostly category 4 assistance . A few products were
excluded and other enjoyed Phase VI benefits.
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Tabl e 6-90 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cateqorv A (Rmillion)
1982 I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Electric machinery 0,54 I 0,54 I 0,37 I 0,47
Catecorv B(Rmillion)
1982 I 1983 I 1984 I 1985
Electric machinery 1,03 I 0,97 I 0,72 I 0,76
Source: Board ofTrade and Industry, 1987.
Tabl e 6-91 GElS and Phase VI exp ort incentives p aid in 1992
Industrial Radio, TV Appliances Other apparatus
machinery Communication
GElS exclusions %oftariff headings 0 9 0 0
%ofexport value 0 26 0 0
Primary products %of tariff headings 0 0 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0 0 0
Beneficiated %oftariff headings 0 0 0 0
nrirnarv product %ofexport value 0 0 0 0
Material intensive %oftariff headings 0 0 0 2
%ofexport value 0 0 0 1
Manufactured %oftariff headings 91 88 100 88
%ofexport value 68 72 100 92
Phase VI %of tariff headings 9 3 0 10
%ofexport value 32 2 0 7
Source: IDC, 1992.
6.3.29.4 Export
In broad terms, this sector 's exports have suffered long-term decline since the mid-
1970s. However exports recovered in 1985 and have improved consistently since then.
The sector has become more export oriented and exported almost eight per cent of its
production in 1993.
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Figure 6-J22 Exports of radio, television, and
communications equipment
Figure 6-J24 Exports of other electrical apparatus
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Source: Sectoral Data Series: Manufa cturing. IDC, 1995
Exports of electrical machinery were high in the early 1970s. This was probably due the
Cobora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique that required apparatus and supplies.
Since 1985, the exports of all the subsectors increased both in real values and as a percentage
of production, indicating the industry has become more outward oriented.
6.3.29.5 Results of regression for electrical machinery
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the electrical machinery sector,
the following export function was estimated:
X90EMACH = -6, 1048593e+08 + 18,841698*GEIS90EMACH +579427,5*UUDEMEMACH +
337374,43*REEREMACH +38572,683*OECDGDP90 +78929113*DUMMYAB +[AR(1 )=-
0,46287724]
with:
X90EMACH = The real value ofelectrical machinery exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
GEIS90 EMACH = Real GElS payments (1990=100)
REER EMACH = The REER forthe electrical machinery sector
UUDEM EMACH = The percentage unutilised capacity ofelectrical machinery due to lack ofdemand
OECDGDP90 = The weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below.
Figure 6-125 below shows the actual and fitted real export figures for electrical machinery
relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is given on the left hand scale. The function
gives a good representation of electrical machinery exports. Both the R-squared and F-statistic
are in acceptable ranges. Serial correlation was corrected using First Order Autoregression
techniques.
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LS 11 Dependent Variable isX90EMACH
Sample: 1988:21994:2






















































Figure 6- I25 Residuals, actual and fi tted real values fo r the export ofelectrical machinery and equipment
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
I~ Residual m~ __ Actual -~-- FittedI
Both the old Categories A and B incentive scheme and GElS are statistically significant and
have had a positive influence on the sector's export performance. The OECD's GDP is also
statistically significant. This is one of the few sectors in which GElS has had an influence.
The T-statistics are strong and indicate that the coefficients are true at the 99 per cent
confidence level. Since the Category A and Category B too were significant, it can be
concluded that support measures have not had a sustainable influence on the export
development and the hypothesis that infants will always be infants is true. New measures
must therefore be used to maintain the level of exports achieved using GElS, and at the same
time making the giving the sector a sustainable competitive edge.
Scerri (1985:115) pointed out that in 1983 this sector spends more than any of the any other
sectors on research and development (R&D). South African exporters have therefore
developed niche products that have proved to be successful in the international market place.
Although much of the R&D took place in government laboratories, the Support Programme
for the Electronics Industry (SPEI) also has played a role. Exporters such as ImproTech,
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winners of the 1995 Presidents Award for Export Achievement, benefited from the scheme.
Other manufacturers have also achieved export successes but preferred to remain less visible
because of the sensitivity of the products and markets in which they operate. It would be
difficult to evaluate the success of the SPEI; firstly because for industrial reasons the
beneficiaries of the scheme and the degree of assistance until recently was kept secret, and
secondly due to the nature of the research, the amounts spent would have to be amortised over
a period, which would require knowledge of the research and the marketing potential.
6.3.30 Motor vehicles, parts and accessories (SIC 384)
This sector covers the manufacture and assembling of motor vehicles, caravans, trailers, as
well as the manufacture of motor vehicle parts and accessories.
As with most of the development of South African industry, it is important to analysis the
impact of protection. There have been a series of local content programmes that have been
adopted. High duties were placed on completely built units. This combined with a rapidly
growing local market encouraged foreign manufacturers to set up assembly plants. Ford and
General Motors set up production in Port Elizabeth in the 1920s. Growth was rapid and in
1958 107 000 units were assembled in South Africa. The local content was only 20 per cent.
The first local content programme was introduced in 1961. Manufacturers were required to
source peripheral items such as tyres, batteries, and trims locally. Local content rose rapidly
and by 1971 52 per cent by mass could be considered having been produced locally. Rapid
growth was accompanied by a proliferation of assemblers and the development of low volume
high mass components.
Phase III of the local content was still based on the mass concept and the aim of this phase
was to increase the mass to 66 per cent by 1977. Phase IV was a consolidation period with no
additional requirements. Phase V required that the local content of light commercial vehicle
increase from 50 per cent in 1980 to 66 per cent in 1982. The motivating factor of these
phases was, in common with all import substitution policies, the development of industry and
to save foreign exchange. Phase V had two main deficiencies: " . . .a tendency to produce low
cost, low technology components which are unremunerative to export and produced in
uneconomic volumes so locking the industry into a low volume, high cost production
structure; and a very high import bill as source companies tended to load the price of
components they supplied to local producers. As they were supplying largely high technology
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components which the local industry did not produce, this tended to raise prices as there was
no incentive to produce low mass, high cost components locally" (BT!, 1992)
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Phase VI was introduced to promote investment, job creation and growth, improve
productivity, minimise price increases and maintain a high level of competition. (BT!, 1989)22
This move represented both the first move away from a mass based development system to
one based on value and included export promotional elements.
Exports under Phase VI received a subsidy in the form of a rebate of the Excise Duty of 50
per cent. All exports were channelled through the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM).
Component manufacturers had to negotiate the percentage of the incentive with one of the
OEMs. The subsidy paid to the motor industry was therefore higher than that paid to other
manufacturers under GElS . The motor industry therefore operated in a neutral environment
with a slight bias toward exports.
Table 6-92 Proliferation under var ious phases ofthe local content programmes

















22 BT! 1989 : Board of Trade and Industry 1989,Investigation into a Structural Adjustment Programme for the Industries
Manufacturing Motor Vehicles and Automotive components: Phase VI of the Local Content Programme, Report No 2767 ,
Pretoria Government Printer.
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In summary, therefore, the South African motor industry has suffered from a number of
factors. The fact that there was a number of new goal posts set in the various Phases did not
contribute to long-term stability. Due to the excessive protection, there has been little
incentive to keep up to date with modern global trends. Protection was not selective. It
therefore resulted in the proliferation of models , none of which was able to achieve economies
of scale, which in turn resulted in a high cost structure.
6.3.30.1 International comparison
SITC Product Imports SACU World
from SACU trend 90-94 trend 90-94
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Source: 1TC. / 996.
Because of licensing agreements imposed on the industry by European, US, and Japanese
parents, the market share is low. This, together with other inefficiencies, such as scale of
production, has resulted in a low revealed comparative advantage. However due to Phase VI
South Africa's exports have grown at a rapid rate - almost 30 per cent compared to the world
trend from 1990 to 1994.
6.3.30.2 Development assistance
Table 6-93 Nominal levels ofprotection
Average nominal protection 40
Ad valorem (% oftariff headings)) 87
Formula (% oftariff headings) 12
Import control (% oftariff headings) 0
Import surcharge (% oftariff headings) 97
Source: toe. /992.
The nominal protection afforded the motor industry was far higher than the average for the
total manufacturing industry at 15 May 1992. This has resulted in an anti-export bias that even
with GElS assistance still exists.
Table 6-94 Protection and anti-export bias
Note. lw indicates that value was calculated assuming that inputs are p urchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added was
calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domest ic pri ces.
Source: /D C (1990)
Effective protection on exports
EPC Anti-exl ortbias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (Iw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id)
Motor vehicle 1,46 1,23 T-0,77 1,00 1-1 ,00 1,19 1-1,91 1,19 1-1 ,46
Ninety per cent of this sector qualifies for assistance under Phase VI.
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Table 6-95 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
GElS exclusions %oftariff headinqs 0
%ofexport value 0
Primary products %oftariff headings 0
%ofexport value 0
Beneficiated %of tariff headings 0
orirnarv product %ofexport value 0
Material intensive %oftariff headings 1
%ofexport value 0
Manufactured %oftariff headinqs 41
%ofexport value 10




In the 1970s the industry exported to Africa, as this would seem to be a natural market. This
was in many cases the only market permitted by the parents. As can be seen in Figure 6-127
below the proportion of export s to this region declined in the 1980s. This was due partly to
political reasons, in that African countries did not want to be seen to be doing business with
South Africa, and economic reasons.
With the introduction of Phase VI, it became important to export and parent companies started
looking at buying more components from South Africa. Consequently, the share of the
industries export s to Europe increased.
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6.3.30.4 Results of regression for motor vehicles
The following regression was estimated. However since most of the industry qualified for
Phase VI assistance, the GElS variable is meaningless. Quarterly Phase VI data is not
available and therefore it was not possible to estimate a regression with Phase VI as a
variable. However, both spare capacity and the OECD's GDP are significant at 95 per cent
and 99 per ...cent levels respectively. The assistance levels provided to motor vehicle
manufacturers were higher than even Category 4 GElS payments. Even if it is assumed that
Phase VI contributed to the level of exports, it did not contribute to a sustainable level of
exports which could be maintained without GElS. The sector's spare capacity and South
Africa's trading partner's income levels are important components of the level of exports.
Strategies should therefore be devised to enhance the manufacturing capacity and create spare
capacity and an industry that will be able to compete internationally without other support
measures.
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LS 11 Dependent Variable isX90VEH
Sample: 1988:11994:2
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Exports in the motor vehicle industry would seem to depend on the amount of spare capacity
available and the demand of the DECD countries. Typically, South African manufacturers
would produce a wide range of varied components at relatively low volumes especially fairly
labour-intensive industries. Thus, while unable to compete with DECD manufacturers in the
manufacture of high volume components, South African manufacturers can compete in the
niche markets.
6.3.30.5 Factors hindering exports
Built up vehicles are highly protected as can be seen from Table 6-94 above. Prices of
vehicles are much higher than in other countries.
Economies of scale
South Africa manufactures a wide range of vehicles that cannot be sustained in such a small
market. The US manufactures almost 200 000 per model. Even Brazil manufactures 25 000
vehicles to model, while South Africa averages 6 000 vehicles per model. This raise costs in
the motor assembly plants and affects the component manufacturers.
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Low capacity utilisation
Figure 6-130 Spare capacity due to lack of demand. Many assemblers have spare capacity,
which if utilised would contribute a greater share to the firm's fixed costs and therefore lead
to greater profits and lower unit costs.
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Licensing agreements
"Virtually all South African component firms are dependent on foreign licensers and many of
these agreements regulate exports" (Black, 1994). Although there is not much that can be
done to remove this restriction, it does seem as though South Africa is being seen as the
natural supplier for African markets. And as competitive niches appear, foreign parents are
buying more for their own plants. Mercedes Benz have even begun to investigate having their
owner's manuals printed in South Africa.
Raw materials
South African manufacturers suffer from excessive protection. The prices below indicate the
extent to which South Africa suffers when using locally made raw material inputs. Black
(1994) estimated that the cost difference in the price of aluminium resulted in a 3,7 per cent
increase in the car's price.
Table 6-96 Comparative raw material prices. South Africa price compared to international price (R/ton)















Although manufacturers can use Rebates and Drawbacks and import raw materials for
exports, the administrative procedures and the fact that such a small proportion of exports are
destined for exports militate against this option.
There are various other production problems such as low productivity, quality etc. These
problems are not only present in South Africa and can be sorted out by management.
6.3.31 Transport equipment (SIC 385)
This sector consists of the building, repair and alteration of locomotives, coaches and other
railway coaches, wagons or cars and the manufacture of ships, barges, aeroplanes, gliders,
scooters, bicycles, as well as other transport equipment.
6.3.31.1 Structure of industry
Figure 6-131 Production oftransport equipment
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6.3.31.2 International comparison
SITC Product Importsfrom SACU trend World trend Market
SACU 1994 90-94 % p.a. 90-94 %p.a. share %
US$
CI% RCA
,4 29,3 4,4 0,1 23,8 0,20
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6.3.31.3 Development assistance
Source. IDC, 1992.
Table 6-97 Nominal levels ofprotection
Railroad equipment Other transport
Average nominal protection 5 20
Ad valorem (% of tariff headings) 74 74
Formula (% of tariff headings) 1 5
Import control (% of tariff headings) 29 11
Import surcharge (% of tariff headings) 99 79
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Compared with the South African manufacturing sector, railroad equipment received minimal
nominal protection, while the "other transport" subsector received the same as the South
African manufacturing sector. Consequently, the effective protection coefficient on domestic
sales is low. GElS effectively reduces the anti-export bias and in fact a pro-export bias is
created. However, a more efficient method of achieving this would be to allow manufacturers
to buy inputs at international prices.
Table 6-98 Protection and anti-export bias
Effective protection on exports
EPe Anti-ex iort bias
domestic with GElS without GElS with GElS without GElS
Sector sales (Iw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (lw) I (Id) (lw) I· (Id)
Other transport 1,02 2,20 I 2,05 1,00 I 0,85 0,47 I 0,50 0,47 I 1,21
Note: lw indicates that value was calculated assumtng that inputs are purchased at world prices. Id indicates that values added was
calculated at assuming that inputs are purchased at domestic pri ces.
Source: Belli (/993) and /DC (1990)
Table 6-99 Total Category A and Category B assistance: 1982 to 1985
Sector Cate; ory A
1982 T 1983 1984 I 1985
Transport equipment 6,47 I 7,65 6,75 I 4,90
Cateqory B
1982 I 1983 1984 I 1985
Transport equipment 1,54 I 1,09 1,03 I 1,40
Source. Board ofTrade and Industry, 1987.
Table 6-100 GElS and Phase VI export incentives paid in 1992
Railroad equipment Other transport
GElS exclusions %of tariff headinos 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0
Primary products %of tariff headinas 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0
Beneficiated %of tariff headinas 0 0
lorimarv product %ofexport value 0 0
Material intensive %of tariff headinqs 0 0
%ofexport value 0 0
Manufactured %of tariff headinas 100 100
%ofexport value 100 100
Phase VI %of tariff headinas 0 0
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6.3.31.5 Results of regression for the transport sector
In order to determine the effect GElS has had on the export of the transport sector, the
following export function was estimated:
LXMANTRANS =
with :
-88,771117· 0,17405937*LGEISXTRANS + 1,1733301*LCAPUTTRANS + .
O,13730208*LREERTRANS + 20,918604*LOECDGDP90 + [AR(1)=-0,010328708,AR(4)=-
0,653245111
LX90TRANS = The log of the real value oftransport equipment exports (Rmillion 1990=100)
LGEIS90 TRANS = The log of the real GElS payments (1990=100)
LREER TRANS = The log of the REER forthe transport sector
LUUDEM TRANS = The log of the percentage unutilised capacity of transport sector due to lack ofdemand
LOECDGDP90 = The log of the weighted index of the GDP index of the OECD countries
The regression results are set out below. Figure 6-133 below shows the actual and fitted real
export figures for the transport sector relative to the right hand scale, while the residual is
given on the left hand scale . The function gives a good representation of transport exports.
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LS 11 Dependent Variable isLXMANTRANS
Sample: 1989:11994:4











Sum squared resid 0,707818
Log likelihood 8,228949
Durbin-Watson stat 2,248124
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In this sector only the OEeD's GDP proved to be statistically significant at the 95 per cent
level. Of concern is the fact that GElS proved to be statistically significant at the 90 per cent
level - with a negative coefficient. One hundred per cent of this sector's exports qualify for
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As can seen from the above graph, the sector's exports started to grow in 1987, which implies
that the marketing effort started in the mid-1980s, before GElS was even a concept. Iscor
provided certain rebates to enable exports to buy raw materials at lower prices, although not
quite world prices. A large proportion of the content would be ferrous metal. Further, as can
be seen from Table 6-98 Protection and anti-export bias, the industry enjoys a pro-export bias
if inputs are available at world prices. Since the industry also was able to claim GElS as it
never made use of Customs and Excises rebates and drawbacks, the pro-export bias was
greater.
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7. Summary of findings and conclusion
7.1 Economic conditions
Economic and political conditions facing South Africa at the end of 1996 are considerably
different to those in 1988/89 when GElS was designed, or in 1990 when it was implemented.
Sanctions have now been removed, a democratic, internationally recognised government is in
power, and African and other markets have opened to South African exporters . Although
inflation is lower, it remains higher than that of its major trading partners and therefore the
South African Rand still has lost value. The REER is, however, conducive to further exports.
7.2 Summary of findings
Of the 23 relationships estimated, the R-squared was more than 0,70 for 13 and over 0,65 for
eight. The F-statistic in all cases rejects the hypothesis that the partial slope coefficients are
simultaneously equal to zero at the 95 per cent confidence level. The industries with low R-
squared are the iron and paper industries. Both these industries are dependent on international
trading conditions and therefore other factors such as international supply conditions would
influence the international demand for South African products. Additionally, the iron and
paper industries are capital intensive. Once the decision to invest has been made, production is "
of such a nature that firms are natural exporters and therefore long-term profit rather than
short-term considerations are important. Nevertheless, the results would suggest that for the
majority ofthe industrial activities GElS, REER, capacity utilisation or capacity due to lack of
demand, and the OEeD's GDP, when taken together, are important determinants of the level
of South African exports.
Tab le 7-1 Summary a/findings
Sector Lagged Capacity OECD's
depend GElS REER utilisation GDP
Variable
Food -0,862 522967 -22784103 21492
(-1,720) (0,239) (-4,296) (1 ,078)
Beverages -0,734 555662 -1465451 37780
(-0,4418) (0,8482) (1,0888) (5,3675)
Tobacco 0,7034 44,0202 60350 54108 -679,89
(4,9084) (1 ,864) (1 ,0676) (0,7716) (-0,852)
Textiles -0,2913 1872831 -3891188 -100915
(-0,1288) (1 ,1889) (-2,1799) (-7,8113)
Clothing 3,4504 307505 5597888 2958,9
Footwear
(1 ,3947) (0,3865) (2,6650) (0,7867)
2,8657 -138389 170258 5109,6
Woodproducts
(2,0325) (-1 ,698) 2,61 24 (2.6096)
-0.5469 -1266676 123426 10514,8
-05449 -3,0693 0,1413 1,7037
Furniture 0,0102 -0,0541 0,2394 0.6098
1,5568 -2,2042 3,0837 04972
Paperand paper products -0,0069 -0,0875 -0.1982 0,7016
Printin
-1 ,0904 -3,5590 -2,3559 0,5649
-0,0678 -0,0368 -0,0098 0,0006
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At the same time, the individual T-tests (conducted at both the 95 and 99 per cent levels) on
the GElS variable show that very few of the coefficients are statistically different from zero.
This indicates that, with the exception of the tobacco, footwear and electrical machinery
industries, GElS made no significant difference to the level of South African exports. There is
no common element in these industries. They use substantially different channels of
distribution and there are no common trends regarding the destination of the products. The
manufacturing techniques are different, the raw materials employed are not the same, and the
industries are not located in the same area of South Africa. Although hindsight is "20/20" and
it is easier to analyse the impact of GElS down the line, it is nevertheless clear that GElS did
not achieve greater exports. The effects of GElS were not evenly distributed, just as the
effects of import substitution affected different sectors in varying ways. The only industries in
which GElS appears to be significant are tobacco, footwear, and electric machinery. Leather
products , clothing, and furniture were significant at the 90 level. In the other sectors, the
volume of exports did not benefit from GElS . It either contributed to companies ' profits (see
paper) or perhaps saved the company from going bankrupt. However, overall , GElS had little
impact on the level of exports . In many cases, the level of capacity utilisation was so low, that
manufacturers were forced to export.
An interesting conclusion can be drawn from the capacity utilisation variable. The coefficient
is non-zero in eight sectors. Four of these are positive and four negative. Food, textiles , paper,
and metal products display a negative sign. It would be expected that the sign would be
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positive, i.e. when there is spare capacity the sector exports. In these cases, however, there is
spare capacity when the sector does not export. The paper and paper products industry has
matured to such an extent that it no longer simply exports as vent for surplus. Spare capacity
is in fact generated when international trading conditions deteriorate.
The REER is statistically significant in the wood, furniture, paper, leather, pottery, and non-
ferrous metal products industries. Since the REER can be considered a proxy for price, it can
be concluded that these industries are sensitive to movement in prices. This is certainly true in
the case of non-ferrous metal, where both the REER and the price of aluminium are
statistically significant. It would therefore appear as though most industries in South Africa
sell on criteria other than price. This is encouraging, as it seems as though other competitive
factors are playing a role and the South African manufacturers have responded accordingly.
Factors such as service, design, modification of the product, creative use of the various
channels of distribution and other niche marketing techniques have become more important
than price.
Consistently, the OECD's GDP has proved to be an important factor in determining the level
of South Africa's exports. This is not only the case with primary products, as one would
expect but also with manufactured products. The model determined that generally the
OECD's GDP was the most common factor influencing South African exports. Sixteen of the
sectors had statistically significant coefficients. However, one, the textile industry, had the
incorrect sign. This was discussed fully above. It would therefore appear that although certain
sectors are exporting more to African countries, the economic conditions in the DEeD remain
an important determinant of South Africa's export performance.
Although it is not possible to determine how many of the companies depended on GElS for
their survival without an in depth analysis of the exporters financial statements. Interviews
with individual exporters seem to indicate that they will battle and that many industries face
extinction with the phasing out of GElS. In the paper industry, GElS "comprised as much as
50 per cent of the profit rate of some companies in the industry ." (Bethlehem, 1994:83). With
the exception of trading houses, it is doubtful however whether any sector is totally dependent
on GElS for its survival. Regrettably, GElS was never designed to make companies create
sustainable export markets .
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7.3 Conclusion
It can be concluded, that South African exporters will not withdraw from foreign markets en
masse with the withdrawal of GElS. Nevertheless, the fact that exports rather than export
growth was rewarded would be fair criticism. Had the assistance been aimed at developing
new markets rather than rewarding exports (which in any event would have taken place and
was therefore short-sighted), new sustainable markets would have been developed.
One of the drawbacks of any government scheme involving "handouts" is that there IS
invariably rent seeking. Inevitably, firms allocate resources, either directly or through agents
such as organised business, to lobby for greater subsidies. In April 1995, the Department of
Trade and Industry announced certain requirements , such as research and development and
human resource development, which were designed to ensure the long-term competitiveness
of South African exports. A spokesperson for the PSEAC commented: "It was amazing that
the department could even contemplate such a scheme." In addition, went on to say: "The
department is demanding we pay yet another tax for the luxury of being exporters." (Business
Day, 27 April 1995). Kenny and Reekie (1996) stated recently that "Taxes, subsidies,
industrial policy, lavish welfare handouts - all blunt the incentives of those who would
otherwise seek out profitable trading opportunities" and "The developing countries of the
world are those in which profit-seeking dominates rent seeking." GElS did not benefit the
South African economy as a whole and companies that would have exported in any event
were assisted without becoming competitive profit-seeking firms.
Together with the rent seeking activities, GElS and other subsidies spurred corruption and
fraud. The Department of Trade and Industry has uncovered a number of fraudulent GElS
claims, but many still go undiscovered. Incentives "have effectively been milked by the kind
of sharp operators that thrive in the muddy waters of weak authoritarism and transition."
(Hirsch, 1993:154)
GElS was an expensive scheme. Regrettably, it took some time before the costs were
calculated and eventually fiscal pressure on government and WTO obligations resulted in
GElS benefits being reduced and eventually withdrawn.
7.4 Other instruments to promote trade and neutralise the anti-export bias
As Belli (1993) showed, reducing the anti-export bias by allowing firms to purchase inputs at
world prices would have had more impact than providing GElS. South African industry has
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always had access to mechanisms to import inputs at world prices using either section 470,02
or 521,00 of the Tariff Schedule. The procedures were complicated and results were never
certain. Industrialists therefore opted for GElS, which they could rely on. Although, in line
with WTO commitments, South Africa will reduce tariffs, which will result in a lower anti-
export bias, efforts should be made to further reduce it by improving the system of Customs
rebates and drawbacks and perhaps even introducing a "Free Trade Zone".
As multi-national companies (MNC) and other foreign investors tend to be more outward
looking and therefore have a higher propensity to export, regrettably the level of direct foreign
investment has remained low. Efforts should therefore be made to attract these companies to
South Africa. At present, there are many macro-economic impediments, such as high
corporate tax rates. However, should these be removed it will benefit both local and foreign
investors.
A suitable, stable exchange rate policy, where the anti-export bias is removed and the
effective exchange rate for exporters is equal to the REER for importers, will allow exporters
a chance to use their competitive or comparative advantages in order to penetrate foreign
markets.
South Africa's trade policy over the past 30 years has not been successful. The policy of
import substitution and protectionism resulted in an anti-export bias, which neither Categories
A and B nor GElS could successfully neutralise. Policy-making has not been well coordinated
with the Department of Trade and Industry moving at a tangent to the Board of Trade and
Industry. Decisions were made and reversed; enquiries were regularly held, which all
contributed to confusion and contributed to the lack of new investment. Although there were
extenuating circumstances in South Africa (such as apartheid and the resulting sanctions
campaign), exporters were hampered more by domestic policies than foreign policies. South
Africa's infants ofthe 1920s are still infants and will remain infants until firms are allowed to
compete with the playing fields level. GElS has not resulted in an industry that can compete
internationally without assistance.
Goodbye GElS
Source: Engineer ing News
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8. Appendix A: Revealed Comparative Advantages
Product Imports from SACU World Market Comp RCA No. Of 1st 2nd 3rd
SACU 1994 trend 90- trend 90- share et.% exporte
US$m 94%p.a. 94%p.a. %
Food And Agricultural 2398,6 3,0 3,9 0,7 -0,9 1,17 215 USA FRA NLD
Mineral And Fuels 5965,6 -3,2 -3,0 1,4 -0,2 1,56 192 SAU RUS CAN
Manufactures 5378,2 7,8 5,2 0,2 2,5 0,48 224 USA JPN DEU
00 Live Animals 12,3 42,8 -0,9 0,2 44,1 0,27 117 FRA CAN NLD
01 Meat, Meat Preparations 118,1 6,4 2,3 0,3 4,0 0,76 108 USA NLD DNK
02 Dairy Products,Bird Eggs 19,2 21 ,5 3,8 0,1 17,0 0,61 109 DEU FRA NLD
03 Fish,Crustaceans,Mollusc 368,4 23,0 4,9 0,8 17,2 1,72 190 THA USA NOR
04 Cereals,Cereal Preprtns. 363,9 -0,8 5,0 0,9 -5,5 2,72 120 USA FRA CAN
05 Vegetables And Fruit 1 091,5 1,2 1,9 1,8 -0,6 2,61 175 USA ESP NLD
06 Sugar,Sugr.Preptns,Honey 184,7 -15,7 1,1 1,5 -16,6 2,21 117 FRA AUS DEU
07 Coffee,Tea,Cocoa,Spices 30,0 0,0 4,8 0,1 -4,6 0,16 164 BRA COL DEU
08 Animal Feed Stuff 15,5 -31 ,9 4,8 0,1 -35,1 0,07 128 USA BRA ARG
09 Misc.Edible Products Etc 8,9 12,6 12,2 0,1 0,4 0,32 108 USA IRL FRA
11 Beverages 88,1 36,4 3,1 0,4 32,4 1,55 123 FRA GBR ITA
12 Tobacco, 50,5 5,8 5,5 0,3 0,3 0,80 113 USA NLD DEU
21 Hides, Skins, ,Raw 75,0 -4,3 -1 ,0 1,2 -3,3 9,85 139 USA FRA DEU
22 Oil Seed,Oleaginus Fruit 28,8 5,2 3,2 0,2 2,0 0,21 122 USA CAN BRA
23 Crude Rubber . 2,6 10,8 2,6 0,0 8,0 0,04 93 THA MYS IDN
24 Cork And Wood 207,5 26,8 6,2 0,5 19,4 0,69 136 CAN USA MYS
25 Pulp And Waste Paper 280,7 0,6 -3,4 1,6 4,1 2,95 106 CAN USA SWE
26 Textile Fibres 252,7 -13,6 0,1 1,1 -13,7 2,36 150 USA AUS DEU
27 Crude Fertilizer,Mineral 481,7 -1 ,6 -1 ,2 3,4 -0,4 7,43 135 USA DEU CAN
28 Metalliferous Ore,Scrap 1390,6 -1,0 -2,8 3,3 1,9 4,34 173 AUS USA BRA
29 Crude Animal,Veg.Materl. 57,9 2,3 0,5 0,4 1,8 1,23 164 NLD USA CHN
32 Coal, Coke, Briquettes 1681,4 -0,3 -2,2 8,5 1,9 91,4 65 AUS USA CAN
33 Petroleum,Petrol.Product 199,6 22,7 -4,1 0,1 28,0 0,07 140 SAU NOR ARE
34 Gas,Natural,Manufactured 5,4 13,9 -0,7 0,0 14,7 0,03 77 RUS CAN IDN
41 Animal Oils And Fats 0,2 -8,2 7,0 0,0 -14,2 0,04 66 USA DEU CAN
42 Fixed Veg. Fats And Oils 18,0 -6,4 9,2 0,1 -14,3 0,08 111 MYS IDN ARG
43 Animal,Veg.Fats,Oils,Nes 0,4 14,4 8,3 0,0 5,6 0,01 69 MYS DEU NLD
51 Organic Chemicals 212,2 20,3 4,4 0,2 15,2 0,63 142 USA DEU GBR
52 Inorganic Chemicals 359,9 -3,8 1,5 1,3 -5,2 4,10 126 USA DEU FRA
53 Dyes,Colouring Materials 58,4 16,3 5,0 0,2 10,7 1,17 106 DEU USA GBR
54 Medicinal,Pharm.Products 13,8 10,5 11 ,8 0,0 -1 ,1 0,24 116 DEU USA CHE
55 Essentl.Oils,Perfume,Etc 14,0 9,2 8,9 0,1 0,2 0,35 127 FRA USA DEU
56 Fertilizer,Except Grp272 39,4 17,1 -1 ,3 0,3 18,6 0,96 112 USA CAN RUS
57 PlasticsInPrimary Form 69,0 10,9 2,3 0,1 8,4 0,28 120 DEU USA NLD
58 Plastic,Non-Primary Form 13,0 14,2 3,7 0,0 10,1 0,21 101 DEU USA JPN
59 Chemical Materials Nes 66,6 12,0 4,4 0,2 7,3 0,97 125 USA DEU FRA
61 Leather, Leather Goods 159,5 13,2 4,2 1,1 8,7 1,07 129 ITA KOR TWN
62 Rubber Manufactures, Nes 30,1 27,4 5,3 0,1 21 ,0 0,24 105 JPN DEU USA
63 Cork, Wood Manufactures 57,2 6,6 7,7 0,2 -1 ,0 0,37 140 IDN CAN USA
64 Paper,Paperboard,Etc. 226,7 -0,8 1,0 0,3 -1 ,7 1,64 136 DEU CAN USA
65 TextileYarn,Fabric,Etc. 135,9 4,0 2,2 0,1 1,8 0,23 170 CHN TWN DEU
66 Non-Metal.Mineral Manfct 635,9 -5,5 2,4 0,8 -7,7 3,22 157 BEL GBR ITA
67 Iron And Steel 1720,1 7,9 2,3 1,5 5,5 2,83 145 JPN DEU FRA
68 Non-Ferrous Metals 2207,0 -8,0 -1 ,0 3,0 -7,1 5,89 137 RUS DEU CAN
69 Metals Manufactures,Nes 130,5 10,8 3,9 0,2 6,7 0,47 161 DEU USA JPN
71 Power Generatng. 73,8 14,1 6,3 0,1 7,3 0,23 154 USA JPN DEU
Machines
72 Special.lndust.Machinery 105,9 7,9 1,2 0,1 6,6 0,60 157 DEU JPN USA
73 Metalworking Machinery 13,7 -1 ,0 -2,4 0,0 1,4 0,38 99 JPN DEU USA
74 Generallndustl.Mach.Nes 179,3 25,0 4,1 0,1 20,1 0,49 170 DEU USA JPN
75 Office Machines,Adp Mach 38,1 14,2 9,3 0,0 4,5 0,06 136 USA JPN SGP
76 Telecomm.Sound Equip 28,0 34,5 8,6 0,0 23,8 0,02 169 JPN USA CHN
77 Elec Mch Appar,Parts,Nes 97,3 19,2 11 ,6 0,0 6,8 0,05 179 JPN USA DEU
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78 Road Vehicles 198,4 29,3 4,4 0,1 23,8 0,20 162 JPN DEU CAN
79 Othr.Transport Equipment 38,4 9,3 2,3 0,1 6,9 0,43 150 USA FRA DEU
81 Prefab Buildgs,Fttng Etc 5,7 5,1 5,6 0,0 -0,5 0,13 106 CHN DEU ITA
82 Furniture,Bedding,Etc. 233,3 31,3 3,9 0,7 26,3 1,40 125 ITA DEU USA
83 Travel Goods,Handbgs Etc 7,4 34,3 6,9 0,1 25,7 0,16 103 CHN ITA FRA
84 Clothing And Accessories 218,9 11 ,5 6,0 0,1 5,2 0,28 181 CHN ITA HKG
85 Footwear 16,7 52,7 5,3 0,0 45,0 0,07 116 CHN ITA IDN
87 Scientific Equipment Nes 33,2 20,5 5,2 0,1 14,6 0,23 155 USA DEU JPN
88 Photo.Apparat.Nes;Clocks 7,7 19,9 4,3 0,0 15,0 0,07 120 JPN CHE USA
89 Misc Manufctrd Goods 140,1 22,6 4,8 0,1 16,9 0,32 191 CHN USA DEU
91 Mail Not Classed By Kind 4,6 3,3 -22,1 0,8 32,7 5,85 82 FRA USA CHE
93 Spec.Transact.Not Classd 463,4 24,6 8,1 0,6 15,3 1,88 191 USA DEU CAN
96 Coin Nongold Noncurrent 3,9 95,1 -11 ,1 2,8 119,5 4,08 41 AUS GBR USA
97 Gold,Nonmontry Excl Ores 2835,4 2,1 1,5 13,4 0,6 77,6 110 CHE ZAF AUS
Source: Ire. / 996.
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9. Appendix B: Export Subsidies provided by Governments
from the US Government's National Trade Data Base: NTDB
Australia
Australia maintains several programmes intended to enhance Australian exports. These
include: Export market development grants (EMDG) scheme: This programme aims to
encourage Australian exporters to seek out and develop overseas markets for goods, services,
industrial property rights, and technology that is substantially of Australian origin. EMDG
grants are provided to reimburse Australian residents who have incurred eligible expenditures
while developing overseas markets for Australian products or services. Grant recipients are
reimbursed for up to 50 percent of their eligible expenditures above A$15,000, but no
recipient may receive more than A$200,000 in reimbursements in anyone grant year. In
addition, claimants with export earnings exceeding A$25 million, or who have received eight
previous grants, are not eligible.
Commodity boards: Several national and state commodity boards control the marketing and
export of Australian agricultural products. Activities for these marketing authorities are
financed in large part by the producers, but the boards often enjoy export monopoly status
conferred by the federal or state government.
While some of the boards' domestic activities have been deregulated, the export of wheat and
rice remains under the exclusive control of commodity boards. Currently, the Australian
wheat board strictly regulates wheat marketing abroad, but consideration is being givern to the
possibility of liberalizing this activity beginning in the latter half of 1996. The export of
barley from certain states likewise remains strictly regulated.
Dairy exports are made both by the private sector and an arm of the state's dairy corporation.
Australia terminated its export support payment scheme for dairy products on June 30, 1995,
but instituted a new internal support programme on July 1, 1995. The United States is closely
monitoring this new programme for compliance with Australia's Uruguay Round
commitments.
International trade enhancement scheme (ITES): Support available under the ITES
programme is primarily directed toward the establishment of foreign markets or the expansion
of sales for specified goods and services in specified markets. Under the scheme, participants
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may receive financial support up to a total of A$5 million , in the form of concessionalloans to
fund export promotion activities and market research or the direct provision of Australian
Trade Commission (AUSTRADE) services relating to product development, export
management, establishment of an overseas market presence, market research, and other
AUSTRADE-approved activities.
Automotive export facilitation scheme: Under the terms of an export facilitation scheme,
manufacturers of automotive vehicles and components receive subsidies based on the level of
exports of specified automotive products . The subsidies are in the form of duty rebate
"credits" which recipients can, in turn, use to offset their duty liability on imports of specified
automotive products . In general, the level of subsidies is determined based on the sales value
of the eligible exports, but the calculation is also done in a way which rewards domestic
value-added. The greater the value of any qualifying exported product , the greater the import
credit granted. Significantly, however, there is no requirement that the imported products be
consumed in the production of exported products, as there normally is in a duty drawback
system. Indeed, imports of finished vehicles for consumption on the Australian market are
fully eligible for duty rebates under this scheme.
The subsidy benefits are freely transferable and may be sold among participants in the
programme. Current information indicates that the scheme will remain in force until at least
December 31, 2000. Although benefits are progressively reduced each year between 1991 and
2000, the level of the duty rebate would still be significant in the year 2000, when Australia's
duty on imported vehicles and components will be at 15 percent.
Brazil
The Brazilian Government offers a variety of tax and tariff incentives to encourage export
production and the use of Brazilian inputs in exported products . Several of these programmes
have been found to be countervailable under US countervailing duty law in the context of
specific countervailing duty cases. Incentives include tax and tariff exemptions for equipment
and materials imported for the production of goods for export, excise and sales tax exemptions
on exported products, and excise tax rebates on materials used in the manufacture of exported
products. Exporters enjoy exemption from withholding tax for remittances overseas for loan
payments and marketing as well as from the financial operations tax for deposit receipts on
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export products. Exporters are also eligible for a rebate on social contribution taxes paid on
locally-acquired production inputs.
An export credit programme, known as PROEX, was established in 1991. PROEX is intended
to equalize domestic and international interest rates for export financing. Revisions to PROEX
were announced in late 1995. The revisions expanded the size of the programme and
authorized coverage of additional export sectors. The initial budget for PROEX in 1996 was
set at US$ 344 million. Since most large Brazilian exporters borrow abroad against future
receipts at international rates much lower than prevailing Brazilian rates, the expansion of the
programme is not expected to be of great significance.
China
The Chinese Government claims that direct financial subsidies for all exports, including for
agricultural goods, ended as of January 1, 1991. Nevertheless, Beijing still uses a mixture of
subsidies to promote exports, including low-priced energy, and raw materials. State
enterprises and state trading companies, many of which are significant if not exclusive
exporters, have received bank loans on preferential terms or have not been penalized for late
payments or outright failure to repay loans.
State trading companies cross-subsidize certain exports.in order to generate foreign exchange.
Prices in the Chinese domestic market for some ofthese products are so high, however, that
Chinese enterprises lose their incentive to export. To encourage exports, state trading
companies subsidize the difference between the low world price and the higher domestic
price. While the enterprises do not receive any additional profits per product sold, the practice
does encourage them to export. This artificial incentive to export disrupts normal trade flows.
Local content and export performance requirements (or expectations) also are frequently
features of China's industrial policies. Such policies constitute subsidies to the extent that, as
part of the industrial policy package, receipt of financial and other benefits is tied to a
performance requirement.
Other export incentives that may be regarded as subsidies include tax incentives for exporters,
with additional preferences for firms operating in China's special economic zones and coastal
cities. In 1995, China announced reductions in the rate of rebates paid on value-added tax on
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goods that are exported, and further reductions are to take place in 1996. Preferential policies
available to firms in the special economic zones and coastal cities may be revised in 1996.
China continues to provide financial subsidies for development programmes for products that
are eventually exported. Soda ash has been one example.
Columbia
As a result of "apertura" and commitments made by the GOC to the US Government in the
context of acceding to the GATT Subsidies Code, Colombia agreed to phase out any export
subsidies inconsistent with the previous Subsidies Code. This process will continue under the
new WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Colombia's Tax Rebate
Certificate Programme (CERT) contains a subsidy component; the GOC has committed to
eliminating the subsidy and creating an equitable drawback system, but has not yet done so.
The GOC also has notified the WTO of its "Special Machinery Import-Export System" and
"Free Zones" as constituting export subsidies.
The GOC still provides export subsidies to flower exports to third countries. The negative
impact of these subsidies on US flower exports to the same markets is estimated at below $10
million.
Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic does not have aggressive export-promotion schemes other than the
exemptions given to firms in the free trade zones. A tax rebate scheme designed to encourage
exports is considered a failure and is usually avoided by exporters. The government agency
charged with export promotion (CEDOPEX) is considered ineffective by most business
people.
El Salvador
El Salvador offers a six percent rebate to exporters of non-traditional goods based on the f.o.b.
value of the export , but exporters have found it very difficult to collect. Free zone operations
are not eligible for the rebate but enjoy a ten-year exemption from income tax as well as
duty-free import privileges.
EU Agricultural Product Subsidies
The EU grants export subsidies (restitutions) on a wide range of agricultural products
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including wheat, wheat flour, beef, dairy products, poultry, and certain fruits, as well as some
manufactured products such as pasta. Payments are nominally based upon the difference
between the EU price and the world price, usually calculated as the difference between the EU
internal price and the lowest offered price by competing exporters.
The Uruguay Round agreement will require the EU to reduce export subsidies over six years
by 21 percent in volume and 36 percent in value from a 1986-90 base period. Under the
agreement, the EU will have cut export subsidies by about $5-7 billion from recent levels.
Canned Fruit
The US cling peach industry complained in late 1994 that the European Union had failed to
observe and enforce a commitment made in the 1985 US-EU Canned Fruit Agreement (CFA)
to not subsidize EU processing operations for peaches in syrup. The US industry claimed
implementation of the EU's minimum grower price and fruit withdrawal programmes was
undermining the no-processing subsidies commitment made by the EU in the CFA, and that
the sale of subsidized Greek canned peaches in the US and a number of foreign markets,
including Japan, Mexico, and Canada, was harming the US industry. The United States is now
working to address industry concerns.
Gulf
Saudi Arabia has recently reduced wheat production subsidies. The Grain Silos and Flour
Mills Organization
(GSFMO) controls wheat production by assigning production quotas to each of the country's
grain farmers. Farmers can only receive government support prices within preassigned quotas.
GSFMO production quotas for the current year were reduced to 1.3 million metric tons,
compared to two million metric tons in 1995. The reduction in quotas coincides with a June
1995 decision by the Saudi Government to reduce production support prices for wheat from
$533/Mt to $400/Mt, still double world prices.
The Oman Development Bank offers interest subsidies for the relatively few non-petroleum
sector exporters obtaining commercial bank letters of credit and offers some lower than
market "insurance" against delay in payment of receivables.
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Hungary
Hungary maintained agricultural export subsidies in excess of its WTO commitments during
1995 and is budgeted to exceed its commitments again in 1996. Hungary has sought
agreement to have its WTO commitments modified. Most recently, Hungary proposed a
revised schedule which would substantially increase its ability to subsidize exports above
current expenditure levels. G-8 countries (New Zealand, Australia, Argentina, Japan,
European Union, Canada, Thailand and the United States), as well as Uruguay, have been
conducting informal consultations on the Hungarian export subsidies issue under the
sponsorship of the Chairman of the WTO Committee on Agriculture since the fall of 1995.
Despite encouragement from its trading partners to adjust policies, Hungary has insisted on
modifying its obligations. Extensive bilateral and multilateral consultations have failed to
resolve the problem.
India
Export earnings are exempt from income and trade taxes, and exporters may enjoy a variety of
tariff incentives and promotional import licensing schemes, some of which carry export
quotas. Export promotion measures include duty exemptions or concessional tariffs on raw
material and capital inputs, and access to special import licenses for restricted inputs.
Commercial banks also provide export financing on concessional items.
Kenya
In 1992, the Government enacted a dutyN AT remission facility which allows exporters to
purchase imported inputs tax-free. There is no general system of preferential financing, but
sectoral government development agencies in areas such as tourism and tea are supposed to
provide funds at below market rates to promote investment and exports by Kenyans.
Since late 1995, the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) has sold 403,000 metric
tons of subsidized corn to Southern Africa. The combined production and export subsidy
amounts to approximately $75 per ton.
Nigeria
In 1976, the Government established the Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) to
encourage development of non-oil exports from Nigeria. The Council administers various
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incentive programmes including a duty drawback programme, the Export Development Fund,
tax relief and capital assets depreciation allowances, and a foreign currency retention
programme. The duty drawback or manufacturing in-bond programme is designed to allow
the duty free importation of raw materials to produce goods for export, contingent on the
issuance of a bank guaranteed bond. The performance bond is discharged upon evidence of
exportation and repatriation of foreign exchange. Though meant to promote industry and
exportation, these schemes have been burdened by inefficient administration, confusion, and
corruption, causing great difficulty and in some cases losses to those manufacturers and
exporters who opted to use them.
The NEPC also administers the Export Expansion Programme, a fund which provides grants
to exporters of manufactured and semi- manufactured products. Grants are awarded on the
basis of the value of goods exported, and the only requirement for participation is that the
export proceeds be repatriated to Nigeria. Though the grant amounts are small, ranging from
two to five percent of total export value, they appear to be export subsidies as designated by
the WTO and may be in violation of WTO rules.
NIS
In January 1996 the Government of Belarus announced a senes of export stimulation
measures. Under the new government plan, exporters will reportedly pay ten percent less tax
when they operate a barter regime between enterprises. A Presidential decree sets different
exchange rates for local exporters purchasing raw materials abroad and for importers of
"non-essential" goods. In accordance with the law on foreign investment, firms with at least
30 percent foreign participation are exempted from the requirement. The revenue from the
higher exchange rate will go into a special fund to support exporters.
Pakistan
Pakistan actively promotes the export of Pakistani goods with measures such as government
financing and other tariff concessions on imported inputs, and income and sales tax
concessions. Pakistan has established one export processing zone (EPZ) in Karachi and the
addition of more zones is under consideration. EPZ benefits include tax holidays, indefinite
carry forward of losses, exemption of imports from taxes and duties, and exemption from
labor laws and various other regulatory regimes.
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While Pakistan has not reported any export subsidies to the World Trade Organization, the
Government-run Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan continues to sell rice to selected
exporters for well below market prices.
Peru
Peru does not provide any direct payment upon export. Exporters can receive rebates of the
tariffs and value-added taxes paid on their inputs. In June 1995 the Government approved a
simplified drawback scheme which allows small exporters to claim a flat 5 percent rebate,
subject to certain restrictions. Other policy measures to encourage exports are under
discussion.
Phillipines
Phillipines Enterprises (including exporters) engaged in government-preferred activities may
register with the Board of Investment (BOI) to qualify for incentives under the Philippine
Omnibus Investment code. The incentives include income tax holidays, preferential duties for
imported capital equipment, tax credits for domestically purchased machinery, and income tax
deductions for incremental labor expense. A number of benefits apply specifically to
BOI-registered export companies (such as tax credits for imports of raw material and
exemption from taxes and duties on imported spare parts). Export firms in
government-designated zones and industrial estates registered with the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA) enjoy basically the same incentives as BOI-registered companies.
Firms that export at least 50 percent of production may also register for incentives under the
Export Development Act of 1994 (EDA). Firms registered with the BOI, PEZA or other
government agencies which meet the 50 percent minimum export requirement may register
under the EDA to avail themselves of any additional incentives under that law. Incentives
under the EDA include: duty-free imports of capital equipment (up to 1997); for exporters of
nontraditional products, partial tax credit for locally purchased raw materials, equipment and
spare parts (up to 1997); tax credit for imported inputs and raw materials not readily available
locally (up to 1999); and tax credit on incremental annual export revenue. The EDA also
provides for the establishment of an Eximbank which will offer preferential and simplified
credit schemes to exporters.
In December 1994, the Bangko Sentrallaunched an Export Development Fund (EDF) facility
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(the forex counterpart of its peso rediscounting window).The EDF rates are based on the
London Interbank Bid Rate (LIBID) and adjusted periodically. The Bangko Sentral imposes a
ceiling on the spread at which financial institutions can re-lend the funds (currently one
percent, after applicable taxes).
Poland
With its accession to the WTO, Poland has ratified the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement.
Poland also plans to join the GEeD code on shipbuilding but has requested a derogation
allowing transitional restructuring. The package would not involve direct export subsidies due
to budget constraints but may include indirect support to struggling shipyards in the form of
deferred tax payments and utilities payments at concessionary rates.
Poland has eliminated past practices of tax incentives for exporters, but it still offers, on a
negotiated basis, some tax holidays to foreign investors who plan to export. Poland also
provides for drawback levies on raw material imports which are processed and reexported in
finished products within 30 days. A new law restructuring the sugar refining industry
essentially creates export subsidies for sugar financed out of high domestic prices.
Russia The Government has announced plans to introduce a system of support for exports in
1996. Discussion to date indicates that it will have very limited budgetary funding and be
aimed at stimulating exports of manufactured goods. Russia has no explicit export subsidies
on agricultural products, although from time to time subsidies for specific commodities may
have the effect of spurring temporary increases in exports of those commodities.
Singapore
Singapore offers tax incentives to exporters and reimburses firms for certain costs incurred in
trade promotion. The Government also offers significant incentives to attract foreign
investment, almost all of which is in export-oriented industries.
SA
The primary subsidy regime of the South African Government is the General Export Incentive
Scheme (GElS) through which South African exporting companies receive direct,
non-discriminatory cash subsidies based on the value of exports, the degree of beneficiation or
processing, and the local content of the exported product. The GElS was recently downsized
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in early 1995 and is expected to be eliminated by the South African Government at the end of
1997. Under this most recent revision, subsidies for fully manufactured products were
lowered from 25 percent to 14 percent of export value on April 1, 1995; to 12 percent on April
1, 1996; and to 10 percent on April 1, 1997. Subsidies for partially manufactured products
dropped from 12.5 percent to three percent on April 1, 1995; to two percent on April 1, 1996;
and eliminated on April 1, 1997. Subsidies on raw materials and beneficiated raw materials
were eliminated on April 1, 1955. In addition, categorization of the various goods eligible for
GElS subsidies were re-defined such that many goods previously defined as "partially
manufactured" were downgraded to "beneficiated," and so lost eligibility for subsidies.
Another export incentive of the South African government is the Export Marketing Assistance
Scheme (EMA) which offers financial assistance for the development of new export markets
through financing for trade missions and market research. Other subsidies include electricity
and transport rebates for business located in designated development corridors. Provisions of
the Income Tax Act also permit accelerated write-offs of certain building and machinery
associated with beneficiation processes carried on for export and deductions for the use of an
export agent outside South Africa.
Thailand
Thailand maintains several programmes that subsidize exports, including preferential
financing for exporters. Thailand's export-import bank, established in September 1993, IS
responsible for some of these programmes, particularly the packing credit programme.
Turkey
Turkey has used several export subsidy programmes. Producer-exporters may deduct eight
percent of industrial export revenue in excess of $250,000 from their corporate taxable
income. Non-producer industrial goods exporters are entitled to a four percent deduction.
Turkish exporters can also benefit from tariff and surcharge exemptions on imported inputs,
surcharge exemptions on export financing transactions and export credit schemes provided by
the export-import bank.
Venezuela Venezuela has reduced the number of export subsidies it provides, but retains a
duty drawback system established in June 1994. Exporters of selected agricultural products
receive an export bonus in the form of a credit against the exporters' tax liability.
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